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ABSTRACT 
 
THE ROAD TO NON-ACTION: 
THE OTTOMANS BETWEEN THE BRITISH EMPIRE AND THE MAHDIYYA  
IN THE SUDAN 
 
Merve Uçar Nurcan 
History, M.A. Thesis, 2015 
Y. Hakan Erdem, Thesis Supervisor  
 
Key words: Abdülhamid II, Mahdiyya, the Britain, Ottoman Orientalism and 
Colonialism 
 
The aim of the thesis is two-fold. The first one is to draw a comprehensive 
picture of the Mahdi revolt from an Ottoman point of view and the second one is to 
analyze the Ottoman perception of its distant periphery in the light of Ottoman 
colonialism/ orientalism debates. Although there are numerous studies regarding the 
British and Egyptian policy on the Sudan, the Ottoman perception of the Sudanese 
Mahdi had been largely ignored and studies remained limited in the literature. For this 
reason, this study also tries to fill the gap and add a contribution to the Ottoman-African 
relations from an Ottoman point of view.  
There are three decisive features of Abdülhamid’s policy of Sudanese Mahdi revolt: 
prevent spreading of revolution, non- intervention and legalism. The reasons of 
Abdülhamid’s indecisive attitudes could be explained in three certain points. First, 
military and economic resources of the empire were inadequate to afford a campaign for 
such a distant place. Second, minor local conflicts could become an excuse for 
imperialist powers to intervene in the regions. Last, spreading of any clash to the Hejaz 
area could give irreparable damage to the prestige of the Sultan. For these reasons, 
Abdülhamid II did not show a hostile attitude towards the local Muslim rulers or 
mutineers despite serious pressures and threats come from European powers. 
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ÖZET 
EYLEMSİZLİĞE DOĞRU:  
SUDANDA İNGİLİZ İMPARATORLUĞU VE MEHDİ ARASINDA OSMANLILAR 
 
Merve Uçar Nurcan 
Tarih, Yüksek Lisans Tezi, 2015 
 
Tez Danışmanı: Y. Hakan Erdem 
 
 
Anahtar kelimeler: II. Abdülhamid, Mehdi, İngiltere, Osmanlı kolonyalizmi ve 
oryantalizmi 
 
 
 Bu tezin iki amacı vardır. Birincisi Sudandaki Mehdi ayaklanmasının 
Osmanlıların bakış açısından kapsamlı bir resmini çizmek ve ikincisi de Osmanlı 
kolonyalizmi/oryantalizmi tartışmaları ışığında Osmanlıların kendi uzak taşrasını nasıl 
gördüğünün bir analizi yapmaktır. Sudandaki İngiliz ve Mısır politikası hakkında çok 
sayıda çalışma olsa da, Sudanlı Mehdi’nin Osmanlı devleti tarafından nasıl algılandığı 
literatürde ihmal edilmiş ve bu konudaki çalışmalar sınırlı sayıda kalmıştır. Bu nedenle, 
bu çalışma alandaki boşluğu doldurmayı ve Osmanlı- Afrika ilişkilerine Osmanlıların 
bakış açısından bir katkı sunmayı amaçlamaktadır.  
 II. Abdülhamid’in Sudandaki Mehdi ayaklanmasına karşı üç tane belirgin 
politikası bulunmaktadır: ihtilalin yayılmasını önlemek, müdahale etmemek ve bölge 
üzerindeki hukuki haklarını savunmak. Abdülhamid’in bu politikası üç nedenle 
açıklanabilir. Birincisi, bu uzak bölgeye harekat düzenlemek için imparatorluğun yeterli 
askeri ve ekonomik kaynağı yoktu. İkincisi, küçük yerel çatışmalar emperyalist güçlerin 
bölgeye müdahale etmesi için bahaneye dönüşebilirdi. Son olarak, çatışmaların Hicaz 
bölgesine sıçraması sultanın prestijine onarılmaz zarar verebilirdi. Bu sebeple, II. 
Abdülhamid yerel Müslüman yöneticilere ya da isyankarlara karşı Avrupalı 
devletlerden gelen baskı tehditlere rağmen açıktan düşmanca bir tutum göstermemiştir. 
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION 	  	  
1.1: Introduction  	  
 The Sudanese Mahdi revolt was a watershed in the history of modern Sudan. It is 
also an important case study to shed light on the Ottoman foreign policy towards the 
Saharan Africa and offers some insight on a radical Islamist movement in the nineteenth 
century. It is also a fertile case to develop a perspective on the Ottoman colonialism and 
orientalism debates in historiography.  The first political presence of the Ottoman 
Empire with the African continent has occurred in sixteenth century. The conquest of 
Egypt started the Ottoman dominance in North Africa and in the following four hundred 
years the Ottoman sphere of suzerainty continued to spread into the inside of the 
continent. Sudan had been conquered by Egypt in the first decades of the nineteenth 
century and remained under the rule of the Egyptian government for sixty years. Then 
the Mahdi revolt has broken out in 1881 against the Egyptian administration and British 
colonialism. Even after the death of Muhammad Ahmed, the mission had continued and 
spread to neighboring communities until 1898, the date of the reconquest of the Sudan 
by the British forces.  
There are numerous studies regarding the British and Egyptian policy on the Sudan 
whereas Ottoman perception of the Sudanese Mahdi had been largely ignored and 
studies remained limited in the literature. For this reason, this study tries to fill the gap 
and add a contribution to the Ottoman-African relations from an Ottoman point of view. 
Ottoman response towards the Sudanese Mahdi offers an insight to understand Ottoman 
approach to the rapid European imperialism in the late nineteenth century.  
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1.2: Literature Review  	  
It was in 1821 that Sudan had been conquered by the troops of Muhammad Ali 
Pasha and thereby the boundary of Ottoman Empire has been extended to the interiors 
of Africa. The truth of the matter is that the Ottoman Empire had never established 
direct centralized rule on the Sudan but strategic position of the country in terms of 
being Egyptian hinterland and being intersection point of Indian-Africa trade makes it 
important in the eyes of the Ottoman Empire. Besides, there has been a considerable 
Muslim population in the region that Ottoman Empire had to take care of them because 
of the caliphate. When the Mahdi revolt has broken out in 1881, the Sudan fell into 
eighteen years instability. It was this multi-dimensional incident affected the future of 
three countries: Ottoman Empire, Egypt and Britain. As a result of this mutiny, Egypt 
has gradually lost its sovereignty on Sudan and at the end; Sudan de facto became a 
colony of Britain separated from Egypt. In 1882, British troops “temporarily” occupied 
Ottoman Egypt in the wake of Urabi revolt but then with the spreading of the Mahdi 
rebellion British occupation remained permanent in Egypt. Because; they perceived the 
Mahdi riot as a threat to Egypt’s security. In addition to this, Britain has lost one of its 
prominent commanders Charles Gordon whose head was cut by the Mahdist dervishes 
in the war. This incident has caused an immense indignation in the British public and 
the British government has decided to take revenge for Gordon. On the other hand, it 
costed too much to the Ottoman Empire. First, even though the Ottoman Empire did not 
take it seriously, it was a challenge to the legitimacy of the sole caliphate. Secondly, this 
revolt was utilized by Britain as a pretext of permanency of Egyptian intervention and at 
the end the Ottoman Empire had to give up all legal rights on Sudan. Egypt remained 
under the occupation of Britain.  
In between the period of outbreak of Mahdi revolt 1881 and the end of Turkey’s 
judicial rights on Sudan in 1923 is crucial in the history of Sudan and also Ottoman 
Empire-Egypt- British trio. Therefore, the literature about the Sudanese Mahdi 
movement developed in these countries and recently the case had been studied from the 
perspective of Ottoman Empire. This thesis is also aiming to approach the Mahdi revolt 
from the view of the Ottoman Empire. The sources about the Mahdiyya could be 
classified into three categories. First, European and Ottoman traveller accounts which 
composed of the personal narratives of civil and official travellers in Sudan; second, the 
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memoirs of officials like sir Henry Drummond Wolff and Earl of Cromer who served 
for British government in Egypt and the memoirs of Ahmed Muhtar Pasha, Ottoman 
high commissioner of Egypt; and last, the theses and books issued in the period or 
region would be reviewed in order to make a comprehensive analysis of Mahdi revolt. 
The Arabic literature which includes the Mahdi’s personal letters and speech 
unfortunately is outside of this study because of the language shortcomings of this 
author.  
In the first group, there are many traveller accounts written by Europeans during 
the Mahdiyya period. Rudolf von Slatin’s Fire and Sword in the Sudan: A Personal 
Narrative of Fighting and Serving the Dervishes, 1879-1895 1 , Father Joseph 
Ohrwalder’s Ten Years Captivity in the Mahdi’s Camp: 1882-1892 2  and Charles 
Neufeld’s A Prisoner of the Khaleefa: Twelve Years Captivity at Omdurman3. These 
three books are the narrative of personal experiences of European travellers or officials 
who had come across with Mahdi. As active participators in the historic events, their 
testimonies are valuable to broadly understand the Mahdist movement. There could be 
found a wide range of knowledge in these personal notes on the organization of 
dervishes, perception of Egyptian and British rulers of the characteristics of Mahdi. 
Although the authors have been prisoners of war and their circumstances have been far 
away making objective observations, the importance of their pure descriptions and 
observations have been still useful for the researchers. Charles R. Watson’s The Sorrow 
and Hope in the Egyptian Sudan: A Survey of Missionary Conditions and Methods of 
Work in the Egyptian Sudan4 should also be taken into consideration.  What makes this 
book interesting that it describes the Sudan from the standpoint of missions. This book 
undertakes the story of what has been accomplished in terms of missionary activities 
and what could be done to ameliorate the current conditions. It was written in order to 
be a permanent missionary handbook thereby it encapsulates large spectrum of 
knowledge about the Sudan’s history, people and geography. Existing missionary work 
and its methods and problems has added this account special prominence. This book has 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1R. Slatin Pasha, Fire and Sword in the Sudan: A Personal Narrative of Fighting and Serving the Dervishes, 1879-
1895, trans. F. R. Wingate, (London: Edward Arnold, 1935). 
2 Father Joseph Ohrwalder, Ten Years Captivity in the Mahdi’s Camp: 1882-1892, by Major F. R. Wingate, (London: 
Sampson Low, Marston & Company, 1893). 
3 Charles Neufeld, A Prisoner of the Khaleefa: Twelve Years Captivity at Omdurman, (London: Chapman & Hall, 
1899). 
4Charles R. Watson, The Sorrow and Hope in the Egyptian Sudan: A Survey of Missionary Conditions and Methods 
of Work in the Egyptian Sudan, (Philadelphia, Pa.: The Board of Foreign Missions of the United Presbyterian Church 
of North America, 1913).	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been used by the students of United Presbyterian Church of North America for special 
missionary studies. It showed that the country of black have been pursued and worked 
in depth for a long time. James Dermesteter’s The Mahdi: Past and Present5 is also 
relatively earl research on Mahdi. This book deserves to be examined in detail because 
it was written to guide Britain’s Egyptian policy. According to author, history repeats 
itself so closely among Muslims and to recount the past and present story of Mahdi 
would be important for possible Mahdi movements in Muslim world in future. Indeed, 
this book gives signs of the long-term policies of Britain in the Muslim lands and this 
academic study provides a basis for the future attempts of Britain in Muslim countries. 
Formation of the idea of Mahdi in the early period of Islam, Mahdi in Persia, Africa, 
Turkey, Egypt and Sudan are the main parts of the book. Sudanese Mahdi, Mohammed 
Ahmed has been profoundly scrutinized and the mistakes of British government during 
the fight with dervishes have been put forth not to reiterate same mistakes.  
On the other hand, Haim Shaked’s The Life of the Sudanese Mahdi is based on 
the translated and annotated version of the Sira- biographical chronicle of the life and 
the campaigns of the Muhammad Ahmad was written by one of the Mahdi’s followers 
Ismail bin Abd al- Qadir. The importance of the source was the reflection of the 
Sudanese view on both Turkiyya and Mahdiyya periods in Sudan. It was an original 
account in terms of four characteristics: Firstly it is the only one manuscript copy which 
is available. Secondly, it is the only contemporaneous biography of the Mahdi and 
chronicle of his uprising. Thirdly, it is the only known study written by a 19th century 
Sudanese Muslim who was one of the Mahdi’s close adherents who collects the 
historical data and records it for next generations. Fourthly, Ismail’s work has a unique 
position as an intermediate link between the more primary Mahdist documentation and 
Shuqayr’s Tarikh al-Sudan published right after the Anglo-Egyptian conquest of the 
Sudan and first serious study based on primary sources by a non-Mahdist.6 
Proffesor Mekki Shibeika is the first modern Sudanese historian who worked on 
the British and Sudanese archival sources and made use of personal letters and memoirs 
of the Mahdi family in order to illustrate Mahdiyya period of the Sudan. His great work 
British Policy in Sudan 1882-19027 covers the twenty years period of Mahdiyya and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 James Dermesteter, The Mahdi: Past and Present, (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1885). 
6 Haim Shaked, The Life of the Sudanese Mahdi, (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1978). 
7 Mekki Shibeika, British Policy in the Sudan: 1882- 1902. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1952) 
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British reconquest of Sudan. The mission of Charles Gordon has been taken seriously. 
The other most important researcher on the history of Sudan is Peter Holt who wrote 
The Mahdist State in the Sudan: 1881-18988 and A Modern History of the Sudan.9 Holt 
seeks for the reasons and historical background of the Mahdi rebellion and the process 
of state formation with its impact on the future. The Mahdiya: A History of the Anglo-
Egyptian Sudan10 by A.B. Theobald is another significant research about the Mahdi 
movement. Rather than concentrating on the Mahdi period, Theobald elucidates the 
period of caliph Abdullah’s reign and military incidents. However, this book approaches 
the Sudan history in terms of politics and military instead of religious background of 
Mahdi movement. Moreover, Historical Dictionary of the Sudan11 written by Carolyn 
Fluehr-Lobban, Richard Lobban and John Obert Voll is a comprehensive reference and 
research book for students and generalist researchers. It includes chronology and 
analysis of significant events which facilitate the study on Sudan history. Recently, 
likewise a source book dealing with Turkish literature about the Sudan was prepared by 
Turkish scholars, as well.12  
Although the Sudan was by Ottoman, de jure, a province of the Ottoman Empire 
and there exists bunches of official documents in the Ottoman archives, studies on 
relations between Sudan and Ottoman Empire are very few. Veysel Akdoğan’s master 
thesis, Sudan Mehdisi’nin İsyanına Dair Bazı Osmanlı Vesikaları: 1881-188513, is one 
of the works that uses some archival documents. It chronologically covers the short 
period of time from Mehdi’s declaration to his death with a special reference to Gordon 
Pasha’s incumbency. Alperen Çelik’s Sünni Dünyada Belli Başlı Mehdilik Hareketleri14 
study also touches briefly on the Sudanese Mahdi by giving place to his life and ideas. 
Furthermore, Ömer Koçyiğit’s recent study From Sufi Movement to Statehood: The 
Mahdi Uprising in the Ottoman Sudan 1881-188515 is an important contribution to the 
Mahdi literature. He focuses on the four-year rebellion period from 1881 to 1885 and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Peter M. Holt, The Mahdist State in the Sudan: 1881-1898, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, Second Edition, 1970). 
9 Peter M. Holt, A Modern History of the Sudan: From the Funj Sultanate to the Present Day, (London: Weidenfeld 
and Nicolson, 1961). 
10 A. B. Theobald, The Mahdiya: A History of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, 1881-1899, (London: Longmans, 1952). 
11 Carolyn Fluehr-Lobban, Richard A. Lobban and John Obert Voll, Historical Dictionary of the Sudan, (Metuchen: 
The Scarecrow Press, Fourth Edition, 2013). 
12 Ahmet Kavas, Muhammed Tandoğan and M. Birol Ülker, Osmanlı’dan Günümüze Afrika Bibliyografyası, ed. 
Zekeriya Kurşun, (İstanbul: Taş Mektep Yayıncılık, 2013), pp. 341-346. 
13 Veysel Akdoğan, Sudan Mehdisi’nin İsyanına Dair Bazı Osmanlı Vesikaları (1881-1885), (Unpublished master’s 
thesis, Marmara University, 1993).	  
14 Alperen Çelik, Sünni Dünyada Belli Başlı Mehdilik Hareketleri (Unpublished Master thesis, Marmara University, 
2005). 
15 Ömer Koçyiğit, From Sufi Movement to Statehood: The Mahdi Uprising in the Ottoman Sudan 1881-1885, 
(Unpublished master’s thesis, Boğaziçi University, 2014). 
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the echoes of the Mahdi uprising in the Ottoman Empire.  On the other hand, Tarig M. 
Nour’s Sevakin’de Türk-İngiliz Rekabeti16 stress on how Ottoman Empire lost his 
judicial rights on Sudan. Also, he claims that the Sudanese Mahdi revolted against the 
corrupt Egyptian administration rather than Ottoman Empire and he refers to the 
influence of Britain in the uprising.  Ismail H. Göksoy’s The Establishment of Anglo-
Egyptian Rule in the Sudan 1897-191417 mentions about the British state formation in 
Sudan in all its parts. Political, social and economic policies towards changing the 
structure of the Sudanese state have been elaborately examined throughout the study. 
He also analyses the importance of Nile valley and conflicts amid Britain, France and 
Italy for the region. Moreover, Mustafa Minawi’s PhD thesis Lines in the Sand: The 
Ottoman Empire’s Policies of Expansion and Consolidation on its African and Arabian 
Frontiers (1882-1902)18 explores the Ottoman Empire’s policies along its southern 
frontiers, between 1882 and 1902. But he touches upon the Mahdist state very briefly.  
The memoirs of Evelyn Baring also known as the Earl of Cromer is a substantial 
source for people who are interested in Egypt’s history. His two volumes book Modern 
Egypt19 published in 1908 and covers the Baring’s experiences during his service 1883-
1907 in Egypt as consul-general. Occupation of Egypt, withdrawal from the Sudan, the 
choice of Gordon to carry out the task and leaving him to death are the some of the 
crucial issues have been undertaken throughout the books. Additionally, the memoirs of 
Sir Henry Drummond Wolff20 who was sent on a special mission to Constantinople to 
negotiate Britain’s position in Egypt during the time period of 1885-1887 is a 
momentous volume. As a result of the negotiations, high commissioners from both sides 
were dispatched to Egypt in order to reorganize the army and to reform the general 
administration. In 1887, the Anglo-Ottoman Convention was signed with the promise of 
Britain to evacuate Egypt at the end of three years. As the chief witnesses of this fervent 
negotiation process, Wolff’s memoir is crucial to grasp the political atmosphere and 
social conditions of the period. On the other hand, Rıfat Uçarol’s Bir Osmanlı Paşası ve 
Dönemi21 narrates Ahmed Muhtar Pasha’s political and military life. He served as 
Ottoman high commissioner in Egypt during 1885-1908. He carried out the negotiations 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Tarig Mohamed Nour, Sevakin’de Türk-İngiliz Rekabeti, (Unpublished PhD thesis, Istanbul University, 2006). 
17 Ismail H. Göksoy, The Establishment of Anglo-Egyptian Rule in the Sudan 1897-1914, (Unpublished Master thesis, 
Universtiy of Manchester, 1986) 
18 Mostafa Minawi, Lines in the Sand: The Ottoman Empire’s Policies of Expansion and Consolidation on its African 
and Arabian Frontiers (1882–1902), (Unpublished PhD thesis, New York University, 2011).	  
19 The Earl of Cromer, Modern Egypt, 2 Vols. (New York: Macmillan, 1908). 
20 Sir Henry Drummond Wolff, Rambling Recollections, (London: Macmillan and co., limited, 1908) 
21 Rıfat Uçarol, Bir Osmanlı Paşası ve Dönemi, (İstanbul, Milliyet Yayınları, 1976).	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with his counterpart Sir Henry Drummond Wolff. Uçarol’s biographical study paved the 
way for the illustration of this peculiar time period from the standpoint of Ottoman 
official. There are also personal accounts of Ottoman elites who travelled to the interior 
of Africa and wrote their memoires about the inhabitants and political conditions. Both 
the discourse of the author and their observations about the region are precious for 
researchers in order to comprehend Ottoman’s intention towards the elites.22 
In addition, Ottoman-African studies in Turkish historiography have been newly 
flourishing. Cengiz Orhonlu’s Habeş Eyaleti23 is the primary but constituent study in 
the field. Eastern politics of the Ottoman Empire has been put forward with a consistent 
and holistic point of view. There could be found valuable information about the 
geography, society and trade of the region and the establishment of Habesh province. 
The variety and numbers of the archival documents enhance the value of the book. 
Orhonlu also touches upon Ottoman-Egyptian relations and directly to Sudan through 
Britain’s colonial aspirations in the region in one chapter. Similarly, Hatice Uğur’s 
Osmanlı Afrikası’nda Bir Sultanlık: Zengibar24 delves into the concept of Afrika-i 
Osmani through the small country located on the shore of Indian Ocean. Even though 
there is not a specific reference to the Sudan or the Mehdi rebellion in the book, its 
methodology and approach to Africa is an important contribution to the field of African 
history. She showed that European scramble for Africa in the nineteenth century has 
reached up to the coast of East Africa. Süleyman Kızıltoprak has examined diplomatic 
part of the Ottoman-Britain struggle in Egypt in detail. His document-oriented study 
Mısır’da İngiliz İşgali: Osmanlı’nın Diplamasi Savaşı (1882-1887) explores the 
Egyptian occupation and Ottoman diplomatic war against Britain in order to end 
temporary invasion in a reasonable period of time. The Sudan has been dealt in part in 
the book, as well. Muhammed Tandoğan’s Afrika’da Sömürgecilik ve Osmanlı 
Siyaseti25 also approaches the issue from a political point of view. He gives brief 
information about each Ottoman African country yet scope of the book has remained 
insufficient to make in depth analysis for each country’s political conditions. However, 
it could be used as a guidebook for the newcomers of the field. On the other hand, the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  22	  See, Mehmed Mihri, Sudan Seyahatnamesi (Istanbul: Ahmed İhsan ve Seyahatnamesi Şurekası,1326),	  Sadık el-
Müeyyed, Afrika Sahra-yı Kebiri’nde Seyahat: Bir Osmanlı Zabitinin Büyük Sahra’da Seyahati. İstanbul: Çamlıca 
Basım Yayın, 2008), Sadık el-Müeyyed., Habeş Seyahatnamesi, (Istanbul: Kaknüs, 1999) and Cami Baykut, Son 
Osmanlı Afrikası’nda Hayat, (Istanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2009). 23	  Cengiz Orhonlu, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nun Güney Siyaseti: Habeş Eyaleti, (Ankara: TTK, 1996).	  24	  Hatice Uğur, Osmanlı Afrikası’nda Bir Sultanlık Zengibar, (İstanbul: Klasik, 2005).	  
25 Muhammed Tandoğan, Afrika’da Sömürgecilik ve Osmanlı Siyaseti, (Ankara: TTK, 2013). 
	  	  
	   8	  
study of distinguished Turkish historian Kemal Karpat’s Politicization of Islam26 
attaches special importance to a variety of Muslim revivalist-fundamentalist movements 
in the late Ottoman Empire. One of them is the Mahdi uprising in the Sudan. He 
elaborates on those movements from the perspective of Ottoman government's own 
Islamist ideology.  
1.3: Outline of the Chapters 	  
The first political presence of the Ottoman Empire with the African continent 
has occurred in the sixteenth century. The 1517 Egyptian conquest started the Ottoman 
dominance in North Africa and in the following four hundred years the Ottoman sphere 
of suzerainty continued to spread into the inside of the continent. The Abyssinia 
province established by Özdemir Pasha in 1555 and Hatt-ı Istiva province which is a 
part of current South Sudan came under the rule of Ottoman Empire via Egyptian 
Khedivial administration in 1876, proving that Ottoman existence in Africa was not 
limited to merely northern part of the continent, they also had enhanced noteworthy 
political and economic relationships with eastern and southern Africa, as well.27 On the 
other hand, in the course of these four hundred years, Kuloğlu descendants of janissaries 
married with native women emerged as Ottoman ruling elite in Africa. They lived in 
accordance with the local tradition and customs and deserved to be called ahali-i sadıka 
in their regions. They were charged with collecting levies and maintaining security and 
order on behalf the Ottoman Sultan.28 As it is seen Ottoman influence on the continent 
was widespread not only in a political but also demographic sense.  
 In the nineteenth century, the Ottoman Empire was no longer the only actor who 
claimed rights on North Africa. This challenge in fact relies on two major landmarks in 
African history which concerns the industrial European powers closely. The year of 
1869 is a milestone on the road to partition. First, in South Africa, a huge diamond mine 
was discovered and second The Suez Canal was completed. Both events increased the 
economic value of Africa for European great powers that sought raw material and 
market for their industries.29 In the early 1880s the scramble for Africa had begun to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Kemal Karpat, Politicization of Islam: Reconstructing Identity, State, Faith and Community in the Late Ottoman 
State. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001. 
27 Hatice Uğur, Osmanlı Afrikası’nda Bir Sultanlık: Zengibar, p.1 
28 Ahmet Kavas, Osmanlı-Afrika İlişkileri. (İstanbul: Kitabevi, 2011), p.65. 
29 Gann, Lewis H. and Peter Duignan. Burden of Empire: An Appraisal of Western Colonialism in Africa South of the 
Sahara. (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1971), p.195.  
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gain speed. Soon after, partition of Africa caused disagreements among Europeans 
especially; Britain, France, Germany, Italy. This was the first trial of the fragile balance 
of power system in Europe. The General Act of Berlin was a watershed agreement 
which formulated the legal framework for the colonization of Africa among the great 
powers. Berlin Conference with the invitation of German chancellor Bismarck was 
convened	   between 15 November 1884 and 26 February 1885.	   Attended by fifteen 
European powers including the Ottoman Empire, this was the first conference that aims 
setting the rules for the division of the continent of Africa between the major powers. 
They agreed on the free navigation on Congo and Niger rivers and on free trade with 
each state. The Ottoman state had also joined the conference owing to having lands in 
the continent. But soon exploration committees in Africa created uneasiness in the 
Sublime Porte and in order to protect the Ottoman legal rights, a report that indicates the 
borders of the Egyptian administration in Africa was demanded from Ahmed Muhtar 
Pasha.30 
In the nineteenth century, although the Ottoman state did not have military 
power to keep or interfere in its remote territories, it had always carried out a deliberate 
foreign policy by using all diplomatic and legal means. According to the Ottoman state, 
the Muslim people in the region could not be relinquished to non-Muslim rules and they 
had historical and legal rights over Egypt. Therefore, the Ottoman Empire has waged its 
claims and diplomatic efforts on African lands until the Fashoda Crisis of 1899 when 
the borders of British and French colonial possessions were demarcated and Ottoman 
demands were totally put aside. Minawi points out several reasons that are significant 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  30	  “..... Buna dair olan mütaalat arz edebilmek üzere idare-i Mısıriyye’ye geçen arazi neden ibarettir. Evvel emirde anı 
bilmek içün bu babda sahih ve resmi haritanın elde edilmesi lüzumunun cevaben takdim kılınan ariza-i mezkurede 
dermeyan olunması mütaalat-ı atiyeden neşet etmişti. Zira 21 Zilhicce 1256 tarihli ferman-ı ali ile Nubye, Darfur, 
Kordofan ve Sennar kıt’alarının Mısır’a ilhaken idaresi Mehmed Ali Paşa’ya verilmiş ve 12 Muharrem 1283 tarihli 
ferman ile de ma’a mülhakat Massava ve Sevakin kaimmakamlıkları ve 27 Cumadelula 1292 tarihli hatt-ı hümayun 
ile Zeyla iskelesi İsmail Paşa hazretleri idaresine bırakılmış olduğu malum ise de ahiran Hidivviyet-i Mısıriyye-i 
Sudan içinde ve Hatt-ı İstiva’ya doğru tevsi ve tesis-i idare ederek oraları fersah fersah ilerü geçüp Devlet-i Aliyye 
namına daha bir hayli yerleri taht-ı inzibata almış olduğu ve bu defa taaruz edilmek istenen ise o yerler içinde 
bulunmuş olacağı cihetle hudud-ı Mısriyye o cihetten nerelere kadar vasıl olabilmişdir. Buralarına dair devletçe bir 
malumat-ı sahiha ve hakikiyyenin fikdanı mütaalası ariza-i mezkurenin takdimine esas idi. Bu esas bilinmedikçe 
temhid ve te’yid-i müddeanın kesb-i kuvvet edemeyeceği ve belki kabil olamayacağı zann-ı acizlerince hala bakidir. 
Çünki Mısır’a merbut Sudan mülhakatını yalnız eyalat-ı erbaa-i mezkureden ibarettir der isek pek mühim olan Hatt-ı 
İstiva Müdürriyeti gayb edilmiş olur. Hasılı Sudan’ın hal ve istikbaline müteallik olan mütaalat hep öyle resmi bir 
haritanın elde edinilmesiyle tehassün ve kesb-i kuvvet edeceği re’yinde olduğum muhat-ı ilm-i sami-i hazret-i 
sedaretpenahileri buyruldukda ol babda emr u ferman hazret-i veliyyü’l emrindir. Fi 27 Ramazan 311, fi 23 Mart 
310”quoted in:	  İdris Bostan, Orta Afrika'da Nüfuz Mücadelesi ve Osmanlı İmparatorluğu (1893-1895). (Ankara: 
Belleten 210, 1990) p.688. 
BOA, Mümtaze-i Mısır 5A 135/ 21	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for the participation of the Ottoman Empire in the Conference of Berlin. According to 
him, first, signing of the General Act of Berlin means that the participants of the 
conference has confirmed the right of the Ottoman Empire to the Mediterranean coast of 
Tripolitania and Cyrenaica. Secondly, Ottoman Empire recognized the rights of France 
over the Muslim majority areas which were previously Ottoman provinces of Algeria 
and Tunisia by agreeing on the new rules of the conference. On the other hand, Ottoman 
Empire, de facto, had to redefine an integral part of the empire by signing the agreement 
with new European imperial terms and thereby affirmed the claims of European powers 
gaining possessions in Africa. This by default rebutted the empire’s historical claims on 
the African provinces.31  
The aim of this thesis is two-fold. The first is to scrutinize the Mahdi revolt with 
all dimensions by using Ottoman official sources; the second is to understand the 
Ottoman perception of his periphery through Ottoman colonialism/orientalism debates 
particularly in the case of Sudanese rebellion. In the context of imperialism, the policies 
conducted by the Ottoman state against the struggles in her domains and the local 
resistance towards foreign penetrations will be studied. Sudan is the basic concern of 
the thesis due to the fact that the Mahdi revolution enables us to discover the regional 
insurgency opposed to British imperialism in Sudan.  
To do this, the thesis is organized into five main parts. At the beginning general 
information about the Sudanese geography, people and livelihood will be discussed 
through certain geographical accounts. Important port cities surroundings of the Sudan 
will be also briefly touch upon to understand vitality of slave trade, rivalries for the 
region and the volume of the natural resources. Then in the second chapter, Egyptian 
question which has a great impact on the march of events in the Sudan will be handled. 
Egypt and Sudan’s legal status composed of the main concern of the chapter. Besides, 
Urabi revolt and British intervention as a subsequent consequence of this rebellion will 
be examined with the impacts on the Sudanese movement. In the third chapter, Turco- 
Egyptian period in the Sudanese history will elaborate in detail. The reasons of the 
Sudanese conquest by Muhammad Ali Pasha, modernization endeavors and suppression 
of slave trade in the reign of Ismail Pasha are the basic matters of this chapter.  In the 
following chapter, Mahdiyya period will be concerned as the initial step for independent 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 Mustafa Minavi, Lines in the Sand: The Ottoman Empire’s Policies of Expansion and Consolidation on its African 
and Arabian Frontiers (1882–1902), p.37. 
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Sudan. The life of Muhammad Ahmed, proclamation of his mahdiship, his victories and 
overthrow of his movement will be examined from Ottoman point of view. Then, 
Ottoman response to the Mahdi revolt and British penetration would be scrutinized 
through Ahmed Muhtar Pasha’s reports and politics of Pan-Islamism. In the last 
chapter, in the light of Ottoman colonialism/orientalism debates, Ottomans’ stance to its 
periphery particularly to the Mahdi movement would be analyzed in depth. Thus, 
general appraisal of nineteenth century Ottoman policy in Africa would be made upon 
the example of Sudan. First and foremost the basic concern of the thesis is to approach 
the historiography of African colonialism from the perspective of Ottoman Empire and 
put forward the similarities and differences of Ottoman glance to the continent from the 
European imperialistic/ colonial aspirations.  
1.4: General information about Sudan  	  
Sudan takes its name from the medieval Arab geographers’ bilad al-Sudan 
which means the land of blacks. The origin of the term Sudan is a derivation from the 
plural form of Arabic word ‘sud’ meaning blacks as an indication to the skin colors of 
the inhabitants living in the region. Some eighteenth and nineteenth century European 
writers called the region Nigritia, as well.32 The territories in the most general sense 
contain the area of West and Central Africa and south of the Sahara. It was only in the 
nineteenth century that the name is applied to the countries of the Nile basin, which 
were conquered by the troops of Muhammad Ali in 1820-1822 and thereafter this 
territory known as Egyptian Sudan.33 Present day Sudan comprises only the eastern part 
of this defined territory.  In the nineteenth century, the scope of the Sudan was much 
larger than its current borders. Mahdi movement did not remain limited with these 
territories and spread to wider regions.  
There are a variety of Ottoman descriptions about the borders of Sudan. One of 
the prominent geographical accounts Mehmed Muhsin’s Africa Delili demarcates 
Sudan’s border between the Basin of Chad Lake and the Niger River.34 On the other 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 P.M.Holt, The Mahdist State in the Sudan 1881-1898, (London, Oxford University Press, 1958), p.1. 
33 Brill’s First Encyclopedia of Islam, “Sudan”,  IX, p. 208.  
34 Mehmed Muhsin, Afrika Delili, (Kahire: el-Fellah Ceridesi Matbaası,1312), pp.89-90. 
“Sudan merkezi namı altında sahranın taraf-ı cenubisinde sudan-i garbı ile sudan-i mısıri arasında ve Afrikanın 
kısm-ı dahilisinde vaki’ müttesi’ bir kıta olup hududu pek meşkuk olduğundan adeta gayri kabil-i mahza umumiyeti 
itibar ile Sudan merkezi Çad gölü havzasıyla Nijer nehrinin vasatında kain vasi’ bir kıtayı ve nehr-i mezkurun 
yatakları olan başlıca ırmakları ve Benue’yi dahi muhitdir.” 
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hand, Mehmed Mihri in his Sudan Seyahatnamesi defined the borders more strictly as 
being located between the longitudes of 15- degree west and 25- degree east.35 
However, both sources point out that political turmoil and conflicts among the 
kingdoms and sultanates founded in the center of Sudan precludes the determination of 
exact borders. In this thesis, the Sudan would refer to the area lying from western 
borders of Ethiopia on the east stretching to Atlantic Ocean on the west. Great Sahara 
and Libya form the northern border of the country with 10 -degree northern latitude in 
the south.36 
 The Sudan was a vast country that displays substantial differences in terms of 
ethnicity, language and religion in the nineteenth century. It falls naturally into two 
distinct regions: north and south. As a broad generalization, the northern part of the 
country was predominantly Arab and Muslim whereas the southern part was mainly 
“Negroid” and pagan. Among the black tribes of the south there are an immense variety 
of languages and cultures which make a qualified tribal classification extremely hard. 
The arabization of the northern Sudan occurred for the sake of tribes who had already 
migrated from Arabia to Upper Egypt. Northern inhabitants of the Sudan therefore had 
close racial and linguistic affinities with the people of Upper Egypt who lived between 
Aswan and Wadi Halfa. They were generally known as Nubians. They claimed to have 
come from Arab origin but historical and anthropological evidence show that they were 
a mixture of “Negroes” who were the original inhabitants of northern Sudan, and 
Caucasians who migrated to Sudan in ancient Egyptian times.37 The Sudanese who 
claim Arab descend could be divided into two. Arabized Nubians composed of the 
Barabra and Ja’ali tribes, which were mainly sedentary and the other group of tribes 
were Juhayna waging nomadic or semi-nomadic life. There were also innumerable sub-
tribes like Shukriyya, Kabbabish, Baqqara in the region.38 The common point of these 
various tribes is that they are Muslim and they speak Arabic.  
On the other hand, according to MacMichael’s classification for the southern 
part of Sudan there were three main groups of “Negro” tribes speaking many different 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 Mehmed Mihri, Sudan Seyahatnamesi, (İstanbul: Ahmed İhsan ve Şürekası, 1326), pp.152-153. 
“Asıl Sudan 5/15 arz-ı şimali ve 15 tul-i garbi ile 25 derece tul-i şarki aralarında mümtedd olur. Nilin hizası 
dahilinde bulunarak bu nehre dökülen enharın menba’ı, mecralarını havi olan kısm-i şarkisine (Sudan-ı şarki), Çad 
gölünün hizasını teşkil eden ve bu büyük göle dökülen enharın müsadif olduğu kısm-ı vasatiye (Sudan-ı vasati), (?) 
ırmağının hizasına tesadüf eden kısm-ı garbiyesine de (Sudan-ı garbi) namı veriliyor. 
36 Ahmet Kavas, “Sudan”, Diyanet İslam Ansiklopedisi, XXXVII, p.459. 
37 Mekki Abbas, The Sudan Question, (London: Faber and Faber, 1952), p. 3. 
38 P.M.Holt & M.W.Daly, A History of the Sudan, (Edinburg: Pearson, 2000), pp.3-6.	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languages. The first is Nilotic folk composed of Shilluk, Dinka, Nuer and Anuak who 
deal with their cattle. The second was the Nilo-Hamities comprising Bari, Didinga, 
Turkana tribes who were the cultivators, and herdsmen living the hills. The third one is 
the Azande living in the forest area of Bahr el Ghazal. This last tribe was the branch of 
the tribes of Belgian Congo who invaded the country in the nineteenth century; thereby 
they had different characteristics than other southern tribes.39  As seen, the vastness of 
the country reflects to population as a complexity and heterogeneity in terms of 
language and ethnicity.  
Furthermore, nineteenth century Ottoman traveller Mehmed Mihri presented 
another classification for the Sudan’s tribal society. He divided the society into three. 
For him, “Negroids” were the essential component of the society. They spoke peculiar 
languages and belong to many different tribal groups. Another group is fellahs who 
were dark-skinned but racially Caucasian people. They had established some states and 
disseminated the Islam into the southern and western part of the country. The last one 
was the Arabs who were the dominated groups engaged in animal selling and commerce 
particularly in the northern part of the Sudan. They also served the spreading of Islam 
into the inner part of the country and used Arabic in politics.40 
In brief, for the nineteenth century although there was wide divergence in habitat 
and mode of life, the Sudanese people could be summarized in four categories in terms 
of their livelihood: camel-breeding and cattle breeding nomads, sedentary villagers and 
town-dwellers. Some of them also kept horses and made a reputation of hunting giraffes 
and elephants. Sometimes, despite their racial and tribal origins are similar, the way of 
life could differ from each other. Husbandry and commerce formed the main field of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 Sir Harold Macmichael, The Sudan, (London: Ernest Benn, 1954), p.17. 
40 Mehmed Mihri, Sudan Seyahatnamesi, p.156 
“Ahalisinin cinsi, lisan ve mezhepleri: asıl yerli ahalisi zenci ırkına mensup olan Sudanlılar birçok akvama 
münkasım ve her biri kendine mahsus bir lisanla mütekellimdirler. Bu akvamın birbirlerinden renk ve simaca ahlak 
ve adatça az çok farkları varsa da beynlerindeki karabetin ve lisanları arasındaki müşahebetin derecatı henüz 
anlaşılamamıştır. Ancak yerli zencilerden başka Sudan’da iki kavim daha münteşirdir ki bunların biri (kule) yahud 
fellah denilen muharib bir kavimdir, renkleri ziyadece esmer ise de simaca tamamen ırk-ı Kafkasiye mensub, 
mütenasib …..tavır ve harekete malik adamlardır. Sudanın her tarafına intişar eden ve millet-i hakime gibi geçinen 
bu kavim birtakım devletler tesis ederek bu son zamanlarda Sudan’ın cenub ve garb cihetlerinde neşr-i İslam etmişler 
ve gittikçe etmekte bulunmuşlardır. Mezkur iki kavimden diğeri Arablardır ki birbirleriyle mahlut olukları halde 
Sudan’ın her tarafında ve alelhusus kısm-ı şimalisinde heyvanat ahz ve itasıyla ve ticaret ile meşgul olurlar. Bunların 
ihtilatı ve din-i İslamın kuvvet ve nufuzuyla lisan-ı Arabi hem bütün Sudan’nın lisan-ı edebi ve siyasiyesi sırasına 
geçmiş ve hükümdarların saraylarında ve hükümet dairelerinde arabi tekellüm edilmekte bulunmuştur. Sudanın şark 
ve şimal kısmı ahalisi zaten eskiden beri müslim olub, kısm-i cenubi ve garbisinde dahi mezkur fellahların ictihadıyla 
din-i İslam taammum ederek ahcar ve eşcar ve haşarat ve cemadata ibadet edenler kalmadığı gibi din-i İslam …. 
tecavüzle, Afrika-i cenubiye doğru dahi taammum ve günden güne terakki ve tevessu’ etmektedir.”	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occupation. Conversely, Arabic was the predominant language of the country, 
particularly in the north. It was the only language of letters and administration, but other 
indigenous languages survive, too. The religion of Islam was likewise mostly dominant 
in the northern side of the country. Indeed, Medieval Nubia was a Christian country, in 
the tenth century. Islam came into the northern Sudan in results of Arab immigration 
and later on Egyptian protectorate while Christianity; paganism and native beliefs still 
existed in the south.41  
Additionally, there was strong political antagonism between the northern and 
southern inhabitants; each has its own culture and tradition that results from the slavery. 
Throughout the nineteenth century, slave raiding and the slave trade were carried on by 
northern Muslim Sudanese and encouraged by Egyptian governor of the Sudan. This 
situation created feelings of hatred among the enslaved pagan people against the 
northerners and foreign power.42 Northern slave-dealers sold the slaves gathered from 
the south to the Egyptian slave bazaars, then some of them has brought into the capital 
and selected for Palace. For instance, Beşir Agha (d. 1159/1746) one of the prominent 
chief eunuchs of the harem was an Ethiopian slave. He had been emasculated in Upper 
Egypt, sold in Cairo and brought into Topkapı Palace. He raised the position of head 
chief in harem and succeeds to remain same post during twenty-nine years.43 
Through the conquest of Egypt in 1517, Ottoman Empire gained the territories 
that formerly belonged to the Mamluk sultanate and expanded its borders towards the 
south of Arabian Peninsula. Therefore Ottoman Empire came into contact with Nubia, 
Ethiopia, and Zanzibar by land and Aden and India by sea. Controlling the trade routes 
provided the Ottoman Empire a strategic position in the port cities on the shore of Red 
Sea. These cities were close to Hejaz area and crucial for the spreading of the ideas 
from Africa to Arabian Peninsula. 
The most important port city in the shore of Red Sea was Sewakin (today, a port 
in the north-eastern Sudan) seized by Ottomans in 1524. The port of Sewakin was on 
the trade roads; thereby the most important source of income of the city was commerce. 
The trade of pearl in time became a part of the overseas trade. Moreover, the port of 
Sewakin has been one of the key gathering places of slaves from the Sudan and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 Brill’s First Encyclopedia of Islam, “Sudan”, IX, p.210.  
42 Mekki Abbas, the Sudan Question, (London: Faber and Faber, 1952), p.19. 
43 See, Jane Hathaway, Beshir Agha: Chief Eunuch of the Ottoman Imperial Harem (Oneworld Publications, 2006). 	  
	  	  
	   15	  
Abyssinia and to be dispatched to India, Egypt and Arabia. In the exportation of cereals 
and animal products to the Hejaz, Sewakin has been in an intermediary position, as 
well. 44  In the nineteenth century, Egypt put a claim for the port city and took 
possession of the city in 1865 as a result of the arrangement with the Sultan. Besides, 
the importance of Sewakin port has been particularly increased right after the 
construction of Suez Canal. In the last decade of the nineteenth century Ottoman High 
Commissioner Ahmed Muhtar Pasha wrote a letter to the palace and highlighted that 
Sewakin could not been abandoned to any foreign state.  He points out the activities of 
Britain in the region and warned the Sultan about the future of Sewakin.45  
The other important port in the shores of Red Sea is Massawa. (today, a city on 
the Red Sea coast of Eritrea) It was the door of African countries opening up to the 
world. The products generated in Abyssinia disseminated all over the world from this 
port. Hence, throughout the history, all states strove for Massawa to keep it under their 
own control. It was in 1536, when the Ottomans took the city under domination. In the 
eighteenth century, Britain started to show interest in the Red Sea trade and soon after 
the number of British ships increased. On the other hand, Massawa had also great 
importance for Muhammad Ali Pasha who dreamed of an independent Egypt from the 
Ottoman Empire. However, Massawa had been given to Muhammad Ali Pasha as 
salyane during reign of Sultan Abdülmecid. Similar to Sewakin, pearl hunting, 
husbandry and slave trade formed the substantial source of income of the people.46  
The third noteworthy port city of the region was Zeila.	  (today,	  a port city in the 
northwestern Awdal region of Somalia) In 1520, Zeila entered into the Ottoman 
sovereignty and become the center of Habesh Province during under Osman Pasha, the 
son of Özdemir Pasha. Although Zeila was left to Egypt’s administration for a while in 
the nineteenth century, later on it was reconnected to Istanbul. 47 Furthermore, Zeila was 
the place where people were known as very pious. Most of the learned books were 
distributed from there and it could be said that it was the frontier of Islam. Every year 
people raided against the Habesh for the sake of Allah and by the way of holy war. 48 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 Nihal Şahin Utku, Çöl, Gemi ve Tacir: Kızıldeniz,(İstanbul: Klasik, 2012), p.42. 
45 BOA, YEE.., 129/43,  28 Rebiyyülahir 1306 ( 1 January 1889)  
46 Hatice Uğur, Osmanlı Afrikası’nda Bir Sultanlık Zengibar , (İstanbul: Klasik, 2005), p.24. 
47 Hatice Uğur, Osmanlı Afrikası’nda Bir Sultanlık Zengibar, p.26. 
48 Salih Özbaran, “A Turkish Report on the Red Sea and the Portuguese in the Indian Ocean, The Ottoman Response 
to European Expansion”, Analecta Isisiana, XII, p.108.	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CHAPTER II: EGYPTIAN QUESTION 	  
The invasion of Egypt by Napoleon in 1798 is a benchmark in the Egyptian 
history. After this incidence, European powers have realized the economic and strategic 
importance of this country. Once, it was the gateway of Middle East to Africa and this 
feature was increasing the importance of Egypt in a time when having colonies in the 
overseas was deemed to be the same with being a world power. On the other hand, 
together with the construction of Suez Canal; Egypt becomes the center of maritime 
trade between Europe and India. Therefore, Egypt has undertaken the key position to 
grasp both the colonization of Africa and balance of power politics which describes 
peaceful co-existence endeavors of great powers in the long nineteenth century. 
2.1: Ottoman Jurisdiction over Egypt 	  
Egypt came under the sovereignty of Ottoman Empire in 1517 and ruled by a 
governor as other Ottoman provinces until Muhammad Ali Pasha came to the power. In 
the wake of French evacuation, Egypt entered into long lasting turmoil. The struggle 
between Ottoman sultan and Mamluk Beys has continued for a while. In 1805 
Muhammad Ali Pasha has been appointed as Egyptian governor by receiving the 
support of the leading social stratum. In a short time, he eliminated the Mamluks and 
established his own authority in Egypt. Once he ensured his authority, he started on the 
long-term military, economic and administrative reforms. The administration has been 
centralized by establishing assemblies and councils. Increasing revenues comes from 
the cotton export inclined him to conduct expansionist policies. He attempted to fight 
against the Ottoman Empire but he failed because of the British opposition. In the wake 
of long struggle, Muhammad Ali Pasha gained governorship of Egypt and Sudan by 
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way of hereditary succession.49 Thereby the firman of 1841 recognized the autonomous 
status of Egypt and bestowed the administration to people who were descended from 
Muhammad Ali. In return, Egypt was still the part of Ottoman territory and 
subordinated to rules and regulations of Istanbul. In 1867 the privileges of this province 
were enlarged. Egyptian khedive had a right to enact a law and conduct trade relations 
with foreign governments inside. Finally the firman of 1873 enabled the khedives to 
grant capitulations to Europeans. With the result of these amendments, though Egypt 
legally adhered to the Ottoman Empire, politically it has gained semi-autonomous 
position.50  
Ismail Pasha like his grand father Muhammad Ali attempted to enlarge the 
autonomous status of Egypt and displayed expansionist policies. He attached particular 
importance to the relations with Sublime Porte in order to widen his scope of authority. 
Hence, he achieved to gain several concessions through particular firmans by rising the 
amount of annual taxes yielded to Ottoman Empire and granted gifts and money to the 
high rank Ottoman bureaucrats. He received the title of khedive means viceroy of Egypt 
and Sudan and vassal of the Ottoman Empire. Khedive Ismail was educated in Paris and 
for this reason, was highly influenced by European style of modernization. Moreover he 
proclaimed “my country is no longer in Africa. I have made it part of Europe.” 51 With 
departure point of this notion, he made enormous infrastructure investments in the 
country which causes a great economic depression. During his reign thousands of miles 
of railroad tracks were built, 8000 miles of canal was excavated and 5000 miles of 
telegraph cable was raid. Arable land was increased by more than 30 percent through 
improved irrigation. A modern port was gained to Alexandria, thousands of schools 
were opened and sugar refineries were built.52  
Indeed, Ismail Pasha’s economic confidence was understandable. At the outset 
of his reign, Egyptian profits were considerable due to the fact that the civil war in the 
United States suddenly made Egypt the biggest cotton exporter of the world. 53 
Thorough the privileged status of Ismail Pasha as khedive and economic potential of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  49	  Hilal Görgün, “Mısır” Diyanet İslam Ansiklopedisi, c. XXIX, p. 569 
50 Süleyman Kızıltoprak, Mısır’da İngiliz İşgali: Osmanlı’nın Diplomasi Savaşı (1882-1887), (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı 
Yurt Yayınları, 2010), p.26 
51Barbara Harlow, and Mia Carter, Imperialism & Orientalism: A Documentary Source Book, (Massachusetts: 
Blacwell Publishers, 1999), p.113. 
52 H. L. Wesseling, Divide and Rule: The Partition of Africa 1880-1914. (London: Praeger, 1996),p. 43. 
53Barbara Harlow, and Mia Carter, Imperialism & Orientalism: A Documentary Source Book, p.113. 
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Egypt, Ismail Pasha was treated like an independent ruler by the European states.  One 
of the great projects of Ismail Pasha was the Suez Canal. Indeed, the modern history of 
Suez project starts with Napoleon. His engineers concluded that it is an infeasible 
project because of the difference in level between the two seas. Therefore, the project 
has been postponed for a long time. In the elapsed time, maritime traffic between 
Europe and Asia thus continued over the Cape route. But, it came to the agenda again in 
the period of Khedive Said.  
The Suez question was turned into an Anglo-French rivalry in time.  Britain 
considered railroad link more practical while the French was in favor of canal. Both 
countries had an impact on the Egyptian administration. For instance, at first the British 
were more influential than French, but in 1854 the new khedive Said Pasha who was 
pro- French came to power and the balance changed in favor the French side. More 
importantly, he was friendly with a French diplomat, Ferdinand de Lesseps who comes 
from a family of consuls. He was born in 1805 in Versailles and came to Alexandria as 
vice-consular in 1832. Therein, he became acquainted with Said and starts to teach him 
horse riding. In 1849 De Lesseps left the diplomatic service and allocated all his time to 
his canal project. He elucidated his plans to Khedive Said who gave his consent. On 30 
November 1854 de Lesseps created an international company called Compaigné 
Universelle du Canal Maritime de Suez. This company would be granted broad 
concessions to exploit the revenues of canal for ninety-nine years following its 
completion. Thereafter the canal would be handed over to the Egyptian government 
which would have received 15 percent of the annual profits during the first ninety-nine 
years. Said’s death and his succession by the dynamic Ismail accelerated the project. 
Ismail declared: “No one is more canalist than I am” and he had bought almost half of 
the total shares and thus became the largest shareholder. The other parts of the shares 
were in the hands of French individuals. In August 1869 the canal was completed, and 
on 17 September of that year the official inauguration took place.54 
Many people were advocators of Ismail’s progressive system of government. 
First, Europeans who profited from it were satisfied. As a consequence, the European 
population of Egypt has grown rapidly. By 1880, the number of resident foreigners in 
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Egypt has reached to 70.000.55 For the Turkish ruling class new career paths had been 
seen on the horizon. Yet, the local Arab population took a different view. 
Modernization project of Ismail meant more forced labor, higher taxes, more debt and 
higher interest payments. And still the taxes were not enough to cover the costs of the 
ambitious modernization program. Ismail therefore chose another solution: foreign 
loans.56 His total external and internal debts reached 400 million pound in a short time. 
Furthermore, the Ottoman Sultan Abdülaziz had to warn him with a firman in order not 
to raise the taxes and take the foreign loans. In 1875, he failed to pay back the enormous 
debt and had to sell the shares of the canal belonging to Khedive dynasty and to the 
British government.57 Because, with the establishment of the British Indian Empire, and 
the opening of the Suez canal in 1869 which linked Europe with the orient and thus 
increased the amount of trade through Egypt, Egypt became increasingly important to 
Britain. Indeed, Suez Canal was begun and completed as a project of French engineers. 
The French made the entire plans and actualized it by undertaking the whole 
responsibility but now the British has gained the shares without taking any risk. This 
situation has already triggered the imperialist aspirations between the two great powers. 
In the forthcoming periods, Suez would be part of bargain process in the partition of 
Africa.  
Slowly but surely, Egyptians began to lose control of their own affairs. By a 
system of capitulations the most vital privileges were granted to foreigners in Egypt; 
these privileges included: exemption from taxation, inviolability of domicile, and 
protection from arbitrary arrest, exemption from the jurisdiction of the native courts and 
the mixed tribunals established in 1876, that no legislation could be enforced to 
foreigners without the consent of the Capitulatory Powers.58 Furthermore, the sold 
shares of the Suez Canal had not sufficed to compensate the total amount of the 
Egyptian debts and Khedive Ismail had continued to take new credits from the 
European bankers with high interest rates. In 1876, when Ismail declared his failure 
about discharge of debts, creditor European states established The Public Debt 
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Commission in order to take back their money. Under the dual control of Britain and 
France, Egypt lost her authority in financial issues. There would be a reflection of this 
maladministration on the social life of the Egyptians.  
Economy from now on was under the supervision of the foreign hands and some 
European ministers have been appointed to the crucial positions in the government of 
1878. The penetration of the foreigners in the state created disquiet in society and 
Khedive Ismail had to dismiss them in order to preserve his position. This act prompted 
to the reaction of Britain and France. An ultimatum has been given to Khedive Ismail 
Pasha because of breaking his promises. He was advised to relinquish his place to his 
son. Subsequent to this incident, Khedive Ismail has dispatched a telegram to the 
Ottoman sultan and enounced that Egypt is the Ottoman property and he was the servant 
of Ottoman state. Hence, the proposal brought forward by colonialist states was the 
infringement of the Ottoman judiciary rights on Egypt. Yet, in May 1879, the British 
Empire and France began pressuring the Ottoman Sultan to depose Ismail Pasha, and 
this was done on June 26, 1879. The more pliable Tewfik Pasha, Ismail's son, was made 
his successor as the new Khedive. Ismail Pasha during his reign acted in accordance 
with the British interests particularly in the Suez Canal and the Sudan have been 
governed by a British governor on behalf of the Khedive. Furthermore, many port cities 
in Somalia and Ethiopian coast have been hired to European states and soon after those 
became a colony of the Europeans.59 Eventually, all these independent behaviors have 
ended Ismail Pasha’s political carrier. First and foremost, deposition of khedive Ismail 
proved that in the year of 1879 the Ottoman Empire still held the de jure and de facto 
rights on Egypt and both Britain and France still looked for the confirmation of the 
Sultan in the governmental change.  
Moreover, weakening of the Egyptian power also harmed the authority in the 
Sudan. Modernization project of khedive Ismail both in Egypt and Sudan coasted a lot. 
Economic decline of the state also triggered the social uneasiness. Abolishment of the 
slave trade in Sudan affected the interest of the wealthier class detrimentally. The 
centralization policies on the religion created disquiets among the ulema, as well. Plus, 
the appointment of the retired Christian generals as an administrator of the Sudan to 
establish the state authority and to supervise the slave trade drew reaction of the local 
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people against the Egyptian administration. As seen, Sudanese affairs did not 
independent from the marches of the events in Egypt. Urabi revolt occurred in 1882 also 
leaded to neglecting of the Sudanese Mahdi uprising and finally become a threat for the 
Egypt’s integrity.  
 
2.2: The Urabi Revolt 	  
In the reign of Muhammad Ali Pasha, Mamluks were eliminated from not only 
politics but also from the army. Higher posts in the newly established army were 
occupied exclusively by the Turkish speaking “Circassian” class while the Arabic 
speaking fellahin population held the lower ranks. Khedive Ismail had achieved to raise 
the number of soldiers in the army with particular firmans taken from the Ottoman 
Sultan. Yet, increase in number naturally lead to increase the number of Egyptians in 
the army, as well. However, Turks and Circassions were still holding the higher ranks 
though quantitative and proportional balance shifted towards the Egyptian soldiers.60 
This situation created a discontent among the soldiers and both side attempted to 
establish superiority on the other one.  
Ahmed Urabi who was the leader of Egyptian uprising was a perfect example of 
the frustrated Egyptian soldier. He was born in 1841 as the son of a village leader; he 
was from a prosperous but rural background. Educated at al-Azhar and the military 
academy, he rose through the ranks to the rank of colonel.	  From 1879 onward Urabi 
appears to have been part of a secret society of nationalist officers, apparently supported 
in Istanbul by Said Halim Pasha, the khedive’s uncle and heir to the throne under the 
traditional Turkish law of succession until the rules of succession in Egypt were 
modified by Ismail. ’Abd al-Halim was the Porte’s choice as khedive in 1879, but was 
rejected by the British in favor of the more pliable Tewfik Pasha.61 Their slogan “Egypt 
for Egyptians” may have targeted not only the outside British and French but also the 
internal Turco-Circassian elite. 	  
Urabi was justified in presenting himself as spokesman not only of the army, but 
also of the Egyptian people as a whole. According to Schölch, “Urabi was not a 	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revolutionary leader… he did not strive for power, he had no interest in becoming a 
dictator or in forcing upon the country a particular political system. He wanted to be a 
protector and to take care that nobody would stray from the straight path, the path of 
Allah’s commandments, of justice, equality, humanity and fraternity.” 62  Indeed, 
political activities during the years 1881-1882 mostly developed because of European 
interfering in the Egyptian internal affairs. Since, the repercussion of French occupation 
of Tunisia was still vivid on entire Arab provinces. However, Wilfred Scawen Blunt 
who was an English aristocrat and poet in charge of diplomatic service in Egypt. He 
became known as the	  fierce opponent of imperialism and colonialism. In mid-December 
1881 Blunt found a change to meet with Urabi, due to his popularity with the Egyptians. 
His book “The Secret History of the English Occupation of Egypt” written in 1907 was 
the major English-language source sympathetic to the ‘Urabi revolt. There, he stated:  
Arabi, a presentable young fellow… accompanied Said to Medina the 
year before his death. It was during this close intercourse with the Viceroy that 
he acquired his first political ideas, which were those of equality as between 
class and class and of the respect due to the fellah as the preponderating element 
in the Egyptian nationality. It is this particular advocacy of fellah rights which 
distinguished Arabi from the other reformer of his day. The Azhar movement 
was one of the Muhammedan reforms, without distinction of the race. Arabi’s 
was essentially a race movement and as such far more distinctly national and 
destined to be far more popular.63 
Blunt believed that Urabi riot was a nationalistic-religious one. However, in 
October 1881, the Porte’s commissioner’s incumbent by the Sultan in order to inspect 
Urabi movement came to the conclusion that “the apprehension that Egypt might 
become the center of an Arab national movement was unfounded. They had discovered 
loyalty only towards the Empire. The struggle against the Turco-Circassian power 
monopoly had not at the same time been a struggle against the “rights and privileges” of 
the Sultan in Egypt. Ismail had endeavored to loosen the ties to the Porte, not the 
Urabi.”64 On the other hand, distinguished historian Kemal Karpat describes the Urabi 
revolt as nationalism against west. Besides he defines Abdülhamid’s Pan -Islamism 
politics as religious nationalism, as well. But both of them had a different motivation. 
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Abdülhamid II saw this politics as a preventive measure while Urabi’s intention was to 
end foreign domination in his country.65 
Briefly, it could be said that Sublime Porte and Abdülhamid II before the British 
occupation of Egypt failed to define the problem and develop a functional policy. In 
fact, they have known that Urabi movement was a result of social and economic 
conditions of Egypt and it showed the characteristics of nationalist rebel to some extent. 
Additionally they were aware of Britain and France’s provocative attitudes but for 
solution they merely concentrated on the Urabi Pasha and administration problems. The 
Sultan applied the classical methods to tackle with Urabi. If Urabi Pasha has been taken 
away from the Egypt, the problem could be solved in the eyes of the Ottoman Empire. 
Two methods had been used to persuade Urabi Pasha. First, warnings reference to 
religion and second, threats supported by pejorative words. The first method has been 
used via dignified religious man and Ahmed Esad Efendi who was a prestigious man 
among Arabs was tasked with persuasion of Urabi. He reminded Urabi his religious 
responsibilities and warned him to stay away from creating disorder among Muslims. 
Second method was used through the medium of recognized generals. Ali Nizami Pasha 
and Derviş Pasha have been sent to Egypt in order to give him up the rebellion. They 
did not hesitate to address him derogatorily when needed. They have three main duties 
assigned by Abdülhamid. Firstly, they had to prevent any military entanglement of 
Ottoman force in Egypt. Secondly, Urabi pasha must have removed from the scene by 
inviting to Istanbul. Finally, Khedive Tewfik Pasha must have been supported as a 
legitimate representative of Sultan and thus preclude the British intervention.66 On the 
other hand, Sultan Abdülhamid II has used different methods like issuing honors to him. 
In order to encourage persuasion endeavors, he was to be given the Mecidiye First Class 
and made Pasha. The first reason to grant this sign was to move him away from the 
Egypt and the second reason it could be an opportunity to change khedive and remove 
the concessions of Egypt. Although Urabi Pasha acted in a respected manner during 
negotiations and refrained from using unfavorable remarks against the Ottoman state, 
they did not reach a resolution.67  
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Abdülhamid was in favor of the solution without any conflict between Egypt and 
Ottoman Empire due to the fact that he was afraid of spreading of the movement to the 
other Arab provinces. Indeed, he was correct. Buzpınar’s article showed that Egyptian 
refugees who immigrated to Syria right after the first communal fighting on 11 June 
facilitated the spreading of the news from Egypt. Apparently, The Muslims in Syria had 
a strong sympathy for Urabi Pasha seeing him as a champion of Islam. From their point 
of view, Urabi was a leader of Muslim who was waging of holy war against a Christian 
power rather than a nationalist leader.68 In this situation, Ottoman Empire faced with a 
harsh dilemma. Whether they take a sharp stance and repress the Muslim sympathy for 
Urabi or show some degree of tolerance and allow a limited support for him. The 
former one would damage the Sultan’s prestige and in the eyes of the Muslim, Sultan 
would seem to be cooperating with Christian power whereas the latter one would mean 
endorsing Urabi who rebelled against the khedive who is the legitimate authority of 
Egypt and representative of the Sultan-Caliph.69 
2.3: British Intervention in 1882 	  
On 11 June 1882, an anti-Christian riot occurred in Alexandria and caused loses 
of lives from both Egyptians and foreigners. The riots were probably a spontaneous 
result of tension and excitement; but for British government it appeared as a massacre 
of Christians, probably provoked by Urabi. British forces had already begun to occupy 
some certain places by the reason of the security of Suez Canal. Fights among Egyptian 
soldiers under the command of Urabi and British troops had been continued for a while 
then in the region of Tel-el Kebir Urabi Pasha has been heavily defeats by British 
forces. Thereby Egypt was occupied by Britain in 1882. In effect, Britain has asked for 
the sending Ottoman soldiers to Egypt and declaring Urabi as a rebel but both demands 
were unanswered by the Sultan. Only one week before Urabi’s defend, Abdülhamid 
declared him as a rebel. Furthermore, Urabi and his friends were charged in the court 
and Urabi pled guilty and was sentenced to death, but the sentence was immediately 
commuted to punishment of exile for a life. He went to Ceylon to pay his penalty. In 
1901 he turned back to Cairo in the wake of khedive Abbas Hilmi’s forgiveness. He 
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spent his life in Cairo away from the politics and wrote his memoirs. He died in 
September 1911 in Cairo.70 Indeed, Galbraith and Marsot point out that 
[T]he disorders of 1882 were incited by the actions of Europeans, not by 
Urabi. It was the British and French fleet that stirred the rioting of June. It was 
the British fleet that opened a bombardment in July against forts and earthworks 
which had been ineffectually strengthened to defend Alexandria. It was the 
British, not Urabi, who violated the neutrality of the Suez Canal under the 
pretext that they were merely acting as the agents of the khedive against rebel.71  
However, Although Urabi movement emerged against Britain-France political 
interference and financial domination and against the administration of Khedive Tewfik, 
it ended with occupation of Egypt in September 1882.  
In the 1880s, Abdühamid II has been faced by four challenges: the first was the 
Egyptian army mutiny of 1882 led by Ahmed Urabi against the Khedive and second 
consequent British occupation of Egypt in 1882; the third was the Mahdist revolt which 
targeted the overthrow Egyptian rule in the Sudan in 1883-4 and the fourth deriving 
from the Mahdist revolt, was the occupation of African shores of the Red Sea by 
Britain, France and Italy in 1884-5. According to Yasamee, a specialist of Ottoman 
diplomatic history, Abdülhamid’s attitude towards the third and forth challenges were 
mostly determined by his experience of the first and second. Owing to this approach, he 
summarizes the Ottoman response to the Egyptian crisis of 1881-2 in three main 
features. The first was fear of revolution. Abdülhamid suspected that Urabi revolt was 
an act of British plot hidden under the shadow of anti-European protestation. In reality, 
Urabi Pasha aims to establish an Arab government to defies the Islamic caliphate and 
Ottoman sovereignty in the Fertile Crescent and Arabia. However there is no document 
to verify this argument. But it is important to reflect Sultan’s belief that his sphere of 
influence was fragile in Arabian lands. Although he had a centralized bureaucracy and 
standing army in reality he needed the support of local leaders whose political 
tendencies readily changed with regard to balance of power. The second feature of 
Abdülhamid’s politics was the non-intervention. He decisively refused military attack 
against Urabi despite the intensive requests of Khedive Tewfik and European powers in 
spite of the British occupation of Egypt. The third feature developed in response to 
British invasion of September 1882 was the complete denial of the legitimacy of British 	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occupation. He insisted on the Ottoman’s sovereignty rights on Egypt in the firmans. 
The sultan in fact has no tool except for diplomacy to use against Britain. He tried to 
persuade other European powers in order to take effective action and support Ottoman 
supremacy in the region. But the efforts only sufficed to take guarantees from Britain 
that the invasion would be temporarily. In the long term, this would never occurred.72 
Egyptian question arose at a particularly bad time for the Ottomans. The empire 
still suffered from the consequences of the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1888, the 
Cyprus Convention and the Congress of Berlin. Establishment of the Ottoman Debt 
Commission in 1881 and heavy war indemnities to Russia have weakened the economy. 
Large extent of its territories and populations had already been lost in the Berlin 
Conference. And finally, in May 1881 Tunisia was left to the French.73 Because of all 
these troubles, Abdülhamid II and the Sublime Porte did not read the Urabi revolt 
accurately and took the necessary steps. The fear of spreading of the revolt to the other 
provinces decelerated taking decision. Sending troops would cause the killing of 
Muslim by Muslim in Egypt and Abdülhamid II had never approached to this idea. On 
the other hand, he used all diplomatic effort to deter Urabi from any kind of reaction 
against the Sultan. Although Urabi later on declared his loyalty officially, he was not 
trusted any more. Furthermore, his mutiny caused the invasion of Egypt by Britain. 
Although Britain formally recognized the Ottoman sovereignty in Egypt until First 
World War, their temporary occupation has never ended and thereby new phase of 
negotiation has started between Britain and Ottoman Empire through the agency of 
Ahmed Muhtar Pasha.  
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CHAPTER III: THE TURCO-EGYPTIAN PERIOD IN THE SUDAN (1820-1881) 	  
History of Sudan in between Egyptian invasion and prior to independence could 
be divided into three periods. The first “Turkiyya” includes Ottoman-Egyptian Rule in 
1821-1881. It was followed by the Mahdiyya period lasting from 1881 Mahdi uprising 
to 1898 Omdurman defeat and finally the second “Turkiyya” which is called Anglo-
Egyptian period in the years 1899-1955. Though, this thesis mainly concentrated on the 
period between 1881 Mahdi revolution and 1914 First World War, these three period 
would present a holistic view to understand the cause and consequences of the scramble 
for Africa in a particular case. 
The conquest of the northern Sudan was undertaken by Muhammad Ali who was 
the Ottoman governor of Egypt in 1820. In 1822, Khartoum was founded as the 
headquarters of the Egyptian army. The fall of Darfur and conquest of the southern 
Sudan which was divided into two provinces; Bahr el-Ghazal and Equatoria occurred 
during the reign of Khedive Ismail. In the history of Sudan, this period became known 
as the (first) Turkiyya. 
Ottoman jurisdiction over the Sudan appeared in a particular form. Egypt had 
become a part of Ottoman Empire by right of conquest in 1517. Muhammad Ali had 
been appointed as a governor-general in 1805. In the forthcoming years, he gained 
many concessions and began de facto to act independently. However, whether he 
unified Sudan with Egypt on behalf of the Ottoman Sultan or for the sake of himself, 
Sudan legally has been under the jurisdiction of Egypt indirectly of Ottoman Empire, as 
well.74 There are several firmans declared by Ottoman Sultan that confirmed the Sudan 
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as an Ottoman province under the rule of Egyptian khedives. For instance, the firman on 
13 February 1841, as follows: 
 Whereas, as by our previous ferman, we have confirmed you as viceroy 
of Egypt with hereditary rights on specific conditions and within well-defined 
limits, we hereby confer upon you the additional vice-regal rights upon the 
provinces of Nubia, Kordofan, and Sennar and all dependencies beyond the 
frontiers of Egypt proper…The exercise of such rights does not, however, confer 
any hereditary prerogatives. By the experience and wisdom of which you have 
given proof you are to administer such provinces and manage their affairs in 
accordance with my wishes to justice and with a view to ensuring the welfare of 
the inhabitants. You shall send to our Sublime Porte an annual statement of all 
the revenues of the above-mentioned provinces.75 
 As could be seen, Ottoman jurisdiction on Sudan stems from Egypt’s peculiar 
status. Though the invasion of Egypt by British forces in 1882 had altered the legacy of 
relations in between Ottoman sultan and Egyptian khedives, Ottoman sovereignty on 
both Egypt and Sudan had legally continued to the official termination of the Ottoman 
Empire in 1923. 
3.1: Reasons of Sudan’s conquest by Muhammad Ali 	  
Egyptian historians justified the conquest of Sudan as fath from an Islamic point 
of view. To strengthen the religious justification of this conquest some of them even 
further claimed that Ottoman Sultan who was also emir al-mu’minin has demanded 
conquering of Sudan from his governor. Thereby, the legitimacy of this conquest on 
religious grounds could have been ensured. Second, Egyptian Muslims had close 
relationships with the Sudan since the Middle Ages and intermarried with the local 
population. Therefore, blaming Egypt due to conquest is not sincere and just because 
there were no separating borders between the two regions. Third, the Sudan was a 
prosperous country which had been continuously plundered by its primitive rulers. 
Some of the sources claimed that as a result of over-taxation and anarchy, people of 
Sudan had been impoverished. Hence, the people welcomed the Egyptian forces as their 
saviors.  Fourth, there are also those who praise Muhammad Ali’s invasion of the Sudan 
to discover the sources of the Nile and protect them from European invaders. Finally, 
still on positive side, Muhammad Ali had undertaken the mission civilizatricé since he 
saved them from the renewed jahiliya. When he first visited Sudan in 1838-9 at the age 
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of seventy, he brought back with a group of young Sudanese from the tribal and 
religious notable to educate them in the Egyptian Sunnite ideology.76  
On the other hand, Sudanese historians do not share same points of view with 
Egyptian historians. Mekki Shibeika one of the Sudanese scholars denotes that 
Muhammad Ali’s administration was a typical Turkish one; it was highly centralized 
and aimed at maximum amount of money via taxes. He also emphasizes primitive 
nature of Sudanese society which should be civilized by Egyptians. Furthermore, 
another scholar Hasan Ahmed Ibrahim criticizes the paternalistic attitudes of Egyptian 
historians towards Sudan. He stressed that Sudan have been already Muslim before the 
conquest so there was no need to Egyptian interference in order to enhance Islam.77  
There are additional reasons of Egyptian conquest of Sudan. First, Muhammad Ali 
determined to annihilate the surviving Mamluks who had escaped to Dongola (today, 
located in North Sudan) following the 1811 massacre. He pursued them towards the 
inner sides of Sudan to prevent their reappearance as political rivals against him in the 
forthcoming years.  Second, Muhammad Ali decided to establish a new modern army. 
Therefore, he had to eliminate those who opposed modernization in the present army. 
He compelled whether to dispatches them to Sudan where they would perish either way 
or relinquishes from their politic and economic privileges in Egypt. Third, Muhammad 
Ali was impressed by immense human sources of Sudan. At that time his main goal was 
to seek slaves for their army and monopolies. However most of these Sudanese slaves 
perished en-route or died of various diseases later on. According to figures given by 
some research, out of 20000 slaves gathered between 1820 and 1824 only 3000 
remained alive in 1824. Moreover, the campaign itself was facing significant problems 
and had cost the Pasha a lot of money and one of his sons. 78 Finally, Muhammad Ali 
was looking for gold and other precious metals to fulfill his aspirations on Egyptian 
modernization.79  
 Indeed, the reasons for the faults of the Turco-Egyptian government in the 
Sudan throughout this period was clear. Firstly, they originally went to Sudan with the 
conscious intention of exploiting it for slaves and gold. Exploitation remained main 	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motive at least of the local officials. But they were disappointed for both. Expected 
amount of gold could not be found. Slaves died on the route due to the various diseases. 
Secondly, there was a failure in the human material of the government officials. Service 
in Sudan was hated, and was regarded as a punishment; consequently only the worst 
types of officials were to be found there. Thirdly, they took into consideration of 
expansion rather than consolidation. Lack of communication and transportation made 
extremely difficult to control such a long-distance country.80  
3.2: Modernization in the Turco-Egyptian Period 	  
There are three aspects of modernization in the Turco-Egyptian period. First, the 
introduction of technical devises; second, the development of a modern administrative 
system; and third, the direct impact of the west were the original source of the 
‘modernization’ in Sudan society. The three western inventions played an important 
part in the nineteenth century Sudan: firearms, steamers and electric telegraph. These 
new devices enabled the northern society and its Turco-Egyptian rulers to overcome the 
two principal obstacles to move along the White Nile; tribal raids comes from riverfront 
and the immense barrier of the Sadd which is a vast swamp in southern Sudan blocking 
approach both to the Equatorial Nile and the Bahr al-Ghazal.81  
 In the first place, the Turco-Egyptian administration was highly centralized. The 
Sudanese provinces were directly connected to a department in Cairo. Although 
representatives of the ruling families continued to hold office, they were no longer 
autonomous. The power of government stems from especially its armed forces. The 
improvements in communication technology facilitated to control such a vast country. 
In the time of Ismail the introduction of steamers greatly increased control over the 
central riverine areas while the development of a telegraph network, though quite weak, 
contributed to centralization. With the support of these instruments, the Turco-Egyptian 
administration to a large extent achieved to provide security and order in the settled 
areas and along the main routes by suppression the turmoil among nomads and 
enforcing the tax payment.82  
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The religious life of northern Sudan society was also greatly affected by changes 
imposed by Turco-Egyptian rule. Previously, the religious leadership has been in hands 
of hereditary teachers (fakis) of the religious sciences and Sufism. In the Turco-
Egyptian period, the traditional Islam of the Sudan faced with two serious threats.  On 
the one hand, the new regime tried to form friendly relationships with these religious 
leaders; on the other hand, they created a formal hierarchy consisting of qadıs, muftis 
and other cult officials properly educated in Sunni thought as part of classical Ottoman 
legal system. They also facilitated the education of the Sudanese ulema at Azhar. 
Furthermore, In 1850s new arrangements made in the legal system of Egypt and Sudan 
paved the way for the administration of commercial and criminal code in secular courts. 
The change diminished the prestige of religious authority. Indeed, these courts lacked 
the credibility in the eyes of the Sudanese Muslim due to the fact that they implemented 
the Ottoman Empire’s Hanafi School of law regardless of the Sudanese ties with Maliki 
School tradition in the area. The Turkiyya also encouraged a religious orthodoxy 
favored in the Ottoman Empire. The government has built many mosques and staffed 
religious schools and courts with teachers and judges trained in accordance with Sunni 
sharia at Cairo's Al Azhar University. The government promoted the traditional sufi 
branch Khatmiyyah, because its leaders made cooperation with the regime. But 
Sudanese Muslims condemned the official orthodoxy as decadent because it had 
rejected many popular beliefs and practices.83  
 The new administration established by “the Turks” was relayed on a strict 
hierarchal structure between center and local authority. At the head of the affairs, there 
was a Governor-General, responsible to the viceroy in Cairo. Under him, the country 
was divided into provinces, each under its own mudir, or governor. A province was sub-
divided into districts, each under an administrator, who was called a kashif. The daily 
affairs of the people were still controlled by their own leaders. The great nomad tribes 
had their hereditary chiefs; while the villagers in the settled communities elected their 
own Sheiks, who were responsible to a district Shaikh, and he in turn to the Kashifs.84  
It should be here noted that all the government officials in Sudan were known as 
Turks. The term Turk was applied indiscriminately to Circassian, Kurds, Albanians, 
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Syrians, Greeks, Egyptians, and indeed to all the races of the multi-ethnic Ottoman 
Empire. In later years, Egyptians also European official appointed by Egypt became 
more prominent. But for Sudanese, the government official remained simply Turks, 
even today in the more remote parts of the Sudan, the term still used to describe any 
European.85 From a Sudanese historian Fadlalla’s point of view: 
Egyptian occupation of Sudan was disastrous. Under the new 
government established in 1821, which was known as the Turkiyah or Turkish 
regime, soldiers lived off the land and exacted exorbitant taxes from the 
population. They also destroyed many ancient Meroitic pyramids searching for 
hidden gold. Furthermore, slave trading increased, causing many of the 
inhabitants of the fertile Al-Jazirah, heartland of Funj, to flee to escape the slave 
traders. Within a year of pasha’s victory, 30.000 Sudanese slaves went to Egypt 
for training and induction into the army. However so many perished from 
disease and the unfamiliar climate that the remaining slaves could only be used 
in garrisons in Sudan.86 
Most of the sixty years of Egyptian rule displayed inefficient administration 
because of the inferior quality of the administrative officers posted to Sudan. Just as 
Britain sent out the incapable officials to the colonies, some of the Egyptians dispatched 
to the Sudan as a punishment for crimes committed in Egypt or for incompetence at 
homeland; thereby they lacked public spirit.87  
3.3: Era of Ismail and Suppression of Slave Trade 	  
Muhammad Ali's immediate successors, Abbas I (1849-54) and Said (1854-63), 
lacked leadership qualities and paid little attention to Sudan, but the reign of Ismail 
(1863-79) revitalized Egyptian interest in the country. In 1865 the Ottoman Empire 
relinquished the Red Sea coast and its ports to Egypt. Two years later, the Ottoman 
sultan granted Ismail the title of khedive. Egypt organized and deployed troops in the 
new provinces of Upper Nile, Bahr al Ghazal, and Equatoria and, in 1874, conquered 
and annexed Darfur. Ismail named Europeans to provincial governorships and 
appointed Sudanese to more responsible government positions. Under the pressure of 
Britain, Ismail had to take steps to complete the elimination of the slave trade in the 
northern Sudan. The khedive tried to establish a new European model army whose 
human sources no longer hinged on slaves. However, this modernization process 
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created disquiet. Urban merchant class and the Baqqara Arabs which took benefits from 
slave trade were disturbed because of the efforts of slavery suppression.88 
We have to bear in mind that most of the people in the Sudan, especially those 
living in the remote parts and the nomads, were never brought completely under 
authority. Mehmed Mihri’s traveler account written in 1326 (1908) also affirmed this 
issue. Because, he denoted that Sudanese people has not officially conscripted by 
government but if they voluntarily demand to join army, the government welcomed.89 
When Ismail Pasha came to power, his first goal was to re-establish a central authority 
in the Sudan. Therefore, he signed a decree of centralization and introduced reforms in 
Egypt and also in the Sudan. Telegraphic lines connected all the chief towns by ties the 
local district to center, a railway line was laid down from Wadi Halfa southwards, five 
primary schools were opened for the education in five important towns, and state 
subsidies were allocated to teachers and students in the Mosque schools.90 There are 
three characteristic themes of the Egyptian Sudan which is broadly attributed the era of 
Ismail in the two decades. The first is a great expansion of the territories ruled by the 
Khedive. The second is an adamant struggle against the slave trade. The third is the 
increasing employment in high military and civil offices of men who were neither 
Muslims nor Ottoman subjects, but for most part Europeans namely, Christians.91 For 
instance, Charles Gordon who was appointed as governor-general of the Sudan was the 
first Christian and European to hold this post. The failures of the regime resulted from 
inefficient officials and their abuses centered on the taxes. Taxes were quite heavy for 
the people to bear, and in the levying of the taxes inhuman and cruel methods were 
being implemented. The majority of the administrative staff kept part of the money for 
themselves or accept bribes for allowing some people to avoid payment.92  
Slavery had been an institution of Sudanese life throughout history. Until 1843 
Muhammad Ali maintained a state monopoly on slave trading in Egypt. Thereafter, 
authorities sold licenses to private traders who competed with government. In 1854 
Cairo ended state participation in the slave trade, and in 1860 Egypt prohibited the slave 
trade in response to European pressure. However, the Egyptian army failed to enforce 	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the prohibition against the private armies of the slave traders because; the introduction 
of steamboats and firearms enabled slave traders to oppose the restrictions and bans. A 
further measure against the slave trade, embarked on June 1864, was the establishment 
of a force of river-police. But it failed again because of profound interests of mercantile 
community and lack of honest and devoted officials. In 1869 British explorer Sir 
Samuel Baker became the governor of Equatoria Province, with orders to annex 
southern part of the country and to suppress the slave trade. In 1874 Charles George 
Gordon, a British officer, succeeded Baker. Gordon conducted rather rigid policies; 
disarmed many slave traders and hanged those who defied him. By the time he became 
Sudan's governor general in 1877, Gordon to large extent succeed in controlling the 
slave trade.93 The khedive concluded the Anglo-Egyptian Slave Trade Convention 
which determines the termination of the sale and purchase of slaves in Sudan by 1880. 
Ismail and Gordon liked each other very well from the beginning, and their 
approach to the problem of the southern Sudan was same. Each believed that the only 
ways to suppress the slave trade were to establish good government, and to develop a 
profitable and legitimate trade along the river from the undeveloped area to capital; to 
establish friendly relationships with tribal families which had an influence on Sudanese 
people.94  When Gordon was appointed governor-general of the Sudan he was faced 
with the consequences of Ismail’s expansionist policy; disturbed frontier with 
Abyssinia, revolt in Darfur, and anarchy in the Bahr al-Ghazal.95  
The charge against Gordon was, firstly, concentrating on the abolition of the 
slave trade in order to the neglect of traditional conditions of the region. Secondly, the 
cruel methods implemented against the slave traders damaged the economy of the 
Sudan; it leaded to increasing the hostility of the people and weakening the prestige of 
government. Thirdly, employment of Europeans for crucial positions triggered native 
resentment towards all foreigners, including Egyptians. Fourthly, even though he acted 
on behalf of Egyptian government, indeed he served the interests of Britain.96 All these 
factors alienated the Sudanese people towards the Egyptian and indirectly Ottoman 
administration and roused up xenophobia among the people. 
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CHAPTER IV: THE MAHDIYYA PERIOD IN THE SUDAN (1881-1899) 	  
Sudan uprising initially arose as a religious movement in 1881. The dispute 
between the Fashoda mudir, Rashid Bey who was charged of collecting taxes on behalf 
of the Egyptian Khedive and the son of a boat builder Muhammad Ahmad has pulled 
the trigger of the series of irrepressible incidents.  After a while, in holy month 
Ramadan, Muhammad Ahmed declared himself as al- Mahdi al- Muntazar ‘the 
expected guide’, who would restore Islam and relieve the world from corruption. His 
name was associated with three unique titles in Islam - the imam, the successor of the 
Apostle of God and Mahdi. He envisaged himself recapitulating the role of the prophet, 
by restoring the community that prophet Muhammad had formerly established in holy 
places.97 His message was simple enough: ‘I am the Mahdi, the successor of God’s 
prophet. Stop paying your taxes to the infidel Turks, and let any who come upon a Turk 
kill him for the Turks are infidels.’98  At this point, it should be kept in mind that Turks 
refer to both Egyptian and European administrators rather than directly to Ottoman 
officials. 
It is frequently asserted that the Mahdi revolt emanates from the oppression and 
misgovernment of the Egyptians. However, this claim was insufficient to explain the 
deeper reasons of the outbreak of the revolt in the certain place and time due to the fact 
that Sudanese people have been ruled by Egyptians for sixty years. Yet, timing of 
outbreak is precise and deserves to be examined in depth. Provincial authority, directly 
responsible for keeping peace and order in the region had failed to intervene the 
uprising at early stage. Sudanese historian Shibeika mentions an explanation offered by 
the Governor-General that Fashoda was not in telegraphic communication with 
Khartoum at that time and the only means of passing information and orders was the 	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steamer which was obviously slow and ineffective in dealing with such an urgent 
matter. 99  Furthermore, at the beginning, the governors had high confidence and 
minimized the danger by attributing all the troubles to the Dongolese relatives of Mahdi 
who dealt in slavery. They thought that Sudanese would never be united because of the 
tribal jealousies. They believed those rivalries amid the tribes would prevent the 
movement reaching the degree of shaking the government’s authority. However, they 
did not take account of the religious factor.100 
4.1: The Life of Sudanese Mahdi 	  
Muhammad Ahmad was born on 12 August 1844 (27 Receb 1260) at Labab 
Island on the Nile in Dongola, and died in 22 June 1885 (9 Ramazan 1302) in 
Omdurman.101 He declared himself the Mahdi four years before his death in 1881. His 
family was long known as descendants of the prophet. Besides, his name and his 
father’s name were the same with prophet Muhammad that was in accordance with 
some hadiths describing the expected Mahdi. His father Abdullah was a boat-builder 
and had given him his early education in reading and writing the Quran. When he was a 
child, his family moved to the town of Karari, near north of Omdurman where his father 
died on the journey.  After his father’s death, he continued to receive religious 
education in Sudan while his brothers dealt with their father’s job, boat building.	  He 
took his first education from Sheikh Amin al-Suwaylih in the Gezira, and then 
subsequently went to Berber and became the pupil of the Sheikh Muhammad al-
Dikayr.102 In those days, Sudanese students generally go to al-Azhar in Cairo in order to 
receive theological education. However, after his training Muhammad Ahmed chose 
mysticism way and became the disciple of Sheikh Muhammad Sharif Nur al-Da’im, 
who was the grandson of the founder of the Sammaniyya sufi order, Ahmad al-Tayyib 
al-Bashir. Later, as a sheikh of the order, Muhammad Ahmed spent seven years in 
seclusion and gained a reputation as a mystic and teacher. Then, he became 
Sammaniyah leader.103 At the end of this period, He established his own sufi order on 
the Island of Aba on the White Nile, and married the daughter of his grand-uncle, 
Muhammad Sharif who resided on the island for some years. His two brothers 	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Mohammed and Hamed, also lived there, dealt with good trade in boat building and 
supported the young sheikh.  
Later on Muhammad Ahmed and Muhammad Sharif’s ways were split. There 
are two narratives in the literature about this separation. First one narrated by Rudolph 
Slatin, an Australian in khedive’s service who later became the first governor of Darfur 
Province appointed by Egypt. He cited that one day Muhammad Sharif has gathered his 
sheikhs and disciples to celebrate the feast of the circumcision of his sons and he had 
also allowed people to amuse themselves by singing and dancing as they liked. He 
would forgive in God’s name, any sins that might be committed during the feast which 
were contrary to religious law. But Muhammad Ahmed took up a position against 
Muhammad Sharif and he stated that singing, dancing and playing were infringements 
against the law of God and no man even a sheiks could pardon such sins.  When those 
thoughts reached Muhammad Sharif, he became angry and dismissed him from the 
order despite the numerous apologies and emotional appeals, refused to forgive him.104 
Second narration pointed out by Muhammad Sharif that Muhammad Ahmed declared 
himself the Mahdi and wanted Sharif obey him.105 In the weak of this irreconcilable 
split, Muhammad Ahmad approached to rival leader of the Sammaniyya order, Shaikh 
al-Qurashi. He would accept him gladly due to the fact that there was a jealousy 
between him and Muhammad Sharif. Then, Muhammad Ahmad and his disciples made 
all preparations went to Masallamiyah. When al-Qurashi died in 1880, all his disciples 
pledged allegiance to Muhammad Ahmad. Around this time, Muhammad Ahmad first 
met with Abdullah bin Muhammad al-Taaishi who would become his caliph and head 
of the Mahdist state in the upcoming years.106  
4.2: The Manifestation of Mahdiship 	  
On 29 June 1881, Muhammad Ahmad publicly proclaimed himself as Mahdi. 
Indeed, idea of the Mahdiship had been already present among the Sudanese people 
prior to Muhammad Ahmad's manifestation.107 Muhammad Ahmad was aware of this 
expectation and told one of his dreams to the Abdullah bin Taaishi and other disciples 	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that prophet Muhammad repeatedly heralded him as expected Mahdi.108 Then, the 
Mahdi proclaimed a holy war against the foreigners. He collected his followers. He 
roused the local tribes. He wrote letters to all parts of the Sudan, calling upon the people 
to fight for a purified religion, the freedom of the soil. He promised to clear the land 
from the Turks. The watchword of the revolt is “Better, thousands of graves than a 
dollar tax.”109 There are three principal groups in the Mahdi’s letter: The Turks, the evil 
ulema, and the unbelievers. By the Turks, he means alien officials of the Turco-
Egyptian administration; by the evil ulema, the members of the official Islamic 
hierarchy who have indulged at the innovations of the Turks and have denounced 
Muhammad Ahmad’s claim to be the Mahdi. Behind these two groups there are 
“unbelievers” specifically, the British, the real owners of the authority in the Sudan.110 
At that time, some of letters has reached Muhammad Rauf Pasha, the governor general 
of Sudan. According to Shibeika, Rauf Pasha should not be blamed not taking the 
matter seriously. Because; there was no such an incident in the history of Sudan that a 
Dervish could be a long-standing threat for the government authorities. However, Rauf 
Pasha’s reaction seems to be typically usual. He sent a telegraphic message to the Qadi 
(religious judge) of al-Kawwah and instructed him to go with two men to Aba Island 
and investigate the truth of the rumors. The orders were fulfilled and the qadi confirmed 
the rumors and sent a copy of one of the letters of Muhammad Ahmad to Khartoum. As 
expected, next step was to send a peaceful mission to so-called Mahdi in order to 
persuade him to give up his presumptuous claims. Muhammad Abu al-Sa’ud, the 
assistant Governor General, who had an experience and many connections with the 
Sudanese people selected by Rauf Pasha to conduct the negotiation process with Mahdi. 
It was also wise step that some relatives of Muhammad Ahmad accompanied the 
mission team. However, despite all the persuasion endeavors he did not change his 
position.  Hence nothing remained but to send sufficient troops to capture Muhammad 
Ahmad. On 12 August 1881 the Mahdi Dervishes and Egyptian soldiers met in the 
battle of Aba and the Mahdi won his first brilliant victory. 111  
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The Mahdist movement demanded a return to the simplicity of early Islam, 
abstention from alcohol and tobacco, and strict seclusion of women.112 Sometimes the 
Mahdi was called caliphate al-Resul, the successor of the Prophet and sometimes even 
they dignified him with the sacred title of Nebi, prophet. In truth the Prophet 
Mohammad occupied in the people’s mind quite a secondary position, and the 
celebration of his birthday was forbidden by the Mahdi. Furthermore, Father Joseph 
Ohrwalder noted that one day two men discussed that the Mahdi would have a higher 
seat in heaven than the Prophet while god was higher than the Mahdi.113 On the other 
hand, According to him, the title of the Mahdi as successor of the Prophet demonstrates 
that this uprising was also directed against the Ottoman Sultan who claims this title.114 
However, considering the Mahdi movements throughout the Islamic history, all of 
them, particularly the Sunnis, view the Mahdi as the successor of prophet Muhammad 
who reinvigorates the caliphate. Thereby the main motives behind the Sudanese Mahdi 
uprising needs to be deeply scrutinized to grasp why and when the rebellion occurred 
and against whom?  
Firstly, to explain the timing of outbreak, the incidents have been occurring 
beyond the Sudan could be beneficial. With the deposition of Ismail in 1879, his 
successor, Muhammad Tewfik who was known as a puppet of the Europeans came to 
the power. This change paved way for the opposition gathered around the army leader, 
Urabi Pasha and eventually ended with the British occupation in 1882. The collapse of 
khedive’s authority in 1879 and revolution attempts weakened Egypt’s control over 
Sudanese provinces. In fact, there is no evidence that proving any direct connection 
between the supporters of Urabi in Egypt and Mahdi in the Sudan but emergence of 
both movements in such a close time and place pushes us thinking that both Urabi and 
Mahdi benefited from the power-vacuum caused by the disappearance of Ismail. 
However, a supporter of Urabi named Ahmad al-Awwam had been exiled to Khartoum 
after the Urabi’s revolt attempt. He then wrote an account about the recent Egyptian 
affairs and contacted with the Mahdi’s adherents. Because of his relationship he was 
tried and put to death. His work later publicized in Omdurman by the Mahdist 
authorities. But it was the final stage of Mahdi movement when the book reached the 
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people.115 Hence, It is not sufficient to deduce from his account that Urabi revolt had an 
considerable effect on the outbreak of the Mahdi riot.  
As the reasons of the Mahdi revolt, an anonymous reporter who wrote set of 
letters in Egyptian daily newspaper, Al-Ahram explains it around the wrongdoings of 
the British administration in Sudan. According to this Egyptian writer, one of the causes 
of the revolt was the high-taxes imposed during the Gordon Pasha’s governorship. The 
other one was the prohibition of the marrying of the girls who were under certain age. It 
was against the sharia law and increased tension on Muhammad Ahmad. Furthermore, 
Na’um Shuqayr, a Lebanese serving in the intelligence department of the Egyptian army 
published his Arabic book Ta’rikh al-Sudan al-qadim wa’l –hadith wa- jughrafiyatuhu 
in 1903 in Cairo which is the most comprehensive account on Sudan history. Shuqayr 
had worked on the primary sources and improved different and deeper understanding 
than his contemporaries who at that time studied on the nineteenth century Sudan.  The 
successors did not go beyond the repetition of his findings and conclusion until the late 
1950s.  
He explained the reasons of the Mahdi revolt in four plausible factors. The first 
apparent reason was the mismanagement of Turco-Egyptian administration. The 
brutality and violence towards the local inhabitants increased the tension and when the 
time came turned out to take revenge. However, this does not explain the exact reason 
of revolt. Because; first Sudan was the exile place for the Egyptian officers who were 
mostly incapable and weak. Secondly, this mismanagement situation was not new and it 
was known in Sudan under previous rulers. Briefly, it was not an invention of the 
Ottomans. The second reason for the revolt was the heavy taxes levied from the 
Sudanese by the Turco-Egyptian rulers. In fact, most tax collectors demanded higher 
amounts than actual tax dues. However, the taxes had decreased during Khedive Tewfik 
reign but the brutal methods applied for extracting the taxes caused the initial 
resentment among the Sudanese. The third reason listed by Shuqayr’s account was the 
suppression of the slave trade especially 1870s under Khedive İsmail. Sudan economy 
was based on slavery and the share of the slaves in the economy gradually increased 
over the years. As a result of the forbidding the slave trade, wealthy people lost their 
major source of income. Due to the fact that most extreme methods to suppress slave 	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trade implemented by the Christian governors such as Baker, Gordon and Gessi, 
Sudanese people associated it with that religion. The fourth reason was the traditional 
politics of Turkish administration; favoritism implemented by Turkish administrators in 
favor of the Khatmiyya order and Sha’iqiyya tribe. There was no superiority of 
Sha’iqiyya tribe in the eyes of the other tribes whereas they were helping the rulers to 
collect taxes and thereby were exempt from the taxes. On the other hand, The 
Khatmiyya order had privilege because of its close connection with the holy city of 
Mecca and its rulers. This favoritism alienated all the other orders and created resent in 
Sudanese society.  
Moreover, there were several reasons of Mahdi’s success. Firstly, the 
government had not give an efficient response to Mahdi at the early stage of his riot. 
Secondly, Muhammad Ahmed’s revolt largely coincided with the Urabi’s uprising in 
Egypt which prevented the authorities sending sufficient troops to the Sudan. Thirdly, 
Egyptian battalions deployed in the Sudan were at first weak and unprepared. And 
lastly, both Egyptians and Ottomans did not develop a coherent efficient policy toward 
the movement. Their underestimation of Muhammad Ahmad’s manifestation expanded 
the dimensions of the incident.116 In addition, fanaticism facilitated the advance of the 
movement. It gave the people motivation to fight and enabled them to gather under a 
common object: religion. It made all the personal and tribal disputes insignificant. For 
Churchill who was the British army officer and war correspondent during the Mahdi 
period, it seems like a communism under the flag of religion.117	  According to him, the 
original causes of the Mahdi movement were social and racial. Before the Mahdi, 
Sudanese people were miserable and they were devoid of spirit. When the Mahdi came, 
he gave the tribes the enthusiasm they lacked. He put soul into the hearts of his 
countrymen to clean up the native land from foreigners. He roused the patriotism and 
religion in the Sudan. The movement only opposed to decaying system of government 
and society.118 Indeed, Churchill’ view most concentrated on the nationalistic and 
religious factors. He believed that it was the beginning of a new nation whose founder 
was Muhammad Ahmad.  
In this period, the Mahdi movement was mainly reinforced by three 
distinguished groups which were known as Ansar (helpers), just as the Prophet 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  116	  Gabriel R. Warburg, Historical Discord in the Nile Valley, pp. 22-24.	  117	  Winston Churchill, The River War : An Historical Account of the Reconquest of the Soudan, p. 19. 118	  Ibid., p.33-34	  
	  	  
	   42	  
Mohammed’s followers were known. There were first the genuinely pious men who 
were closely acquainted with him for years and unquestioningly bonded him at heart. 
They wished to be governed by the holy law of Islam in their region. When the Mahdi 
and others complained of misgovernment and purification, they were meaning 
theological corruption rather than political ones. A second group of the Ansar had more 
political concern. These were the tribes who had settled on the southern fringe of the 
Nile and worked as boatmen, traders and soldiers. Directly, or indirectly, they were 
connected with slave trade, and Gordon’s policy for the abolishing of slave trade 
mitigated their prosperity. When Gordon and Ismail were gone, an opportunity to turn 
back to their old ways of life showed up. These men were neither theologians nor 
devotees, but they merely hide their political and economic interest under the veil of 
religion. The third group consisted of the Baqqara nomads straightforwardly oppose 
came under the central authority which required paying taxes. Hence, Mahdi’s 
commitments ‘to kill the Turks and cease pay taxes’ was welcomed by them.119 
Interestingly, Mahdi’s war cry was not the “Down with the Christians!” but “Down with 
the Turks”, indeed he means Egyptians. As previously explained, the word Turk was 
habitually used in the Sudan. Because, Sudanese people were not familiar with the 
changes in the political arena and were not aware of the Ottomans changing position in 
Egypt or capability to interfere to the Egyptian affairs.  
After the failure of the first government expedition due to the disagreement 
between two commanders, without delay Rauf Pasha set up new plans for future war 
with Mahdi’s Dervishes.  A force collected from the surrounding provinces under the 
commandment of Muhammad Pasha Said organized the second expedition to Mahdi 
who at that time settled down Nuba Mountains, south of the Kordofan. But this second 
attempt also failed because of the advantageous positions of Dervishes who were 
accustomed to live in mountainous area. The successive victories and gained booties 
had increased the Mahdi’s reputation among the Sudanese and strengthened the belief 
that he was the true Mahdi. At that time, Rauf Pasha thought that it was unnecessary to 
send new forces. If the movement left alone, it would eventually collapse itself. Hence, 
all operations suspended for a while.  
In the meantime he informed Cairo about the new developments. Egyptian 
government who occupied with the Urabi Pasha’s riot at that time and just managed to 	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appoint Abdülkadir Hilmi Pasha as the governor-general of the Sudan. In the meantime, 
under the command of Yusuf Pasha Hasan al-Shallali, a new troop established against 
the Mahdi forces. But the commander likewise miscalculated the strength, the 
intelligence and devotion of his enemy. Moreover, when he advanced to the region of 
Qadir Mountain, his troops suffer from the increasing exhaustion. In such a time, Ansar, 
the Mahdi’s adherents organized a surprise attack on 30 May 1882 (12 Recep 1299) and 
won a third overwhelming victory. The Ansar whose number already reached 8000 in 
the wake of the Aba battle, now gained more adherents particularly from the western 
tribes.120 Mahdi thought that it was the right time to advance into Kordofan (today, 
constituting the central and southern area of Sudan) and capture El-Obeid (today,	   the 
capital of the state of North Kordofan, in southern Sudan), the provincial capital. He 
was in contact with the tribes who were in revolt against the Egyptian administration 
and took their support. On 19 January 1883, El-Obeid fell into the hands of Ansar. It 
was the first considerable town seized by Mahdi forces.  
The last years of Turco-Egyptian rule in the Sudan were predominately directed 
by the British government since the British occupation of Egypt occurred in 1882. At 
first, it was regarded by Gladstone’s government that occupation was a temporary 
measure which would end with khedive Tewfik’s consolidation of power in Egypt 
again. Hence, the revolt in Sudan has not been taken into consideration by British 
government. Sudan affairs were beyond the responsibilities of Britain that merely 
avoided from further expenditures. However, a success in Sudan could restore the 
prestige of the Khedivate and Tewfik was allowed to establish an expeditionary force 
that mostly consist of Urabi’s demoralized soldiers in order to capture Khartoum. 
Former British officer of the Indian Army, William Hicks was appointed as commander 
in chief and Alaaddin Sıddıq Pasha accompanied him as governor-general. The first 
contact with Ansar occurred on 29 April 1883 and Hicks’s army defeated the mahdist 
garrison in Merabi. Then he returned to Khartoum to prepare for el-Obeid’s seizure 
where the Mahdi lived. Muhammad Ahmad had received the news of Hicks’s attack and 
carried his camp outside the el-Obeid. The first contact between the two forces was 
made on 3 November and the clash had been waged for days in the forested area. On 5 
November, the Ansar surrounded the Egyptian troops who were suffering from serious 
lack of water and sleep and Mahdi ordered a general attack. The battle at Shaykan ended 	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with the great defeat of the Egyptian troops and both Alaaddin and Hicks Pasha and his 
250 Egyptian soldiers have been massacred.121 
One week later, Muhammad Ahmed took the city of el-Obeid. This victory 
increased enormously the prestige of the Mahdi, not only in the Sudan but also all 
Muslim populated areas in the world. The delegators from all over the Muslim world, 
Hejaz, Tunis, Morocco came to visit the Mahdi and listened his summons. The 
administration of Khartoum began to withdraw the garrisons with entire ammunition 
from the Fashoda, al-Kawwa, Shatt and Dueim because of the fear that Mahdi’s next 
attack would target the capital. The most serious consequence of the Shaykan battle was 
the collapse of the Egyptian administration in Darfur and Bahr al-Gazal.122 The western 
part of the Sudan had come under the rule of Muhammad Ahmad.  
The battle of the Mahdi continued after the fall of al-Obeid. He sent Osman 
Digna, the ex-slave holder in Sewakin to the shore of Red Sea on 8 May 1883. By 
receiving the support of the neighboring tribes he defeated the British and Egyptian 
forces in the eastern part of the country. British government who undertook the 
protection of Red Sea ports compelled to intervene in the issue. Right after the harsh 
debates in the parliament, three battalions had been sent to Sewakin under the command 
of General Graham. When he dealt with the forces of Osman Digna, the Ansar had 
already surrounded Tokar,	  near the Red Sea in northeastern Sudan. Graham’s effort had 
remained ineffective and in 1884 eastern Sudan except Sewakin fell totally under the 
rule of Mahdi.  
At the beginning, the British government led by Gladstone and his liberal party 
did not wish to intervene Sudanese affairs. According to them, the Sudanese were a 
people rightly struggling to be free from the yoke of the corrupt Pasha’s of Egypt and 
the slave-traders.123 However, the successive defeats confronted both Egyptian and 
British governments with the problem of the future of the Sudan. British government 
recommendation was to evacuate the Sudan outright. This suggestion created disquiet in 
Cairo and caused the resignation of all ministers. Armenian Christian Nubar Pasha who 
would implement the advice formed a new ministry. At this juncture, the Pall Mall 
Gazette led public opinion that Charles Gordon should be sent to the Sudan to tackle the 	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situation. As a result of this press campaign in Britain, Gordon was sent out to fulfill a 
mission which was variously understood by the different parties. The British 
government charged him of reporting on the best method of carrying out evacuation. 
However, Baring who was the British agent and consul-general in Cairo thought that 
Gordon was instructed to perform the evacuation. On the other hand, he was appointed 
as governor-general by the Egyptian khedive in order to restore the government. Due to 
the misunderstanding and confusions in the communication, Gordon took the last order 
seriously. 124  Indeed, Egyptian government was opposing to Charles Gordon’s 
appointment to such a post of command. Because the movement in the Sudan was a 
religious and appointment of a Christian to crucial position would result in alienating 
those tribes who had still remained loyal to the Egyptian government.125However, he 
arrived in Khartoum on 18 February 1884.  
Charles Gordon, born in 1833, was a British general distinguished himself in the 
Crimean and Chinese war.  He is known as the first Christian governor to be assigned to 
Sudan on behalf of the Egyptian khedive. From 1874 to 1876 he was the governor 
general of Equator region. He was tasked to establish regular administration and reports 
on the developments about the region. In 1877, he became the governor of whole Sudan 
and he was granted the title of Pasha. During the years of 1877 and 1879, khedive 
Ismail charged him of two significant matters: suppression of the slave trade and 
improving the Egyptian-Sudan relationships. The convention between the British and 
Egyptian governments for the suppression of the slave signed on 4 August 1877 has 
been one of the important outcomes of his period.126 Moreover, he was also to deal with 
solving settlements problems with Ethiopia, an uprising against the khedivate in Darfur, 
and controlling of Bahr al-Ghazal, which was in the hands of the son of a slaver.127 
When the time was 1884, Charles Gordon had already known the Sudan and its people. 
His extraordinary military success in China and his earlier service in Sudan put forward 
his name in the British public. However, religious devotion, military strength and 
political skill of the Mahdi have been underestimated and Gordon has been appointed 
for the task but despite his long service his ability was execrating. Firstly, he was almost 
ignorant of Arabic. Secondly, he excessively used his mind and he deluged both his 	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superiors and subordinates with detailed and complicated schemes. Thirdly, he had 
strong and strict prejudices.  
For instance, the crisis living with Zubayr Pasha who was an old slave trader 
and a leader of a military force in Sudan had never been settled. Plus, the mood of the 
Sudanese had been changed in 1880s. British public opinion saw Gordon as 
emancipator of slaves whereas he was the man who destroyed the foundations of their 
prosperity in the eyes of Sudanese.128 A few days before Gordon’s arrival in Khartoum, 
his proclamations have been publicly displayed in the vicinity of province. According to 
those proclamations, first Mahdi was recognized as governor of Kordofan, second the 
taxes were reduced and lastly slave trade was allowed from now on.129 
When Gordon came to Khartoum, Muhammad Ahmad carried his garrisons 
from al-Obeid to Ombdurman located opposite the city of Khartoum and Osman Diqna 
held the Red Sea coast. Berber had already fallen under the rule of Ansar. Thereby, 
Gordon was in a tight corner. He went to battle with eight thousand soldiers but he did 
not take into account that Sudanese soldiers under his command could change their 
sides at the battle. As it might be expected the first regiment of the troops consisting of 
the Sudanese soldiers abandoned the battlefield. Only Egyptian soldiers continued to 
war. The forces of the Mahdi seized the city of Khartoum on 26 January 1885, and 
killed General Gordon. The major cities of Egyptian Sudan from Red Sea to Darfur and 
from Dongola to Bahr al- Gazal now came under the domination of Muhammad 
Ahmad. The center of the state has been moved to Omdurman and new mosques and 
buildings have been established there.130 
In the first, it was a mistake to send any British official to Khartoum. The 
task he had to perform was well high impossible of execution, and his 
nomination involved the assumption of responsibilities on the port of the 
British government which it was desirable to avoid. Secondly, if anyone 
was to be sent, it was a mistake to choose General Gordon. In spite of 
many noble traits in his character he was wanting in some of the qualities 
which were essential to the successful accomplishment of his mission. 
Thirdly, when once General Gordon had been sent, he should have been 
left a free hand to long as he kept within the main lines of the policy 
which he was authorized to execute. It is, in my opinion, to be regretted 
that general Gordon was not allowed to employ Zubeir Pasha but any 
view held as to the probable results of employing him must be 	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conjectural. Fourtly, the question of whether an expedition should or 
should not have been sent from Suakin to Berber in the spring of 1884 
depends on the military practicability of the undertaking a point on 
which the best military authorities differed in opinion. Fiftly, a great and 
inexcusable mistake was made in delaying for so long the dispatch of 
Gordon relief expedition. Sixthly, the government acted wisely after the 
fall of Khartoum in eventually adopting a defensive policy and in 
ordering a retreat to Wadi Halfa. Lastly, it may be avoid that the British 
government were extraordinarily unlucky. Whatever amount of foresight 
be shown, success in doubtful and difficult enterprises, such as the 
Gordon mission and the Nile expedition, must always depend a good 
deal on adventitious circumstances which can not be foreseen, and over 
which no government can exercise any control. 131 
Gordon’s death had affected the British nation deeply. Prominent journal of 
those days ‘The Times’ had summed up the British people’s reaction saying that the 
shock caused by the news of the fall of Khartoum had no parallel in the experience of 
that generation. On Saturday afternoon, 16 February 1884, British people arranged a 
public demonstration against the government’s policy in Egypt and Sudan.132 Gladstone 
had to resign as prime minister in 1885. Thereby, Mahdi had accidentally relieved 
Abdülhamid II of his greatest enemy Gladstone.133 However, the Sudanese Mahdi 
unexpectedly fell sick and died because of typhus on 22 June 1885 (9 Ramadan 1302).  
Thus, the revolutionary phase of the Mahdiyya ended and consolidation process started 
with his successor caliph Abdullah. 
When the people heard of the death news, they were surprised and felt 
disappointed. Because he died before he fulfilled his commitments. They thought that 
he was the false one. The province was boiling and the leaders of society convened to 
discuss the current situation. At this moment, his successor, Abdullah bin Muhammad 
al-Taaishi, proclaimed himself the caliph of the Mahdi. He was already chosen by the 
Mahdi as his successor before his death. After a long discussion and struggle, the caliph 
Abdullah became the legitimate ruler of Sudan. He ruled the Mahdist state for thirteen 
years until its defeat in 1898 when the British army triumphed against the Mahdist 
forces. He coined silver money on behalf of him134 and declared himself “Sultan-us 
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Sudan”.135  His declaration was also a challenge to Ottoman Sultan’s both religious and 
wordly authority. Abdülhamid II was concern about the strategic position of the region. 
It was very close to Hejaz area and spreading of the ideas or any attack organized by the 
caliph’s troops was threating the security of the holy places. Hence, when the Sultan 
learned that caliph Abdullah proclaimed himself as sultan, he immeadiatly ordered 
sending of three or four small-sized steamers in order to protect the shores of Hejaz. 
Also, another five steamers in Jedda could be reinforced other ships founded in Grete 
and Paris if any rapid attack occurred. After a month later, a silver coin found in the 
Hejaz area increased the tension in the region and demonstrated the seriousness of the 
event. 
 4.3: Overthrow of Mahdism 	  
After the death of Mahdi, Sudanese riot lost its importance in the frame of 
Egyptian question. Britain reached the conclusion that similar structure of 
administration with Egypt cannot be established in Sudan yet. Hence, Britain did not 
change its policy for the next decade and stayed in Egypt and watched the events in 
Sudan. Evelyn Baring136 who was the de facto ruler of Egypt had pursued wait and see 
policy towards the Sudan which was based on there main arguments. First of these 
arguments was that as long as British forces or Egyptian forces under the command of 
British officers remained in Egypt, Dervishes ruled by caliph Abdullah could not be a 
serious threat for Egypt. Second, as long as Egyptian security was ensured no attempt 
should be made for the reconquest of Sudan until Egypt’s military and financial 	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hazret-i hilafet-penahi muhtacin-i hüccacı almak üzere gönderilen Paris vapuru da ba’del-avde yine oraya 
gönderileceğinden şu halde Cidde’deki vapurun miktarı altı kıtaya baliğ olacağına bi’l-arz mütemehdinin 
harekatından sevahil-i Hicaziye içün endişe edilecek bir cihet-i melhuz olsa bile sefâin-i mezkure icab eden nukat-ı 
mühimmeye taksim ve tayin olunduğu halde emr-i muhafazaya kifayet edebileceğine nazaran sevahil-i mezkure için 
yeniden vapur tertip ve irsaline pek de lüzum görülmemekte ise de mamafih oraya sefine irsali sureti emr-ü ferman 
buyrulduğu takdirde ahşap Ertuğrul Firkateyn-i hümayun mücehhez ve müheyya bulunduğundan onun Girid’e ve 
Girid’de bulunan Fırat ganbot-ı hümayununa dahi Cidde’ye irsali münasib olacağının ve bu babda emr-ü irade-i 
keramet-i âliye-i hazret-i şehinşahi her ne suretle şerefrîz-sünuh ve sudur buyurulur ise mantuk-ı âlisi infaz 
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situation afforded. Indeed, the construction of Aswan Dam in 1895 could be interpreted 
that increasing revenues through agricultural expansion could provide a fund in order to 
make possible the reconquest. Finally, Baring believed that Egypt’s welfare depended 
on Nile and a weak Mahdist state could not be threat for Egypt however if an European 
power seized the control of Sudan, this policy should be reconsidered.137 
The second phase of the dispute in the wake of the policy of abandonment 
accepted by Egyptian government did not open until 1896.  In the meantime certain 
events had taken place which resulted in the reconquest of the Sudan. The first event 
was the death of General Gordon who was sent to the Sudan to carry out the policy of 
abandonment. His death created a great outcry in Britain and left a deep impression on 
the minds of the British people. Thereby, ‘avenging of Gordon’ was one of the direct 
reasons for the re-conquest of the Sudan. It gave a strong motive for both British 
soldiers to fight in such a distance place and society. Secondly, in the 1890s scramble 
for Africa began to be heated. Italy and France was competing with Britain for gaining 
sphere of influence in the vicinity of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan. The first threat to the 
British imperial aspirations came from Italy. She gained the protection of Abyssinia as 
regards foreign affairs by signing the Treaty of Ucciali with Ethiopia in May 1889. On 
15 April 1891 Italy and Britain made an agreement by which Italians gained temporary 
occupation of Kassala (today, the capital of the state of Kassala in eastern Sudan) from 
Britain in order to weaken dervishes who were their common enemies. Through this 
agreement, city of Kassala was invaded by Italy in 1894 with the justification of 
protection of Masawwa and Sewakin ports. On the other side, for Britain Kassala was 
insignificant so long caliph Abdullah remained in power. Therefore, Britain aims to 
diminish his power through Italia in order to reoccupy the Sudan. Second attempt 
against the British influence in the Nile valley came from France. France had never 
recognized the British occupation of Egypt in 1882 and opposed the British domination 
in the Nile region. Therefore, she intended to utilize her expedition force to penetrate 
Eastern part of central Africa and then reach the upper Nile. But Salisbury declared that 
Britain would not recognize any French authority over the Nile land. But he came up 
with commercial privileges rather than political concessions. Through those treaties 
Britain guaranteed that Nile Basin was evidently recognized under the British sphere of 
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influence. Third, Egypt changed its approach towards the Sudan because of the 
development of irrigation and emergence of storage problem in Egypt. Sudan in a while 
gained an importance in the eyes of the Egyptian authorities not only for the security 
measure but also guaranteeing their water supply. Fourth, new khedive in Egypt and 
Liberal government in England came to the power. Abbas II was declared as the new 
khedive on 16 September 1892 when he was just seventeen. The young khedive was 
different from his predecessors in terms of being an extreme nationalist and 
Anglophobe. He felt discomfort with British interference in Egyptian affairs and he 
dismissed the entire ministers who favor the British without the consent of British 
Consul-General which was the custom during his father’s reign. During his ten years of 
office, many crises between him and Lord Cromer have occurred. He remained in 
power until the declaration of First World War. On the other hand, coming of the liberal 
government to power in 1892 had prompted to increase hopes amid the Egyptian 
nationalists who though that liberal foreign policy would act in direction of evacuation 
of Egypt.138  Furthermore, caliph Abdullah was losing strength in Sudan and his 
adherents gradually turned their face to the Sultan.139  
These circumstances by creating tense atmosphere paved the way to the re-
conquest of Sudan. British government intended to dispatch an expeditionary force 
composed of Egyptian and British troops to Dongola in 1896. One of the reasons of this 
rapid expedition was the Italians call for help. They had taken a heavy defeat toward the 
Ethiopians and they were suspicious of Ethiopians and Dervishes ally to capture 
Kassala. In the first part of Dongola campaign, The Khedive encountered with Ottoman 
strong resistance in order not to send Egyptian forces to act against Muslims. However, 
the Sultan’s protestations were ineffectual. On 27 March 1896 the Ottoman Grand vizier 
telegraphed to Khedive to remind him that Egyptian military force was a part of the 
Imperial army and the use of these troops particularly against the Muslims was 
depended entirely on the permission of the Sultan. But such permission neither asked 
nor granted to the Khedive for the Dongola campaign.140 But Abbas II kindly refused 
this order with the friendly consultations of Lord Cromer and he guaranteed that there 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  138	  Mekki Abbas, the Sudan Question: : The Dispute over The Anglo-Egyptian Condominium 1884-1951, pp.40-41. 139	  “....Sudanlıların Mısır’a taaruzu şöyle dursun bazılarının kendi beynlerinde hüküm süren asayişsizlikten himaye-i 
hükümete iltica eyledikleri dahi fi 15 Cemaziyelahir sene 1314 tarihli ve 131 numerolu ariza-i çakeremde dermeyan 
kılınmıştır....” 
A.MTZ. (05) 13/43 15 Cemaziyelahir 1304 ( 21 November 1896)	  140	  Muddathir Abd al-rahim, Imperialism& Nationalism in the Sudan: a Study in Constitutional and Political 
Development, 1899-1956, p.26.	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would be no encroachment on Sultan’s right and the intent of expedition was the same 
with 1883 campaign which Ottoman Sultan put no objection.141 After then, the advance 
to Dongola began in 1896 and ended with hoisting of Egyptian flag on the province 
headquarter.  
While Dongola campaign had been done in order to relief the pressure upon 
Italians and for an anticipated attack of French troops, Khartoum campaign was 
actualized purely due to the financial concerns in 1896. Kitchener who found a chance 
to serve under the command of François Wingate who was British intelligence officer in 
Egypt was charged as the chief commander of campaign. Kitchener hoisted the British 
and Egyptian flags side by side in Khartoum as symbol of the concurrent domination of 
Egypt and Britain over the Sudan.  Following the defeat of Dervish forces in Atbara, in 
1898, Kitchener crushed the followers of Mahdist movement at the battle of 
Omdurman.142 Thus, the Britain had taken the revenge of Gordon Pasha. When the city 
was surrounded, they first came to the tomb of Muhammad Ahmed and killed all guards 
in the tomb. The body of Sudanese Mahdi removed from his grave and his head was cut 
off from his body. After his nail ripped off, the rest of body threw into the Nile.143 
Re-conquest of Sudan had changed the balance of power in the Nile valley to the 
detriment of France which claims right on Nile as well as Britain. Hence, when French 
officer Marchand reached Fashoda on July 1898 hoisted a French flag there in order to 
compel Britain reach an agreement with France. After the hearing of this event, 
Kitchener immediately went to Fashoda and informed Merchand that his act was the 
direct violation of British and Egyptian’s rights on the valley of Nile. He solely 
remained to protest the act and after then fervent negotiations embarked on between the 
parties. Eventually, a few weeks later they reached an agreement. According to the 
convention, France had given up her claims on the whole Nile Basin and in return 
Congo and Chad Basin was relinquished to France sphere of influence. The re-conquest 
of the Sudan had been performed by English and Egyptian troops on behalf of the 
Khedive of Egypt. On January 4, 1899, at Omdurman Cromer made speech to the 
notables of Sudan, saying that “You see that both the British and Egyptian flags are 
floating over this house. That is an indication that for the future you will be governed by 
the Queen of England and by the Khedive of Egypt.” In fact, Cromer did not support the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  141	  Mekki Abbas, The Sudan Question: The Dispute over The Anglo-Egyptian Condominium 1884-1951, p. 44. 142	  İsmail Hakkı Göksoy, The Establishment of Anglo-Egyptian Rule in the Sudan, 1897-1914, p.7.	  
143 Ali Akyıldız ve Zekeriya Kurşun, Osmanlı Arap Coğrafyası ve Avrupa Emperyalizmi, p.458. 
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direct annexation of the country because of financial burdens. Annexation could also 
attract French, Turkish and Egyptian’s reaction towards the Britain. Besides, he was 
opposed to the recognition of Sudan as a part of either Ottoman Empire or Egypt. Thus, 
it was decided that Salisbury’s two-flag formula was set out in the form of convention 
between British and Egyptian government.144 The reign of Mahdism in the Sudan thus 
ended on 2 September 1898, at the battle of Omdurman. 
The Anglo-Egyptian Condominium Agreement had recognized Britain as the de 
facto ruler of the country with the Egyptian co-governance. Yet, there was no reference 
to the Ottoman sovereignty over the Sudan. And once, Cromer had questioned the 
validity of such document. Because Ottoman firmans prohibits Khedive making any 
treaties with foreign powers except commercial and customs conventions.145 Despite of 
this reality, British and Egyptian flags were jointly hoisted for the purposes that the 
theory would become reality in the Sudan case. Indeed, Ahmed Muhtar Pasha has taken 
the attraction of the Porte to the incidents. On 10 December 1898, about six months ago 
from official declaration of Cromer, he sent a cipher telegram to the Porte and informed 
them about the two flags plan of Britain and Egypt for the Sudan.146 With the conditions 
of agreement, Britain obtained many privileges in Sudan. Khedive’s authority in the 
Sudanese affairs stipulated the consent of British governor. Egyptian laws and 
regulations were no longer valid in the Sudan territory and Europeans had gained the 
right to trade and reside freely.147 This was the first step to diminish the Egyptian 
authority in Sudan and separate it forever. In fact, to separate Sudan from the Egypt was 
not a new idea for Britain. According to Mehmed Muhsin’s claim, they were bearing in 
mind this issue since the Gordon Pasha’s salvation campaign.148  
Since 1896, Ottoman Empire had resisted the British occupation in the region. 
Although the Ottoman State did not accept the act, Sudan remained Anglo-Egyptian 
administration and became a part of British colony system. In fact, Sudan legally 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
144 İsmail Hakkı Göksoy, The Establishment of Anglo-Egyptian Rule in the Sudan, 1897-1914, pp.9-10. 
145 Mekki Shibeika, British Policy in the Sudan: 1882- 1902, p. 412. 
146 “Mısır fevkalade komiserliğinde varid olan şifreli telgrafname suretidir. 
Lord Cromeri’in geçen gün Hartum’da meşaih urbana şayana dikkat bir nutk verdi içinde en mühim noktalar zirde arz 
olunur şu iki bayrağın yan yana bulunması badema kraliçe ile hidiv tarafından müştereken hükm ve idare olunacağına 
alemetdir. Serdar ikisinden de iktidar-ı kamileyi haiz olduğundan hakimeniz işte yanınızdadır…… başkasına 
müracaat olunmayacak ve her ….tarafına tesviye olunacaktır. Kraliçe her hükümdardan ziyade ………..halkdır 
sizlerde onlar gibi ……artık eski zamanlardan kurtuldunuz din ve….. kata bahs etmemiştir. Nutk bit- telgraf 
Avrupaya gitti ol babda. Fi 28 kanun-i sani 1314. Ahmed Muhtar” 
BOA, A. MTZ. (05) 14B/ 85  28 Kanun-i sani 1314 ( 10 December 1898). 
147 İsmail Hakkı Göksoy, The Establishment of Anglo-Egyptian Rule in the Sudan, 1897-1914, p.12. 
148 Mehmed Muhsin, Afrika Delili. (Kahire: el-Felah Ceridesi Matbaası, 1312), p.338. 
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depended on Egypt, Egypt also under the suzerainty of the Ottoman State and thus 
indirectly, Sudan was still a territory of Ottoman State. Hence, Ottoman State had 
refused to recognize the administration situated in Sudan. Because; it was contradicting 
with the previous Ottoman firmans.149 Nevertheless, Ottoman state neither accepted the 
British rule nor made a counter-attack to modify the current situation. In addition to 
this, the outbreak of First World War caused the rupture of relations with the Ottomans 
and the Sudanese and Britain had unilaterally annexed the Sudan into its colonies. At 
the end of the war, Ottoman state had to be compelled signing the Treaty of Sevr that 
Ottomans relinquished their legal right over Sudan according to the articles 113-114 of 
the treaty. But this treaty has never come into force due to the establishment of Turkish 
republic. Therefore, new Turkish state had renounced all political and legal rights on 
Sudan with the Treaty of Lausanne signed in 1923. 150 Sudan had come under the rule of 
British until 1956 as a part of colony. 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
149 BOA, İ..MTZ. (05), 32/ 1867 17 Zilhicce 1325 (21 January 1908).  
150 Tarig Mohamed Nour, Sevakin’de Türk-İngiliz Rekabeti, (Unpublished PhD thesis, Istanbul University, 2006), pp. 
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CHAPTER V: OTTOMAN RESPONSE TO THE MAHDI REVOLT 	  
5.1: The Mission of Ottoman High Commissioner Ahmed Muhtar Pasha  	  
According to Yasamee, Abdülhamid’s response to the Mahdi revolt could be 
analyzed with three decisive features: fear of revolution, non-intervention and legalism. 
The revolt had broken out in 1881 when Muhammad Ahmad proclaimed himself to be 
the expected Mahdi. The uprising gradually gained strength in the remote west of the 
Sudan, however in the summer of 1883, Mahdi’s ally Osman Digna had carried the 
revolt into the eastern part of the country. It was the first time that Ottoman Empire 
noticed the severity of the incident and felt the fear of revolution. In the earliest 
document regarding the movement sent to Osman Pasha, the governor of Hejaz, 
stressed the stopping of the revolt and more importantly propounds the suspicion of a 
British plot.151 The date of this document, December 1882 is very important, because it 
shows that only one year after the emerging of the rebellion Ottoman authorities have 
been informed about the incident. Apparently, at the beginning stages of the movement, 
they could not see a considerable threat to the state by the local governors that thereby 
they did not see informing the center as necessary. Besides this, Egyptian government 
was preoccupied with another uprising started by Urabi Pasha in Egypt at the time. 
When the government of Cairo noticed the seriousness of the movement in the Sudan, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  151	  “...Sudan’da zuhur eden şaki-i ma’hudun İngilizlilerin amal ve talimatı üzerine hareket eden 
bir ikinci Urabi demek olup meazalik Mısır’ı zabt ve Devlet-i Aliyye’ye olan itaatını kat’ 
eyledikten sonra teavvuzen billah memalik-i saire-i şahaneyi tecavüze alet kılınmış bir İngiliz 
desisesinden ibaret olduğu anlaşılmakda ise de, bu hususa dair ıttılaat ve tahkikat-ı lazımenin 
ala vechi’s-sıhha atabe-i şahaneye arz olunması irade vü ferman buyurulmuşdur...” quoted in 
Ömer Koçyiğit, From Sufi Movement to Statehood: The Mahdi Uprising in the Ottoman Sudan 
1881-1885 p.82. 
BOA, Y..PRK.BŞK, 7/14, no: 1, 29 Muharrem 1300 (10 December 1882). 
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Mahdi had already won his first successes and attained a striking position in the 
region.152  
Abdülhamid II had seen a parallel with the Urabi movement. According to him 
the “false Mahdi” was the “second Urabi”. His followers were consisted of former 
Urabists who had escaped to Sudan in 1882 and like Urabi and his supporters they were 
vermin.153 Additionally, the two movements shared the same goal and same master. The 
sultan believed that Mahdi’s aim was to establish an “Arab government” with the secret 
support of Britain who challenge Ottoman authority in Arabia and Ottoman possession 
of Caliphate. This appraisal could be seen odd because Urabi Pasha’s revolt had 
political characteristics whereas Mahdi’s uprising seems more religious. However 
presence of the revolt in the eastern Sudan where it might easily spread cross the Red 
Sea into Arabia made the Sultan excessively worried. Because Red Sea shores were 
bound to each other with numerous trading links and Osman Digna himself was the 
slave trader who had certain connections in Hejaz.  
Furthermore, the strategic position of Egypt located across the Holy Cities was 
increasing the contingency of the spreading of revolt to the Holy places. Consequently, 
Ottoman government’s first concern was to prevent the insurrection from spreading into 
neighboring regions.154 The second decisive feature of Abdülhamid’s policy towards the 
Mahdi revolt suggested by Yasamee was the non-intervention. The question of Ottoman 
intervention arose when the Egyptian government lost control of the Sudan in the last 
quarter of 1883 when the Mahdi had annihilated the Egyptian expeditionary force. The 
khedive had neither troops nor the funds in order to initiate the fresh campaign and the 
Britain refused to intervene. At the same time, it instructed the Khedive to abandon 
entire Sudan together with his territories along the Red Sea and Somalia coast. The 
khedive immediately turned to his suzerain and asked whether the Sultan could permit a 
recruitment of volunteers among the populations of the Ottoman Empire. If Egypt could 
gather a fresh army, thereby Sudan might be held. At the time, Evelyn Baring, British 
consul of Cairo stated the Egyptian government’s thoughts with those sentences:  
The policy of withdrawal from Sudan was very unpopular in Egypt. No 
one seriously wished Turkish troops to be employed. Everyone felt that 
the remedy would be worse than the disease. The Egyptian government 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  152	  Peter M. Holt, The Mahdist State in the Sudan: 1881-1898, p. 33. 153	  Selim Deringil, The Ottoman Response to the Egyptian Crisis of 1881-1882, pp.9-10. 154	  F.K.A.	  Yasamee, The Ottoman Empire, The Sudan and The Red Sea Coast 1883-1889, p. 91.	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as in the days of Urabi was afraid that if Turkish troops once come into 
the country, they would not leave it again. The British government gave 
a half-hearted assent to the employment of a Turkish force.155 
Baring believes that Turkish occupation presents more danger than its 
advantages and explained the British approach as the following:   
Dervish rule in the Sudan was without doubt an evil, but even at that 
time it could be foreseen that the evil would in all probability only be 
temporary. A Turkish occupation would have been on evil of a more 
permanent nature.156   
However, Egyptian government thought that the best solution of the question 
was to invite the aid of the Sultan. They wished the British government to arrange the 
conditions under which Turkish aid would be afforded, the principal of these conditions 
being that the Sultan’s troops should leave the country when their presence was no 
longer required. Sharif Pasha, Khedive’s minister pointed out that as the rebellion in the 
Sudan was a religious movement, it would probably gather strength if the British or 
Indian troops were employed. However, inviting Turkish troops into the Sudan would 
not be an advantage for Egypt. Hence, the abandonment of Sudan within certain limits 
was recommended by the British government.157 Abdülhamid’s response to the demand 
of troops was explicit. He refused the proposal with precise argument:  
If permission is given for the troops which Egypt wishes to recruit, this 
will plainly mean that they become a Turkish army in the service of the English. 
To outward appearances they will be dispatched against the Mahdi; but in truth, 
as part of the intrigues adopted by the English, they will be united with the 
vermin gathered around the Mahdi, and we shall have caused all of them to be 
used against ourselves. It is manifest what degree of difficulties the Empire’s 
position will suffer from a second Urabi problem. 158  
Although Sultan’s own ministers was in favor of sending troops because this 
was the only way to protect integrity of the Empire’s lands, they failed to change the 
Sultan’s opinion.159 Because, he was afraid of confronting the same consequences as in 
the Egyptian questions and sending troops means the joint operation with the British 
forces against the Islamic population, therefore it was impossible. Abdülhamid II 
repeated his view that the Mahdi revolt was a British-inspired plot and the Sudanese 
question could not be separately solved from the Egyptian question. The reports sent by 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  155	  Evelyn Baring, the Modern Egypt, p.387 156	  Ibid., the Modern Egypt, p.354.	  157	  Ibid., p.373-79.	  158	  F.K.A.	  Yasamee, The Ottoman Empire, The Sudan and The Red Sea Coast 1883-1889, p. 91.	  	  159	  İ.MTZ(05) 23/1096  24 Cemaziyelevvel 1300 ( 2 April 1883).  
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Ahmed Muhtar Pasha have been also confirming the suspicion of the Sultan. Because, 
Muhtar Pasha believes that actual intention of the Britain in the Sudanese incident was 
to separate Sudan from the Egypt and then takeover the Sudan.160 Hence the Sultan 
insisted that Ottoman intervention could not be discussed without a pre-agreement about 
British evacuation of Egypt. Besides, he was afraid of Ottoman troops’ attempt to attend 
Mahdi’s army and Urabi’s supporter. 161Therefore, he conducted policy of indifference 
to the Sudan and beyond the Egyptian territories. On the other hand, Britain came up 
with a new offer for the Ottoman occupation of the Khedive’s Red Sea territories. The 
Red Sea coast had a vital importance for the British imperial goals and the presence of 
the French troops at Obok had disturbed the British government. The foreign secretary 
Granville said to Ottoman ambassador that Ottoman occupation was desirable. 
Regarding the invasion of Zeila although the Sublime Porte were favorable sending 
troops in order to reestablish the order in the region, the Sultan did not move and Zeila 
was occupied by British. They paid Egyptian tribute to the Porte and finally Egypt and 
Istanbul agreed to stop paying tributes.162  
Abdülhamid II was reluctant to divert from his main concern that before 
comprehensive Egyptian settlement, he would not take a step further. Even his grand 
vizier Said Pasha criticized the Sultan to avoid sending troops neither for Egypt nor 
western shores of Bahr-ı Ahmer because this policy caused losing of these 
territories.163The third decisive features of his response arose out of the legalism 
discussion. According to him, British decision to separate the Sudan from Egypt was a 
breach of the Sultan’s firmans which guaranteed the integrity of the Khedive’s 
territories. Moreover, the warning about French annexations and possible Italian 
intervention in Saharan Africa did not prevent the Sultan to place priority to overall 
Egyptian settlement. Even in these circumstances Abdülhamid refused to intervene in 
the region.164 On June 1885, two important developments occurred regarding the 
Egyptian question. First was the death of Mahdi and second was the change of 
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  BOA, YEE. 118/17   17 Cemaziyelahir 1303 ( 23 March 1886).  161	  Kemal Karpat, Politicization of Islam: Reconstructing Identity, State, Faith and Community in the Late Ottoman 
State, p. 270. 162	  Elving Baring, the Modern Egypt, v.2, p.53-54.	  163Ali Akyıldız ve Zekeriya Kurşun, Osmanlı Arap Coğrafyası ve Avrupa Emperyalizmi, p. 415. 
“Mısır’a asker gönderilmediği gibi Bahr-i Ahmer sevahiline de asker gönderilmek arzu olunmadığından Musavva, 
Zeyla, Sevakin, Tacura, Aseb, Berbere ve Harar kita-i münbite ve vasiaları ve Somali arazisi velhasıl baştanbaşa 
Bahr-ı Ahmer sevahil-i garbiyesi ile bu sevahilin içlerinde vaki mahallerin memleket-i Osmaniye’den çıkmasına hep 
sevk-i askerden imtina etmekliğimiz sebep olmuştur.”  164	  F.K.A.	  Yasamee, The Ottoman Empire, The Sudan and The Red Sea Coast 1883-1889, pp. 90-96.	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government in Britain. Lord Salisbury came into the power in Britain as the head of 
conservatory party.  
At the time, Britain was isolated from the international community because of 
Egyptian occupation. Salisbury, successor of Gladstone, wanted to overcome this 
loneliness approaching Ottoman Empire in order to strengthen its position in the Middle 
East and forestall the growing hostilities in the Muslim colonies. On 22 August 1885, 
Sir Henry Drummond Wolff had been sent to Istanbul in order to negotiate Egyptian 
question. Salisbury warned him about three strategic matters: first, Britain should have 
made more benefit from other European states if it was forced to withdraw from Egypt. 
Second, Britain should be rescued from the international isolation and third, the 
opposition must be weakened towards Britain due to the Egyptian question. The main 
mission of the Wolff was to reduce the degree of protests coming from Ottoman Empire 
and France. Hence, he immediately announced that Britain recognized all sovereignty 
rights of the Ottoman Empire in Egypt.  
Then, he put pressure on the Ottoman Empire on the three subjects: First, he 
tried to persuade the Ottomans for sending troops to the Sudan in order to suppress the 
Mahdi uprising. Because it was a religious movement and only Muslim soldiers might 
cause the dissolving of Mahdi dervishes. Secondly, he proposed appointing two high 
commissioners from British and Ottoman sides for the administrative arrangements in 
Egypt. Lastly, he tried to procure acceptance of the international treaties signed by 
Khedive Tewfik. On the other hand, the main concern of the Ottoman side during the 
negotiations to set an exact date for the Egyptian evacuation. On 24 October 1885 Wolff 
and Foreign Minister Said Pasha ended negotiations and agreed on certain issues. 
Therefore, Egyptian question turned to be a matter between Ottoman and Britain and 
Ottoman Empire had officially accepted Britain’s existence in Egypt by signing the 
agreement.165  The convention concluded that Ottoman and British high commissioners 
should be sent to Egypt in order to fulfill the obligations of Article VI which had a 
particular importance regarding the Egyptian deadlock:  
[A]s soon as the two high commissioners shall have established that the 
security of the frontiers and the good working and stability of the Egyptian 
government are assured they shall present a report to their respective 	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  Süleyman Kızıltoprak, Mısır’da İngiliz İşgali: Osmanlı’nın Diplomasi Savaşı 1882-
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governments who will consult as to the conclusion of a convention regulating 
the withdrawal of the British troops in a convenient period166  
Sir Henry Drummond Wolff and Ghazi Ahmed Muhtar Pasha167 were appointed 
as joint commissioners to fulfill the stipulations of the Egyptian Convention signed at 
Istanbul on October 1885. Primary mission of both Ahmad Muhtar and Wolff was to 
monitor the current situation and to write reports concerning the agreed reforms in the 
Egyptian administration and army as well as the ongoing negotiations with Mahdi 
supporters.168 Muhtar Pasha’s appointment as an Ottoman high commissioner was 
welcomed by the Egyptians. The Arab press congratulated his new mission flatteringly. 
Daily journal el-Zaman wrote as follows:  
When the information has reached Egypt, all were pleased, both natives 
and foreigners because of Moukhtar Pasha Ghazi’s reputation. He is highly 
upright, wise and self-composed, is a man of few words who listens much. If 
spoken to, he gives a short but clear reply. He also is a man learning…. his 
excellency is energetic, and can be severe if need be.169 
 At the beginning Muhtar Pasha’s appointment created a good effect in the 
Egyptian society. However, he did not seem to think his stay would be short duration 
Because; he brought with him his wife, his children and his harem of twenty-four 
slaves. His wife was the daughter of an ulema family. This fact attracted this influential 
class sympathy to him. Throughout his speeches, he appealed to the religious feelings of 
people and gained the dignity of the Egyptians. In time, this situation interpreted that 
Muhtar Pasha intended to remain permanently in Egypt and overshadow the powers of 
Khedive himself. The main duty of the Ottoman High commissioner was to maintain 
security and order in the Sudan, to make necessary arrangements in the Egyptian 
administration and to guarantee the Egyptian borders. Then he was expected to write a 
report and start the evacuation process.170 Hence, at the beginning the gravity of the 
meetings was the Sudan question used by Britain as threat to Egyptian security.  
With regard to the Sudan issue, Muhtar Pasha who had considerable experience 
of Mahdis in Yemen thought that Mahdism in the Sudan had attained such dimensions 	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not to deal with so easily. The religious feelings of the Sudanese were so great that as 
long as the Christian troops or negotiators were on the front, it was hopeless to wait the 
tranquilizing of the movement. It just served increasing the fanaticism. So the Egyptian 
force should advance alone in the Sudan without any accompanying British troops.171 
Then he prepared a report to give Wolff, Khedive and Sublime Port. In his report, he 
advised to raise the number of Egyptian soldiers who was in charge in Sudan and to 
reorganize the Egyptian army under the command of Egyptians. Then the decreasing of 
the number of the foreign soldiers would achieve savings and there would be no need 
for British army in Egypt. However, this proposal had been refused by the British 
government on the pretext that Egypt’s budget was inadequate to increase the number of 
Egyptian army.172 
As known Britain had occupied Egypt with the excuse of Urabi Pasha uprising. 
In fact, its main intention was to protect security of the Suez Canal and enhance its 
interest in East and Far East. Salisbury was aware that the legitimacy of Britain’s 
position in Egypt in the sight of international community to large extent depends on a 
compromise with Ottoman state, the legal suzerain of Egypt. An agreement over the 
Egyptian question could be defused the tension with France which was already 
intolerable and it would relieve the Britain from the heavy burdens of constant 
concessions granted to Germany.173  Before the fall of Khartoum, Britain was hiding 
behind the claim that Mahdi revolt threats the security of Egypt thereby Britain had to 
remain in the region until the riot suppressed. However its sole aim was to delay 
evacuation as much as possible and make the occupation indefinitely prolong. And now, 
according to Muhtar Pasha’s reports, the British were putting an objection for their 
evacuation plan that is necessary the restoration of order in Sudan. Yet, they were 
opposing any Ottoman endeavors to reorganize the Egyptian army which could stabilize 
the situation in the region. Conversely, Wolff’s suggestion was sending Ottoman troops 
to appease the revolt which was an inadmissible proposal for Abdülhamid II.  On the 
other hand, Muhtar Pasha asserted that keeping Egypt under the occupation was also 
damaging the British’s prestige and dignity amid the Muslims who lives in India. 
According to following reports sent by Muhtar Pasha denotes that Britain was in favor 
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of the separation of Egypt and Sudan; it would thus hold the strategic place where 
located in the cross of holy cities.174  
Egyptian question was still conserving its vagueness. But however, the existence 
of a commissioner of the Ottoman State in Egypt was providing confidence and 
reliability among the Egyptians. Thereby, Muhtar Pasha firmly refused Britain’s 
suggestion moving the negotiations from Cairo to Istanbul.175 It was not a new idea for 
Muhtar Pasha. Wolff had raised the issue a few months ago and repeated it several 
times. According to Wolff, it would make easier to accomplish their mission properly 
because the communication with Istanbul by telegraph or mail is naturally slowing 
down the process. However, Muhtar Pasha refused this proposal. The presence of 
Ottoman commissioner in Cairo was important to prevent British effort expanding their 
influence as the occupying power. Therefore from the Ottoman point of view it was an 
attempt to get Muhtar out of the Egypt.176   
As a consequence, the deliberations and bargaining between Wolff and Muhtar 
Pasha ended with failure. Wolff left Muhtar in Cairo and negotiated the draft agreement 
of 1887 directly with Sublime Port. Ottoman government has waged his attitude to 
determine the exact date of evacuation. In response, Wolff explained that the fixation of 
the date could be depended on the certain accords on the followings: neutralization of 
Egypt, a sufficient number of British officers to remain within the Egyptian army, 
reserving the right of occupation in case of domestic turbulence or any foreign invasion. 
On the other hand, Ottoman government had not understood the actual meaning of 
neutralization and frames of the right of reoccupation. Thus they put forward their 
counter-proposals: British troops should abandon the Egypt within eighteen months and 
British officers in the Egyptian army should leave one year later and the British right of 
reoccupation could be exercised just in the case of foreign occupation.177   
Those proposals had not satisfied Britain. However, at the time Bulgarian 
negotiations were proceeding between Ottoman Empire and Bulgaria and Ottoman side 
did not wish to lose Britain’s support and the threat, breaking off the relations had 
already raised, compelled the Ottoman Empire to agree on some points. Owing to these 
circumstances, On 22 May 1887 Britain and Ottoman Empire signed a draft agreement 	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that had never been ratified by the Ottoman government. According to the agreement 
Britain would evacuate Egypt at the end of the three years but with the provision that 
any external or internal threat could be postponing this withdrawal. Besides, there was 
no reference to the Sudan or the Red Sea coasts in the articles of convention. Then, 
Muhtar Pasha wrote a report and he criticized that the convention was including 
stipulations that violate the Ottoman’s sovereignty rights in Egypt. Furthermore, Russia 
and France had objected to the absence of binding timetable for British evacuation and 
protested the convention by threating the Ottoman Empire to invade Syria and Eastern 
Anatolia. Therefore, through the pressure of great powers, Ottoman state refused to 
ratify the treaty.178 In the following period, Ottoman Empire has never given up his 
right of sovereignty in Egypt.179 
 Muhtar Pasha has continued to remain in Egypt though his British counterpart 
Wolff was recalled after the signing of draft agreement. He waged his high 
commissioner mission until proclamation of the Second Constitution (Meşrutiyet). 
Indeed, he was the prominent living symbol of Ottoman power, legitimacy, and 
sovereignty in British occupied Egypt any more. Muhtar Pasha’s continued presence 
was largely symbolic and its only real value was to show that the Ottomans still held on 
their legal status as the sovereign power. He was the first Ottoman representative sent 
from the Istanbul to Egypt since the heirs of Muhammad Ali Pasha represented the 
political authority of Sultan. So the existence of another representative now had a 
further meaning for separatist Egyptian government and British as occupying power. 
Furthermore, the continuous presence of prominent war-hero in Egypt bolstered the 	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Ottomanist feelings against the non-Muslim invaders.180 Later on, this duality would 
gradually cause set of legitimacy problems between the khedive and Muhtar Pasha. His 
interference in the internal affairs of Egypt was disturbing for both Britain and Khedive 
himself. Even, an article had been published in Times newspaper on 23 January 1886 
which claimed that Ahmed Muhtar Pasha wishes to acquire the Egyptian Khedivate.181 
After the Wolff’s return, Britain had never recognized Muhtar Pasha as an official 
authority. However, Muhtar Pasha had always acted in accordance with the interest of 
Ottoman state and hence he was accused of interfering in the internal affairs of the 
Egypt by compelling the ministers for resignation. This paternalistic attitude had 
bothered the Khedive that he had eventually complained about the pasha to the Sublime 
Porte. On the contrary, Muhtar Pasha advocated himself by claiming that he was 
protecting the rights of Ottoman state in the Egypt.182 
 In fact power of sanction of the Pasha has been very restricted. For instance, 
when khedive Abbas Hilmi wished to travel to Europe without a stop in Istanbul, 
Muhtar Pasha made an effort to prevent this journey but, he had failed and in 1894 
khedive left Cairo.  As it is understood, the position of the Pasha has not gone beyond to 
giving advices. Ottoman government has seen Muhtar Pasha as an intermediary 
between Khedive and itself sometimes his position was utilized to put pressure on the 
khedive and the British consul.183 Later on, fight for legitimacy has gradually escalated 
and the khedive began to ignore the Pasha in state protocols. His unique status in Egypt 
was open to such violations. From Ahmed Muhtar points of view, the ranks given 
directly by Sultan should be on the front in the protocols.  
At that point, Muhtar Pasha’s period of office deserves to further deliberation, 
his long lasting duty in Egypt might be explained with Sultan’s personal attitude 
towards him as well. Although Muhtar Pasha had appointed to this crucial position 
because of his prior achievements which brought him to Ghazi title, Abdülhamid had 
never desired such strong man in the vicinity of him. Hence, he had benefited from his 
experience in the significant, delicate subject and achieved to hold him for a long time 
such a distant place as well. However, Sultan had never given up to control his acts 
strictly. For instance, Abdülhamid had informed about the establishment of a new 	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community called cumhur-u Islam on 22 October 1905 and ordered to take necessary 
measures against the new formation. Moreover, he accused the Muhtar Pasha of 
disloyalty and supporting idea of Islamic republic. The tension and mistrust between 
Ahmed Muhtar and Sultan had reached the ultimate levels in the1900s.184 But Uçarol’s 
assertion is not convincing enough. Because; Osman Nuri Pasha had also been awarded 
the title Ghazi as a result of his struggles during the siege of Plevne. He received the 
order of Mecidiye and several medals for his services to the empire. Contrary to Ahmed 
Muhtar Pasha, Abdülhamid kept him around without any fear of revolution against 
himself. On the other hand, Despite Muhtar Pasha’s several demands for returning to 
Istanbul, the Sultan extended his service for twenty-three years and only at the time of 
revolution he could find a chance to come back. It probably stemmed from 
Abdülhamid’s trust to him that he was one of the people who were able to overcome 
such a tough duty.  
5.2: Pan-Islamism as a Political Response  	  
The idea of Pan-Islamism (İttihad-ı Islam) was a political ideology emerged in 
the second half of the nineteenth century particularly in the reign of Abdülhamid II in 
order to unite all Muslims over the world against rapid colonization movement. 
However, before it has been used for political purposes, it was present among the 
Muslims as an expression of brotherhood, unity and solidarity feelings by taking its 
sources from the Koran and Hadith. The concept was firstly used by Namık Kemal on 
10 May 1869 in daily newspaper, the Hürriyet (Freedom) and then discussed in the 
other publications of the Young Turks especially in the journal of Basiret. The term of 
Pan-Islamism, counterpart of the İttihad-ı Islam has been probably used in the western 
literature in 1875. Later on, the term was subject to several risales, journals and 
newspapers. It was thought as one of the ways like Ottomanism and nationalism to 
prevent the state’s decline and salvation of the all Muslims.185  
There were two different aims of Abdülhamid’s Pan-Islamism. First, in the 
external world, he attempted to communicate with all Muslim communities who were 
under the rule of foreign invasion under the frame of caliphate and he tried to establish a 
network between Ottoman Empire and them. Thus, he would use this interconnection 	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against the European colonizers. In this direction, raising the awareness of the Muslim 
society gained an importance. The second aim was for internal politics. Increasing 
Muslim population after the 1877-1878 Ottoman –Russian War, compelled the state to 
establish a common political, social and cultural consciousness by utilizing the 
ideological function of the caliphate. Thus political unity and a common identity would 
be created among the Muslim populations who were living in the Ottoman Empire. The 
most important means to reach those aims were the religious orders which had large 
scale of communication network with the people and capability to mobilize them. The 
other tool was the Hajj. Gathering of the Muslims comes from all over the world in the 
Mecca paved the way for the propaganda activities. Istanbul became a break place and 
their food and accommodation expenditures defrayed by the state. The third one was to 
charge the powerful local rulers for the administration of Arab provinces and the last 
was the press.186  
In essence, Abdülhamid did not aim to gather all Muslim population under one 
political unity. At least, the limits of his de facto power have not allowed acting in 
accordance with this goal. Hence, the politics of Pan-Islamism mainly served for the 
purpose of creating solidarity and brotherhood among all Muslims in the world against 
the common enemy. The main goal of this idea was to strengthen Muslim unity under 
the frame of caliphate and to create a resistance against western colonialism that began 
to dominate Muslim territories in the last quarter of the nineteenth century. But the 
attempts were confined to set of diplomatic endeavors such as dispatching gifts, letters 
and officials to the local rulers of the certain places.187 Abdülhamid II was aware of the 
boundaries of this policy as he was restricted with balance of power among the great 
powers and Ottoman state’s actual strength. So he had never furthered it beyond the 
cultural attempts.  
In the case of Mahdi revolt, Abdülhamid II thought that it was a British- inspired 
plot to some extend manipulated by the Urabi Pasha advocators who fled to Sudan in 
the wake of British occupation. According to Sultan, the main goals of the Mahdi 
movement was to establish an Arab government, to bring the Hejaz and Arabian 
Peninsula under control and finally to constitute an Arab caliphate in the region. He was 
worried about the spreading of the movement to Hejaz and then to holy cities. However, 	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he was reluctant to interfere in the Sudanese issue any way. Even, Britain had 
threatened the Sultan by making political alliances with the Arabian tribes to jeopardize 
his caliphate.188 Nevertheless he had not changed his attitude and refused to send troops 
to bolster the new Egyptian army which would be sent against the Mahdi forces. 
Because; he was afraid of serving British aspirations unintentionally and joining of 
Ottoman soldiers to Mahdi dervishes or Urabi followers. Furthermore, sending troops 
would mean killing of Muslims by Muslims and it would harm the prestige of the Sultan 
as a caliph of the world Muslims. Hence, he sufficed to follow closely the course of 
events.  In 1885, Mahdi’s unexpected death changed the dervishes’ stance towards the 
Sultan. The successor of the Mahdi, caliph Abdullah loosened his hostile attitude as a 
reaction the French penetration into the central Africa. It pushed Abdülhamid II to 
honor Abdullah by sending gifts, letters and embassies.189  
 However, Ottoman intellectuals have criticized Sultan’s policy of inaction.  
Filibeli Ahmed Hilmi Şehbenderzade was one of them. He argues that Abdülhamid II 
has not pursued a policy of pan-Islamism. He classified Pan-Islamism into three sub-
categories. According to his classification, first idea is the political unity (İttihad-ı 
Siyasi); the other one is the religious unity (İttihad-ı Islam) and final, a social unity 
(İttihad-ı İctimai). From Ahmad Hilmi’s point of view, Abdülhamid was not able to 
protect his own territories, so he could not adapt Pan-Islamism as a political unity. 
Secondly, he did nothing to actualize the religious unity among the Muslims. 
Conversely, he provoked them to each other and used the Turks against Arabs and 
Arabs against the Albanians. Thus he antagonized them by featuring the discrepancies. 
Lastly, as a social unity Pan-Islamism has been only implemented during the first period 
of Islam. Carrying out this notion had never come to the mind of Abdülhamid II.190 
While he argued the notion Pan-Islamism, he used as an example of 
Abdülhamid’s policy towards the Sudanese uprising. According to him, if Sultan 
Abdülhamid had sent twenty-thirty preachers, teachers and such officers to the Sudan 
which was an easy act to do this, he might have precluded the revolt and stop people’s 
joining to false Mahdi. Such an act could be reinvigorating impact on the Sudanese 
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  Şehbenderzade Filibeli Ahmed Hilmi, Senusiler ve Onüçüncü Asrın en Büyük Mütefekkir-i İslamiyesi Seyyid 
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Muslims. However, Abdülhamid either did not thought this option or his anxieties 
hindered him.191  
It should be kept in mind that Filibeli Ahmed Hilmi was one of the opponents of 
the Sultan. His personal hatred could be understood when his brief life story took into 
consideration. He was born in 1865 in Filibe. (today, Plovdiv in Bulgaria) Then he 
graduated from Galatasaray Mektebi Sultani, began his first official job in Duyun-i 
Umumiye İdaresi (Public Debts Administration). He was commissioned to Beirut and 
escaped to Egypt with the influence of the Young Turks, and joined them there. In 
Egypt he had published a humorous newspaper called Çaylak. Because of the censor in 
the press, his newspaper has been banned and he was exiled to Fezzan, in Libya. He 
could return to Istanbul after the Young Turk revolution and he began to publish 
Ittihad-ı Islam paper for a short time. After the closing of his newspaper, he wrote for 
İkdam, Şehbal and Tasvir-i Efkar newspapers. He died in 1914.192 As seen, the life of 
Ahmed Hilmi gives clues about his personal hatred of Sultan Abdülhamid. He was in 
favor of Pan-Islamism against nationalism which had began to influence Ottoman 
communities. He stated that the separation of Muslim nations from Ottoman Empire 
could be prevented only by way of Pan-Islamism. If the Muslims were to lose their 
unity, they were condemned to be occupied by the European colonizers like the region 
of North Africa. On the other hand, when the Mahdi uprising arose in the Saharan 
Africa, the Ottoman Empire was dealing with many problems. As an internal problem, 
state had lost the war against Russia three years ago and it had brought heavy economic 
and political burdens to the state. On the other hand, remote Ottoman territories were 
exposed to colonialism threat and Egypt and Tunis had already fallen under foreign 
rule. For this reason, if the Sultan had attempted to send an army which were heavily 
defeated just three years ago, this could backfire and cause insurmountable 
consequences.193  
On the other hand, the hesitant policy of Abdülhamid towards the Sudanese 
revolt could be understood from the changing balance of power in Europe. Because, 
neither Egypt nor Sudan was the first territory came under the domination of foreign 
power. For instance, India had been invaded by the British Empire before nineteenth 	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century. In 1857, the great Indian munity also called India’s first war of independence 
had been started and three-years struggle had ended with the bloody suppression of the 
rebellion by the British army. Undoubtedly, Muslims were one of the most effective 
groups of people during the mutiny. However, Britain had known to benefit from the 
penetration and prestige of the caliph over the Indian Muslims. At that time, Britain 
helped the Ottoman Empire in the 1856 war against the Russia. Besides, all the great 
powers of Europe had promised to respect its independence and territorial integrity. 
Under these circumstances, the Sublime Porte assumed a mild attitude towards the 
British during the mutiny. They were allowed passage of British soldiers from Egypt 
and Red Sea to suppress the riot. The recapture of Delhi had welcomed by the Ottoman 
authorities and a congratulatory address had been sent; Sultan Abdülaziz had donated 
even a large amount of money for the British soldiers whose families were damaged 
during the uprising.194  
On the other hand, in the reign of Abdülhamid II, Anglo-Boer war had arisen 
and the Sultan had acted in favor of Britain. When he heard of the news that Young 
Turks, who were the so-called anti-imperialist intellectuals of Ottoman state, went to the 
British embassy and expressed their hopes for British victory in southern Africa; Sultan 
Abdülhamid had punished them with banishment. But the cause of this punishment was 
not necessarily meant that Abdülhamid was against the imperialist policies of Britain in 
Argentine but he resented them to visit the British embassy without permission.195 In 
the case of Sudanese Mahdi, Abdülhamid tried to raise concern on Indian Muslims 
about the British activities which damage the unity of Muslim world. Just for this 
purpose, a loyal Indian man was employed in Dersaadet to influence the Indian 
Muslims against Britain.196 
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Özcan, Azmi, “1857 Büyük Hind Ayaklanması ve Osmanlı Devleti”, Review of Islamic Studies (ed.) Mahmut Kaya, 
v. IX, (Publications of the Faculty of Letters, Istanbul University 1995) p. 274 
BOA, İ.HR 7802, no: 1, 14 Muharrem 1274 (4 September 1857) 
195 Şükrü Hanioğlu, Preparation for a Revolution: The Young Turks, 1902-1908, (New York: Oxford University 
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As seen, Ottoman Empire naturally like other states acted in the direction of its 
self-interest. Religion definitely was an integral part of the policy-making process, but 
they did not abstain from making pragmatist choices. In the last two decades of the 
nineteenth century, the Ottoman Empire was seen as the “sick man Europe” and after 
the Treaty of Berlin, Britain had pulled back its support towards territorial integrity of 
empire’s lands. So-called temporary occupation of Egypt was the first sign of the 
changing balances among the great powers. At this juncture, Abdülhamid’s indecisive 
attitude for the Sudanese issue could be explained on three certain points. First, military 
and economic resources of the empire were inadequate to afford a campaign in such a 
distant place. Second, minor local conflicts could become an excuse for imperialist 
powers to intervene in the regions. Last, spreading of any clash to the Hejaz area could 
give irreparable damage to the prestige of the Sultan. For these reasons, Abdülhamid did 
not show a hostile attitude towards the local Muslim rulers or mutineers despite of 
serious pressures, threats, promises of land and other persuasion endeavors comes from 
great powers even he was not content of their radical conducts. However, if he had an 
enough power to deal with the rebellions, undoubtedly, he would have never stop for a 
while or hesitate to act against them.  
5.3: Ottoman Perception of the Sudanese Mahdi 
 
Although Ottoman state did not attempt a military intervention to suppress the 
Mahdi revolt, the state took several measures in order to control the march of the events 
as much as it can. The description of Muhammad Ahmad gave us certain visions to 
understand the perception of the Ottoman Empire.  As discussed above, at the beginning 
of the riot, local rulers did not even inform the center about the recently initiated events 
due to the fact that they did not perceive it as a serious threat. Yet, in a few months the 
marches of the events changed and turned to Mahdi’s favor. In the Ottoman archival 
documents Mahdi was consciously labeled as mütemehdi. It literally means “the pseudo 
Mahdi” or “false Mahdi”. Ottoman officials believed that he was not the real Mahdi. 
Because there were always people who proclaimed themselves as Mahdi. Although they 
did not listen summons from Muhammad Ahmad or witnessed his manner of life, 
Ottoman statesmen were used to such claims, thereby they preferred to use the word, 
mutemehdi to define Muhammad Ahmad. After certain points, when the Muhammad 
Ahmed won certain triumphs against the Egyptian soldiers, his intention became clearer 
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for the statesmen. It was no longer tolerated since he challenged the territorial integrity 
of Ottoman lands and sultan’s caliphate as well. Then, on 28 November 1883, with the 
edict of Sublime Porte, it was ordered that he would be labeled as the shaqi instead of 
mutemehdi. The shaqi denotes a bandit or rebel in general. Particularly in the translation 
of Turkish, Arabic and French newspaper, it was enunciated using of the word, shaqi to 
define Muhammad Ahmad.197 Indeed, throughout the Ottoman history, the phrase of 
shaqi has been used for the people who neglected their responsibilities towards the 
Sultan knowingly or unknowingly. However, defining of the banditry or mutiny has 
been arbitrary.  Not to send annual tributes, to neglect the sending aid to the poor of 
holy cities or to keep the provisions which would be sent to the center were sufficient to 
make a ruler, shaqi.198 As in the case of Mahdi, to rebel against the absolute authority of 
the Sultan and declare a “holy war” against the Muslims was treasonous acts which 
damage the prestige of Sultan as caliph. For this reason, he was immediately named as 
shaqi and in the same month a translation of risale has been published in four days and 
sent to around of Damascus, Yemen, Iraq and Sudan in order to confute the claims of 
the Mahdi.199 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
197 “Sudanda zuhur eden şakiye dair  encümen-i hususide cereyan eden müzakerat-ı mutazammın tanzim ve takdim 
kılınmış olan mazbata-i manzur-ı ali buyruldu. Mazbata-i mezkurenin hatimesinde bunun bir kere daha 
müzakeresiyle netice-i muzakeratın tekrar arz –ı luzumu dermeyan olunmasına ve fi 5 teşrin-i sani 99 tarihiyle 
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babda lazım’ül ittihaz olan tedabir-i mükemmelenin serian arz ve izbarı ve şaki-i merkum hakkında mütemehdi 
tabirinin istiğmali kat’an muvafık-ı hikmet ve maslahat olmayacağı zikr olunan mazbatada mühürleri bulunan zevat-ı 
fahham nezdlerinde dahi tasdik olunacağı cihetle adeta izhar-ı şekavetle böyle birçok fesadların hudüsüne bais olan 
bir habisin müstehak olduğu şaki namıyla yad edilmesi iktiza edeceğinden bundan böyle gerek her türlü muharriratta 
ve gerek Türkçe ve Arapça ve Fransızca gazetelerin cümlesinde merkumun şaki namıyla yad olunması zımmındada 
icab edenlere tenbihat-ı ekide-i katiyye icrası mukteza-i emr-i ferman hazret-i padişahiden olmağla ol babda emr-ı 
ferman hazret-i veliyu’l emrundur.”    
BOA, İ. MTZ.(05), 23/1115, no: 2, 27 Muharrem 1301 (28 November 1883). 198	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CHAPTER VI: OTTOMAN PERCEPTION OF ITS OWN PERIPHERY: THE 
QUESTION OF OTTOMAN COLONIALISM/ORIENTALISM 
6.1: Ottoman Colonialism/Orientalism Debate in the Historiography  
 
When Herzog and Motika’s study of Orientalism alla turca: Late 19th 
century/early 20th century Ottoman Voyages into the Muslim Outback published in 
2000, it paved the way for an important discussion topic of the late Ottoman 
historiography. During nineteenth century, the Ottoman Empire came across with set of 
intellectual challenges which occupy many historians’ research agenda at the present 
time. Together with modernization processes, Ottoman response to the European 
expansion, colonization and orientalism studies in the academy has been accelerated 
and new sources have begun to take attention of historians. The rihla –literature which 
is the subject of Herzog and Motika’s study is one of them. Although these traveller 
accounts do not offer an objective picture of the period, to some extent the 
instrumentality of them could not be undeniable. There are some basic questions in the 
late Ottoman historiography that many scholars are in quest of the answers. Why 
Ottomans travelled from the one end of the Islamic world to the other, why they went to 
where they went? And how the Ottoman travellers see non-Muslims, Bedouins or 
nomads. Shortly how they construct the otherness in their mind? These are some 
questions that travel reports could have satisfactory answers.200  
These traveller accounts would also be illustrative for the discussion of Ottoman 
colonialism and orientalism. Up to now, the relationship between Ottoman imperial 
center and peripheral provinces has been discussed in terms of economic and political 
point of view.201 But Edward Said’s understanding of center and periphery is a fresh 	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topic in the Ottoman history.202 The first attempt to associate orientalism with Ottoman 
Empire has commenced with Herzog and Motika’s article and it has added a great deal 
to the Ottoman studies. In their article, Herzog and Motika put forward that Ottoman 
Empire has a civilizing mentality, referring to certain traveller accounts such as Ahmed 
Mithad Efendi’s Rikalda Yahud Amerika’da Vahşet Alemi, Mehmed Mihri’s Sudan 
Seyahatnamesi, Sadık el-Müeyyed’s Habeş Seyahatnamesi, and Abdülkadir Cami Bey’s 
Trablusgarb’dan Sahray-ı Kebire Doğru. The article argues that Ottoman perception of 
its orient was different from European sense of Orientalism. The concept of Orientalism 
alla Turca indeed denotes peculiarity of Ottoman approach to its orient. According to 
Herzog and Motika’s analysis, Ottoman perception of civilization was two-fold: Islam 
and western modernity whereas European’s conceptualization of civilization is solely 
based on the Christianity. Ahmed Mithad Efendi claimed that for Europeans the 
difference between savagery and civilization stemmed from the Christianity. If a savage 
people accepted Christianity, he/she is regarded as civilized by Europeans whereas most 
civilized people of India and China were deemed in the category of barbarians. 
However, Ottoman travellers praised the Japanese people as civilized even though they 
were not Muslim or they despise the Berber tribes of Sahara as savage, because they 
were a threat to trade and even settled people. Therefore for Ottomans civilization 
means the combination of western modernity and Islam. 203 On the other hand, unlike 
the European counterparts, Ottoman travellers avoid from monolithization of its orient 
or Muslim people and take into consideration of their differences. They developed a 
hierarchical stratum on Muslim communities expanding from savage to brother and 
declared their superiority over all of them. This sense of superiority was the common 
point of the all traveller accounts and legitimizes their civilizing mission.204 All in all, 
Herzog and Motika summarize their arguments as follows:  
Reading moderns Ottoman travelogues which deal with voyages to the 
Muslim outback makes it clear that the construction of otherness was 
multifaceted. There existed no overall picture or discourse which defined the 
non-Ottoman Muslim. However there seems to have been a common feeling of 
Ottoman superiority vis a vis the rest of the Islamic world which included a 
hierarchy of relegations ranging from “our little brother” Afghanistan to “those 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
202 Mustafa Serdar Palabıyık, Travel, Civilization and the East: Ottoman Travellers’ Perception of the East in the 
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203 Christoph Herzog and Raoul Motika, Orientalism alla turca: Late 19th/ Early 20th Century Ottoman Voyages into 
the Muslim ‘Outback’, p. 192. 
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savages” Tuaregs who were implied to be incorrigible desert bandits. Perhaps 
not surprisingly, Iran appears to be placed right at the bottom of this hierarchy. 
In 2002, another contribution to the Ottoman orientalism studies came from 
Ussama Makdisi with the same headline published in American Historical Review. 
Unlike Herzog and Motika’s emphasis on differences of European and Ottoman 
perception of Orient in the Saidian discourse, Makdisi’s Ottoman Orientalism begins 
with  “in the age of western-dominated modernity, every nation creates its own orient. 
The nineteenth century Ottoman Empire was no exception.” By Ottoman orientalism, he 
means “a complex of Ottoman attitudes produced by a nineteenth-century age of 
Ottoman reform that implicitly and explicitly acknowledged the West to be the home of 
progress and the East, writ large, to be a present theatre of backwardness.”205 According 
to Makdisi, Ottoman Empire’s attitudes towards its periphery were almost same with 
the sights of European colonial powers. With the Tanzimat reforms, Ottoman ruling 
elites acknowledged the inferior position of the empire as a sick man of Europe vis a vis 
European great powers and decided to modernize the empire.206 Therefore the Ottoman 
Empire adopted the same colonial tools in order to civilize its periphery and began to 
approach its provinces by a reformist imperial gaze. In a Saidian understanding of 
Orientalism, there is an ontological and epistemological difference between modern, 
civilized and rational west and backward, savage, primitive east. Indeed, Makdisi point 
out that when the Ottoman Empire decided to redefine itself as a rational central 
bureaucratic state by partnership with the West, the relationship between center and 
periphery turned into the relationships between empire and its colonies.  
Then, Selim Deringil carried the discussion of Ottoman orientalism one step 
further by publishing his article ‘They Live in a State of Nomadism and Savagery’: The 
Late Ottoman Empire and the Post-Colonial Debate in Comparative Studies in Society 
and History in 2003. He tries to comprehend the late Ottomans’ mentality of civilizing 
mission and their project of modernity. According to Deringil, “in the nineteenth 
century the Ottoman elite adopted the mindset of their enemies, the arch-imperialists, 
and came to conceive of its periphery as a colonial setting”.207 He indeed believes that 
Ottoman Empire had to imitate the western colonial empires in order to survive among 
the great powers and represent a similar stance towards its periphery. So he proposes a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
205 Usama Makdisi, “Ottoman Orientalism,” The American Historical Review, Vol. 107, No. 3 (Jun., 2002), p.769. 
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new term “borrowed colonialism” to describe nineteenth century Ottoman Empire. As 
seen, both Makdisi and Deringil equate Ottoman modernization process with 
colonization. Islam composes common significant points of the discussions and also 
seen as a means of legitimization of the colonial rule over the peripheral Arab lands. 
Furthermore, the concept of “civilizing mission” and “white man’s burden” forms the 
backbone of their arguments.208 The rhetoric of the governing elites towards the 
inhabitants of the periphery resemble with the colonial rulers of Britain or France. For 
instance, one of the official translators of empire, Mehmed Izzet by referring to peoples 
and tribes living in the south of Ottoman Libya said: “these peoples who are savage and 
heretics can only be saved by an invitation into the True Faith.”209  
 On the other hand, Ottoman orientalism/colonialism thesis has been criticized by 
many scholars. First, Mustafa Palabıyık in his PhD thesis Travel, Civilization and the 
East: Ottoman Travelers’ Perception of the East in the Late Ottoman Empire claimed 
that the Ottoman perception of the Orient does not totally fit into Said’s three pursuits of 
Orientalism. First of all, Said’s orientalism is based on an institutional and systematic 
study of orient with all dimensions such as language, race and beliefs. However, in the 
imperial schools the oriental languages like Arabic and Persian have been taught for 
many centuries. Besides, the orient is never subject of any anthropological or 
archaeological search in the Ottoman Empire. Additionally these sciences have been 
never studied as intensively as Europeans. Osman Hamdi Bey who is the founder of 
archaeology museum in Istanbul is the exception for nineteenth century due to the fact 
that his endeavors are not adequate to prove that there is a widespread oriental literature 
in the Ottoman Empire. However, his studies and actions had been put forward both by 
Makdisi and Deringil as a justification for Ottoman orientalism. Secondly, for Said, 
orientalism is based on a sharp ontological and epistemological distinction between 
orient and occident and it manly results from the religion. Uncompromising nature of 
Christianity and monotheistic religions, Ottoman Empire unavoidably situated itself in 
the side of Orient. Although in the nineteenth century acknowledged the superiority of 
the western civilization in certain fields, they were not about questioning of the truth or 
superiority of Islam. Finally, the important component of Said Orientalism is civilizing 
mission or “white man’s burden” which fits into some extend into the Ottoman case and 	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highlighted by Herzog and Motika, Makdisi and Deringil, as well. They argued that 
Ottoman perception of orient shaped within the framework of modernization. In this 
context, Ottoman governing elite put themselves into the center of more developed but 
Oriental group and thereby others naturally became backwards who need to be 
modernized by them.  
All in all, in the nineteenth century Ottoman Empire partly shared the same 
discourse with its European counterparts yet it does not mean that Ottoman Empire was 
a hard-core colonial power like Europeans which exploited their colonies in every 
sense.210 First and foremost, Makdisi and Deringil’s approach which consider Ottoman 
center-periphery relations, as a colonial sort of relationship is quite disputable. Because, 
territories which Makdisi and Deringil named as “colonies” were close or far 
“provinces” in the eyes of the any Ottoman ruler in the nineteenth century. Moreover, 
the subjects who were the inhabitants of these provinces were become the legally equal 
citizens of the empire from the period of Tanzimat.211 In the discourse level, Ottoman 
modernization process could resemble with colonial attempts but in essence it is a 
different story. Then, two shortcomings of Saidian Orientalism emerged insofar. First, 
generalization and selective literature review. Second is the monolithic perception of 
Orient.212 
 In years, Makdisi and Deringil’s Ottoman orientalism/colonialism thesis 
continued to be criticized by many sides. Recently, Muhammed Talha Çiçek in his 
recent book War and the State Formation in Syria asserted, considering Cemal Pasha’s 
governorate in Syria right before fall of the empire that Makdisi neglects the balance of 
power in the region. Because, in the nineteenth century there was competition for 
influence between the Ottoman Empire and western states on the Arab province. The 
European great powers had already begun to have an impact upon the Arabian people 
via educational and religious institutions. Missionary activities had been intensified and 
inclinations of the people had turned towards the western side.  
Under these conditions, according to Çiçek, “Ottoman Empire had to persuade 
its Arab citizens that their state was as progressive as its Western counterparts and 
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prevent them from developing sympathies toward the Western powers.”213 Ottoman 
elites’ involvement with modernization process in the Arabian land was the result of 
such reaction against the western threat of colonization. Secondly, the blur between 
state formation and colonization processes weakens the basis of a thesis by looking the 
example of Britain and France. Furthermore, he argued that Ottomans imitated its 
Western peers’ treatment towards their own citizens rather than their treatments in the 
colonies. Thirdly, he accepted the Ottoman elites’ superior stance on sort of Arab 
communities by categorizing them as backward. Yet, he does not restrict this glance just 
with Arab people and mentions existence of same attitudes towards even Turks. 
Fourthly, Çiçek challenged Makdisi’s claim which Ottoman Empire aimed to transform 
itself into a Turkish-dominated structure that indeed the argument is disputable at least 
in the case of Cemal Pasha’s governorate in Syria. Because, although Cemal Pasha to 
some extent Turkified the Syrian bureaucracy, he did not use this method in order to 
civilize it with a colonial mission rather it was aimed to broke western influence in the 
region by superseding it with Ottoman. Moreover, the Arabian officials who were 
amenable to western impact were not simply discharged but they were sent to equal 
positions in Anatolia. And Çiçek rightly posed that was it possible for an Indian to be a 
sub-governor in a British town. 
Finally, with reference to Kayapınar, he put forwards that Makdisi’s 
understanding of orientalism is different from Edward Said. There is no historical, 
cultural, ethnic or geographical basis to prove there is an ontological and 
epistemological disparity among Turks and Arabs. 214  Besides, he propounds that 
Makdisi’s article generates two judgments in the minds of the readers. First, Ottoman 
Empire’s territory is just composed of the lands of modern Turkish Republic and 
thereby the beyond this geography all expansions peculiarly toward the Arabian land is 
illegitimate. Second, Turks are the main ethnic group that constitutes the Ottoman 
community and ruling elite forms the Turks who had ethnic consciousness. So the other 
ethnic groups except Turks were the deviation from the usual.215  
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Abdülhamit Kırmızı has reached a satisfactory answer about the debates on 
modernization and civilizing mission in the late Ottoman Empire by delving into the 
vilayet reports.  Unless Makdisi and Deringil’s stance, he seems to be close to Herzog 
and Motiza’s approach. According to Kırmızı, ethnic and linguistic differences among 
the members of the Ottoman society were not rigidly institutionalized in the provinces 
like French Algeria or British India. In fact, he does not deny the officials feeling of 
superiority on the provinces but he explained this rational neither by means of 
imperialism nor by means of colonialism but with the concept of civilizing mission. 
Besides he concludes that such kinds of attitudes towards the Arab land cannot be 
restricted with the rulers of certain provinces, conversely similar discourses are voiced 
by the rulers of the Anatolian provinces of the empire. For instance, Ferid Pasha who 
became a Grand Vizier after his governorship in Konya, largest province of late 
Ottoman Empire could be suitable example as a modern Ottoman bureaucrat. During his 
mission as judicial inspector in Diyarbekir, he wrote many provincial reports that he 
described local population as savage and nomadic who live in the darkness of 
ignorance. Therefore he advocates the impossibility of implementation of the imperial 
regulations prepared for the more civilized districts of empire in such a backward part 
of the empire. Moreover, there are emphasizes on the development and progress in 
agriculture, trade, education and public works in order to proliferate the general 
happiness and wealth of the population. As it seen, in the mind of Ferid Pasha, progress 
and prosperity were the main concepts and he reappraises the communities, Turkish-
dominated or not by the frame of development. People who were underdeveloped in 
terms of agriculture, trade, education and public works were backward in his view and 
he had a mission in order to enhance their wealth and prosperity, in other words to 
civilize them.216 But shortly it is not a peculiar attitude merely towards Arab but also 
towards all ethnic groups.  
Additionally, Thomas Kuhn’s studies on Yemen set forth that Ottoman 
bureaucrats viewed the province of Yemen and its inhabitants as uncivilized and 
culturally inferior, as well. From Kühn’s departure point removing Nizamiye tribunals in 
Yemen during the 1880s and turning back to Sharia courts was a sign of 
institutionalizing the differences in the Empire. According to him, “by dismantling the 
Nizamiye courts Ottoman bureaucrats in Yemen and Istanbul confirmed their perception 	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of the indigenous population as savages who could not be ruled like the more civilized 
Ottoman subjects in other parts of the empire.”217 However, regarding the differences 
and paying attention to demands of the local population does not necessarily mean a 
colonialist stance. On the contrary, it could be interpreted as respect to their preferences 
and demands. Also, Karen Barkey, in her great book Empire of Difference argues that 
underlying reason of longevity of the Ottoman Empire is the flexibility of its rule and 
regulation in accordance with ethnic, religious and sectarian differences.218 Moreover, 
in his history of Yemen and of Sanaa Ahmed Reşid represented the campaigns of 1870-
73 as a pre-emptive act to protect Muslim lands from the expansionist Christian colonial 
rule.  
As it is seen, for Muslims, colonialism much more associated with the Christian 
European powers who occupied the parts of Ottoman lands such as Algeria, Tunisia and 
Egypt.219 In Yemen’s case, colonialism debates could simply have gone through another 
way. Because, there was a sharp difference between Yemeni people who were 
represented in parliament during both constitutional periods and disenfranchised 
subjects of British India. Superiority feelings and modernization endeavors of Ottoman 
bureaucrats could not be denied in the nineteenth century but it does not always means 
that Ottoman Empire had a colonial aspiration on the certain parts. Because, huge part 
of the empire had been already conquered at least three hundred years before and these 
territories have been the organic part of the empire. The inhabitants of these lands were 
also citizens regardless of whether or not they were “civilized”. Conversely, people of 
India or Algeria were solely subjects who were deprived of all legal rights. Besides, in 
the Ottoman case, “savages and backwardness” were not perceived as biological, 
namely they were not socially unconvertible categories. So, it is assumed that Ottoman 
authorities believed there was not an existence of insurmountable cultural differences 
between rulers and the ruled.220 Hence, the representation of the Yemeni deputies in 
parliament is noteworthy. Finally, it is important to bear in mind that, although the 
Turkish-speaking Sunni elite has ruled the empire, it did not create privileged situations 	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for Turkish speaking people who lived in Anatolia. For this reason, it could not be 
mentioned that there was a colonial imperialist stance on the other culturally different 
groups of people 221 
Cem Emrence’s article Imperial Paths and Big Comparisons: the Late Ottoman 
Empire has also added a great deal to the fierce debates on modernization and 
colonization of the late Ottoman historiography.  He provides a comprehensive 
overview of historiographical trends and sets new directions for late Ottoman history. 
He showed that firstly, late Ottoman historiography has still confined to center-
periphery model and maintained dualistic and state centered narratives. Secondly, he 
suggests a “historical trajectory” framework as a better analytical tools and empirical 
strategy which is spatial, path-dependent, and comparative.222 In the nineteenth century, 
Ottoman Empire had embarked on large-scale reforms in every corner of the empire. 
The influence of these reforms on the members of educated bureaucratic class was 
impressive and they “envisioned a socially elitist, politically centralist, and culturally 
modernist project to transform the Ottoman Empire”223 Those self-assigned bureaucrats 
have seen Arabs, tribes and non-Sunni version of Islam with  “orientalizing contempt”. 
Explaining of Post-Tanzimat Ottoman history with a special reference to colonialism 
and orientalism thesis is a deadlock.  
Thereby Emrence’s offer for approaching the nineteenth century Ottoman 
history from three regional trajectories coastal, interior, and frontier could be a step to 
go beyond the center and periphery, macro and micro, global and domestic dualistic 
views. His frontier trajectory is peculiar to Ottoman Middle East and he mentions two 
guiding policy principals applied into the frontier regions: first, to flourishing trustful 
networks in order to carrying out modernization project and second, to bargain and 
negotiate with local leaders through the leverage of Islam.224 Mustafa Minavi points out 
that adaptation of the idea of periphery for the Ottoman frontiers needs to be 
reconsidered. As Emrence puts it well, these concepts are born out of ideological 
stances. Utilizing center-periphery paradigm leads to biased interpretation of Ottoman 
government’s action on eastern provinces as an extension of European colonial 	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practices amid the civilized “self” and uncivilized “other”. 225  When Ottoman 
historiography examined over the center-periphery dilemma, all routed unavoidably 
goes to colonialism/orientalism thesis.  
Sabri Ateş in his article entitled Orientalism and our East published in 2007 
brought a different perspective to the debates on the Ottoman orientalism and 
colonialism. He distinguishes the perception of the east of the Ottoman Empire and 
Turkish Republic. According to him, Ottomans’ glance to his periphery was not 
exclusionist and negative. It signs the civilizing mission of the center. The final aim of 
the state was not assimilate or destroy the different ethnic groups or rural people. On the 
contrary, Ottoman state aimed to make them primary component of the state and 
confidential subject with their all differences. However, this approached has been 
broken in the republican area and rejected by republican elites. It should be kept in mind 
that primary components of the Ottoman Empire were not the nomadic rural people. 
The ideal citizen of the empire after the Tanzimat reforms was the people who were 
living in the city and Sunni Muslims. What is striking that people who were the outside 
of this definition cannot be alienated but they can transform into the settled, Sunni 
Muslims. For this reason, Ottomans inserted the nomads into the bottom of the 
civilization hierarchy and forced them become settled and Sunni. But, Turkish republic 
interpreted this transformation with strict nationalist sense. When Ottomans perceive 
their periphery as province or rural, Republicans see their east as other by internalizing 
the European racial based theories. 226  
In a nutshell, the nineteenth century was the age of reform whose great 
transformation has been carried out along the vast territories of the empire. In parallel 
with the changes and transformations in the world’s political and economic structure, 
Ottoman Empire felt the need of making reforms promptly. Although decision of 
modernization process has been taken by internal wish, it has been put into practice by 
imitating the west. Western educated bureaucratic class initiated the process. In 
particular to army, then all institutions of the state have been reorganized in accordance 
with its western counterparts. This also reshaped the state-society relations and to some 
extent it changed the ruling elite’s glance towards inhabitants of eastern provinces. Can 
Veyselgil’s master thesis shed light on the Ottoman perception of its periphery through 	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traveller accounts and personal memoirs of high Ottoman officials who had served in 
the Arab and African provinces. Moreover we learned that many Ottoman intellectuals, 
who had never had a chance to travel to eastern part of the country, read the European 
traveller accounts. These European sources have an impact on their perception of 
east.227 Hence, his study is important to show that Ottoman intellectuals’ perception of 
east was shaped by the thoughts of western travellers.  
It could not be denied that the Ottoman ruling elite had feelings of superiority on 
the rest of Ottoman society. But it does not necessarily mean that they have an 
imperialistic/colonial mindset like its European peers. It is palpable that they use similar 
discourses when they described the “other”. Generally the orient was characterized as 
backward, primitive and savage on the contrary the center represents the scientific, the 
rational and the civilized. As Kırmızı addresses that these people had a mission to 
civilize these group of people. But it is not peculiar attitude towards just Arabs, 
Bedouins, or other non-Sunni groups. Turkish ethnic groups in Anatolia have also come 
across with similar treatments. Hence, there were no distinct criteria independent from 
the ruler’s self preference that describes the status of being civilized or not. Moreover, it 
should be born in mind that, despite the fine line between civilizing mission and 
colonization, Ottoman mission has not gone beyond the other side of the line. Under the 
umbrella of Ottoman, all groups of people could find a place for themselves with certain 
rights and freedoms. The concept of “alla Turca” or “borrowed” which is used to 
describe Ottoman experiences on the East signs the differences of it from the European 
experience inside and stresses it peculiarity.   
6.2: Sudan As A Case Study for Ottoman Perception of Its Periphery  	  
Our knowledge about the lives of the nineteenth century Sudan and Ottoman 
perception of Sudanese people is generally based on the traveler accounts of the 
Ottoman officials and intellectuals. Mehmed Mihri’s Sudan Seyhatnamesi, Sadık el 
Müeyyed’s Afrika Sahra-yı Kebirinde Seyahat and Habeş Seyahatnamesi, and Cami 
Baykurt’s Son Osmanlı Afrikası’nda Hayat: Çöl İnsanları ve Jön Türkler, are the main 
sources to have an idea about the Ottoman perception of its periphery. My aim in this 
chapter is to put forward the Ottoman’s gaze to the Muslim and non- Muslim Bedouin 	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communities in Africa and shows the similarities and differences from European 
colonial discourses. Particularly Mahdi revolt and the Mahdi’s himself would be my 
basic concern to explain the Ottoman bureaucrats’ approaching to this society and this 
movement. 
Mehmed Mihri (1849-1915?) was born in Kirkuk as a son of local mullah. He took 
his first education there and around 1864 came to Istanbul and became a protegé of 
Mustafa Fazıl Pasha, the uncle of Egyptian Khedive Tewfik. He worked in the Sublime 
Porte’s Translation Office several years then in 1878 appointed to the position of 
Ottoman Consular in Khoy, Iran. Between 1880s and First World War he undertook a 
service in the Khedivial family. During his career, Mehmed Mihri, had learned certain 
languages of the period and wrote several linguistic and literary books. In 1909, he 
accompanied Khedivial Prince Yusuf Kemal in his three months long hunting trip in the 
Nile Valley stretching into the Sudan. Later on he published a report about his voyage 
entitled Sudan Seyahatnamesi.228  
In his account, Mihri glorifies Islam and ascribed a civilizing mission to it. 
According to him, the criterion for the civilization is the combination of the western 
technological advancements and Islam as the most accurate way of belief. Although the 
local people of the Sudan learned Islam from the Arabs such as reading the holy book 
and some religious knowledge, they were still quite far away from civilization. Through 
Islam, they relieved themselves from the ridiculous pagan customs.229  From this 
departure point, it could be deduced that Ottomans had a mission to spread the Islam to 
the non-Islamic people and to correct the false Islamic practices. It gave them a sense of 
superiority over the non-Muslim societies. In many sentences, he clearly mentioned 
about their strange and weird customs from their toilet habits to their hairstyles.230 In 
addition to this, Mihri regarded these tribal people as savage because of their different 
attitudes and customs from himself. For instance, the Mitu tribe’s women were savage 	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in the eyes of Mihri because they changed the form of their lips and imitated the wild 
animals shapes.231 Moreover, their skills in the making of pottery, shoes and leather 
craft were the sign of their ability to be civilized. However, their houses made up of 
straw and cane were the indicator of their nomadism.232 One of the important features of 
Mihri’s account was the using of the photographs in the book. Those half -naked savage 
people who were dancing with their lances attracted the attention of his master, Prince 
Yusuf Kemal and he himself took the photographs by arraying them like in a military 
order. 233  Indeed, taking photograph is one of the symbolic acts to address the 
relationship between photographer and the person who is photographed. It is also 
related to who is subject and who is object in the frame. The object is the bedouin 
people in this case and Khedivian Prince Yusuf Kemal is the subject who examines the 
object. There is a hierarchical relationship among their positions and it refers the 
superiority feeling favors the prince. Furthermore, if the photographs throughout the 
book are to be taken into consideration, it is obvious that khedivian Prince looks like a 
European governor rather than his Eastern counterparts. When the bedouins first saw 
the prince, they probably thought that he was a European who clothes like Europeans 
and even think like them. The mentality behind the prince’s mind was not so much 
different than his European counterparts. They were savage, backward and primitive 
groups of people deprived of the blessing of the civilization. Although these savage 
people did not differ from the mankind and became happy and sad with similar things, 
they could be easily marginalized by the usual minds.234  
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rekabet edercesine ilerlemişlerdir. Bunlar alt dudaklarının büyüklüğüne kanaat etmeyüp güya tenasüb ve intizam hasıl 
etmek için üst dudaklarını dahi hatra ve hayale gelmeyecek surete sokarlar. Bu vahşi karılar melbusatta ve gerek 
saçlarının intizamında hayvanat-ı vahşiyeden bazılarının şekil ve heyetini taklid ederler ise de dudaklarının böyle 
peyda heyetine getirilmesinin sebebini anlayamadım.”  
232 Ibid., p. 157-158 	  “....topraktan çanak çömlek ve desti ve kub gibi şeylerin imali hususunda dahi maharetleri vardır. Derileri kendileri 
dibağat? ettikleri gibi bundan ayakkabı ve mevadd-ı saraciye vesaireyi de imal ederler. Şu sanatlara olan ehliyetleri 
medeniyete olan kabiliyetlerine delalet etmekle beraber meskenleri umumiyet üzere kamıştan üstleri saman ve otla 
örtülü dairevi kulübelerden ibaret bulunması da hal-i tavr-ı bedeviyetlerine delildir.”  233	  Ibid., p.201 
“....şarkı söyleyerek gelip bir vaz’ı ihtiram ile vapurumuzun karşısında durdular. Benimle kapudan birlikte karaya 
çıktık. Bu vahşi adamların yanına gittik; bunlar Arapça bilmediklerinden tercüman vasıtasıyla ne maksad ve meram 
üzerine böyle alay ile yanımıza geldiklerini sual ettiğimizde prens hazretlerini ziyaret için geldikleri cevabını aldık. 
Prens müşarünileyh henüz Şikargâhdan avdet etmemiş olduğu için bir saate kadar avdet edeceklerini kendilerine 
tefhim eylediğimde artık bunlar usul ve adatları üzere şarkı söyleyrek hepsi birden raks etmeğe başladılar bu sırada 
avdet eden prens hazretleri dahi bu hali görünce sinematografla fotoğraf alet ve edevatını celb ettikten sonra bunları 
usul-i askeri üzere saf saf tertib ve tanzim idüp bizzat kendileri bu vahşi adamların birkaç nev-ü tarzı üzere 
resimlerini aldılar.”  234	  Ibid., p.211  
“Bu yam yam ahalisi herkesin dediği gibi kuyruklu olmayıp bizzat gördüğüm bu vahşiler nev-i beşerden asla farkları 
olmadıktan başka bizim gibi mucib-i esef veya meserret olan ahvalde ya mutesif veyahut memnun olurlar.”  
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On the other hand, Prince Yusuf Kemal’s dressing and behavioring like a European 
governor indicates his feeling of inferiority vis a vis Europeans. Can Veyselgil draw 
attention one more important issue about Mihri’s Sudan Seyehatnamesi. According to 
him, Mihri uses the rhetoric of empty lands similar to colonialist power. He seems to 
internalize this rhetoric and perceived the Ottoman Empire as an equally colonialist 
power rather a victim of colonialism. As a potential Ottoman colony, Sudan was the 
direct competition area between France and Ottoman Empire.235 
Sadık el Müeyyed (1858-1911) who was born in Damascus descended from the 
prominent Azmzade family in Syria. He received an education in military school and 
gained various military posts during his career. In 1884 he became an aide-de-camp of 
the Sultan and he took a part in the committee sending Germany in order to congratulate 
Wilhem II’s thronging in 1887. Same year, he was charged of taking the Sultan’s gifts 
to Senusian Sheikh Mahdi el-Senussi in Libya. He visited the Sheikh in the lodge near to 
Cağbub town and prepared a report about the life of the dervishes and their allegiance to 
Sultan. He presented his report to the Sultan via Dervish Pasha on 3 December 1887. 
Then he was promoted to the rank of binbaşı on August 1888. Sadık el Müeyyed has 
been sent to the region for second time in the 1895. Similar to his first visit, he delivered 
the presents of the Sultan to the Sheikh Senussi and after his return to Istanbul he shared 
his two months experiences with the Sultan in a report and published his observations as 
a travelogue, Afrika Sahra-yı Kebirinde Seyahat in 1895.236  
In 1896, the Ethiopian emperor Menelik II sent a diplomatic delegation to Istanbul 
to contact with Ottoman state and in return Abdülhamid II sent a delegation committee 
led by Sadık el Müeyyed to Ethiopia in 1904. During his three months travel in 
Ethiopia, he recorded his observations and collected information about the people and 
their customs and traditions. Later on, he presented his experiences as a report to the 
Sultan and published it as a traveler book, Habeş Seyahatnamesi, in 1904.237  
In many places of his book, Müeyyed mentioned about the willingness of the local 
people to see him. Wherever he visited, people welcomed him enthusiastically. When 
they recognized that he was sent by the caliph, they prayed for the Sultan and displayed 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  235	  Can Veyselgil,	  The Ottoman Empire and the Rest of the World: Late Ottoman First Person Narratives Regarding 
the Ottoman Perceptions on the non-European World and the Ottoman Periphery, p. 143.	  
236 İdris Bostan, “Sadık el Müeyyed Paşa” Diyanet İslam Ansiklopedisi, XXXV,p. 399 237İdris Bostan, “Sadık el Müeyyed Paşa” Diyanet İslam Ansiklopedisi, p. 400. 
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a great amount of respect and care.238 This was a usual ceremony for Müeyyyed that he 
encountered such celebration in all Muslim countries. For instance, Somalians’ 
welcome ceremony was so magnificent that Europeans living in the region said it was 
the most populous and stirring celebration they have ever seen.239  
On the other hand, being Muslim or non- Muslim did not so much differ for 
Müeyyed to categorize the local people as savage or not. For instance, Somalian people 
were Muslim and most of them were praying. But they did not take an adequate 
religious education. For this reason, they had a reputation with their bloodshed. In the 
wedding night, husband’s beating of his wife to make her obedient was seen as a savage 
custom for Müeyyed.240 Conversely, another tribe who was naked except for their 
private part was regarded as half savage by Müeyyed that they were no ties with the 
religion.241 According to Müeyyed, desert people were dressing primitively. Some of 
them were barefooted; some wore pattens. Nevertheless, their warlike appearance left 
an indelible impression on people.242 
Indeed, Müeyyed used the similar colonial and orientalist discourse in his 
travelogue. When he arrived to Addis Ababa, the capital city of Ethiopia became a guest 
of Hacı Ahmed Efendi. He saw a gramophone in the residence of his host and become 
surprised because of encountering with a gramophone in Addis Ababa.243 This was a 
spectacular example to addresses the Ottoman prejudices over its periphery. Further, 
Müeyyed treated a person who felt sick probably because of eating raw meat and grease 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
238 Sadık el Müeyyed, Habeş Seyahatnamesi, p. 59 
“Somaliler benim, taraf-ı eşref-i hilafet penahiden gönderildiğimi anlayınca büyük bir coşku(?) ve hevesle yanıma 
koşarak her yerde olduğu gibi şevketli Padişahımız Efendimiz Hazretlerine dua ettiler. Heyetimize hoş geldiniz 
dediler gerekli hürmet ve riayeti gösterdiler. Tren Hareket edinceye kadar Somalililer çoğaldıkça çoğaldı. Büyük bir 
kalabalık meydana getirdiler. Heyetimizin buraya gelişi bunlar için sanki özel bir bayram oldu. İstasyonlarda binlerce 
Somali, Halife-i Peygamber-i Zi-şan Efendimiz Hazretlerine olan bağlılık muhabbetlerini izhar ediyorlardı.”  
239 Ibid., p.66.  
240 Ibid., p.59. 
“Somalililer Müslüman’dır. Çoğu namaz kılıyor. Ama henüz layıkıyla dini terbiye görmemişlerdir. Bu nedenle 
bazıları kan dökücülükle ve katliamlarla şöhret bulmuşlardır. İlk zifaf gecesinde giya itaatkar kılmak için, kocanın 
zevcesini bir kamçıyla dövmesi bazan kanını akıtması gibi vahşiyane adetleri vardır.”	  241	  Ibid.,	  p.237-­‐238.	  
“Avret yerlerinden başka her tarafları çıplaktır. Bazılarının bellerindeki futadan başka omuzlarında da futa vardır. 
Manzaraları müthiş. Çünkü yarı vahşidirler. Bir dinle mütedeyyin değildirler. Bir erkek besleyebildiği kadar kadın 
alır. Bazılarının yedi, sekiz karısı vardır. Silahları ellerindeki bir harbi ile bellerindeki büyük bir bıçaktan ibarettir. 
Bunlar Habeş cinsinden olmayıp kendi başlarına bir kavimdir.”	  242	  Ibid.,	  p.	  45.	  
“Bu reisler ilkel bir şekilde giyinmiştiler. Kimisi yalınayaktı. Kimisi Hicaz’da giyilen nalınlar gibi nalın giymişti. 
Buna rağmen insan üzerinde heybetli bir etki bırakıyorlardı. Vali onları görünce tokalaştı. Hepsini hatrını sordu. 
Kendileri reis olmakla beraber her biri cengaverlik timsali olarak gösterilebilecek tunçtan bir heykel gibi 
görünüyordu.”	  243	  Can	  Veyselgil,	  The Ottoman Empire and the Rest of the World: Late Ottoman First Person Narratives Regarding 
the Ottoman Perceptions on the non-European World and the Ottoman Periphery, p. 115.	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during his travels around Ethiopia. Müeyyed manages to heal the person through his 
anti-dysentery pills and then he claimed that Ethiopians resorted to the White men for 
their various illnesses. In the eyes of these people, whites were doctor, surgeon and 
omnipotent for everything.244 Müeyyed’s performing of treatment was not only sign of 
his sense supremacy over the non-European societies but also sign of his equality with a 
European. Besides, Veyselgil takes an attention one more point about the colonial 
rhetoric in Müeyyed’s account. According to him, when Müeyyed learned that there 
were cheap animals in the region, he contemplated to construct cheese and sausages 
factories to benefit from the comparative advantages of Ethiopia. Because animals were 
abundant and pastures were free. Trade of these animals’ bones and skins was also easy. 
But Ethiopians was ashamed of using the sheeps and goats for milk because these were 
the right of the babies of the animals whose size were small to produce large amount of 
cheese. Müeyyed said that he often advised them benefitting from this source of wealth. 
Veyselgil argues that Müeyyed’s approach is “the imaginary imposition of a series of 
civilized institutions on the landscape”.245  
Müeyyed frequently used the rhetoric of the noble savage, as well. He depicted 
morally superior and non-degenerated picture of “Bedouin” people. Once he said 
Bedouin, he expressed not to mean savage. He mentioned about the Bedouin people 
with the glorious words such as brave and elegant men who had excellent morality.246 
Even their children were prideful that they never accepted the money given by Müeyyed 
as tip. Although they have simple dresses, modest houses and little food, they did not 
feel inferiority. They were not greedy and they were chaste people.247 However, these 
positive descriptions do not always necessarily mean that his real thought about 
Bedouins was quite favorable. During his journey Müeyyed met with a black man, 
Fakih Yusuf and described him: “ Although he was black, he was very polite, gentle, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
244 Sadık el- Müeyyed, Habeş Seyahatnamesi, p. 106. 
“ Buranın ahalisi hastalıkları ve her dertleri için beyazlara müracaat ederler. Onların nazarında beyazlar tabiptir, 
cerrahtır, her şeye muktedirdir. Beyaz renge ise pek itibar etmezler.”  245	  Can	  Veyselgil,	  The Ottoman Empire and the Rest of the World: Late Ottoman First Person Narratives Regarding 
the Ottoman Perceptions on the non-European World and the Ottoman Periphery, pp. 144-145.	  
246 Sadık el-Müeyyed, Afrika Sahra-yı Kebirinde Seyahat, p. 8. 
“Bedevi demekten meram bunları vahşi göstermek değildir. İleride sırası geldikçe anlatacağımız bu adamlar pek 
güzel ahlaka malik ve zariftirler.” 247Ibid., p. 122. 
“Hiçbirine hatta çocuklarına bile bahşiş kabul ettiremedim. Kendileri bir şey vermeden başkasının verdiğini almak 
onlarca muayyebattan imiş. Libasları birer mavi gömlek ile birer takyeden, meskenleri hakir kulübelerden, nafakaları 
hurma veya deve sütünden ibaret olan bu çöl evladının nasıyelerinde alaim-i ibtihal ve zillet görülmez. Bilakis hepsi 
istiğna ve iffetin numune-i mücessemidir.”  
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wise and poet.” 248This sentence implies that expected black person was different than 
this man.  Moreover, Müeyyed placed a bet with a Bedouin about the their arrival time 
to the hill. But Müeyyed’s prediction was wrong and they arrived the hill very late 
compared to his prediction. Thereupon he said that he could not believe to be 
embarrassed in front of the Bedouin.249  Actually, this expression signs his feelings of 
superiority over the Bedouin.  
As known, Sadık el Müeyyed’s mission was to bring the Sultan’s gifts to Senussi 
Sheikh. In his traveler account, he gave lots of information about this prominent dervish 
lodge and its activities in the region. The influence of the order was very widespread in 
the Saharan Africa and his sheikh and disciples were loyal to the Ottoman Caliphate and 
advised local people to obey the Sultan. Plus, they were aware of the competitions on 
their living space for this reason the sheikh refused the gifts sent by great powers. They 
maintained the security and order in the vicinity of their lodge and guide the Bedouins 
in the path of civilization. They taught the religion, agriculture and commerce, as well. 
They were desert civilizers who were the agents fulfilling the civilizing mission.250 The 
other Ottoman traveler, Abdülkadir Cami Bey also regarded the Senussian lodges as a 
part of new and civilized world among the black tents of the Africans, Berbers and 
Arabs.251 
Cami Baykurt was born in 1878 in Istanbul as a son of a lieutenant general, Mehmet 
Münir Pasha.  He received his education from Soğuk Çeşme Askeri Rüşdiye Mektebi and 
Kuleli Askeri Mektebi and graduated from military school as a lieutenant in 1896. He 
learned French language and read set of philosophy and sociology books. After his 
graduation, he was appointed to Ghat district of Trablusgarb as administrative governor 
and military commander in 1905 in order to trace French colonial threat.  In 1908, he 
was elected to the Ottoman assembly as a deputy of Fezzan. He wrote his memoirs 
regarding Tripoli in 1910 under the name of Trablusgarb’tan Sahra-yı Kebire 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  248	  Ibid., p.64 
“ Mümaileyh Zenci ise de gayet terbiyeli, nazik, fasih ve oldukça alim ve şairdir.” 
249 Ibid., p. 95. 
“...Mansur Efendi artık ilerlemeyerek bir nokta-i tevaffuk intihabıyla kafilenin vürudunu beklememizin münasib 
olacağını söylediyse de ben bedevilerekarşı mahcub kalmayı bir türlü havasalama sığdıramadım ve öteden zerrin şua 
bir fanus-ı cesim gibi tulu eden kamerin yavaş yavaş mavileşen aydınlığı içinde yolumuza devam etmek cihetini 
iltizam ettim.” 250	  Can	  Veyselgil,	  The Ottoman Empire and the Rest of the World: Late Ottoman First Person Narratives Regarding 
the Ottoman Perceptions on the non-European World and the Ottoman Periphery, p. 244.	  251	  Cami	  Baykurt, Son Osmanlı Afrikası'nda Hayat: Çöl İnsanları, Sürgünler ve Jön Türkler,p.39.	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Seyahat252 and later on wrote Son Osmanlı Afrikası'nda Hayat with Halide Edip’s 
encouragements.253 Throughout his long journey, Baykurt came across with several 
tribes and he gave variety of information about daily lives of the local people. Their 
clothes, foods, beverages, traditions and customs, religions, rituals and tribal relations 
were taken into consideration by him. 
Herzog and Motika give a striking example to understand the Ottoman perception of 
the local people. The Tuaregs who were the Berber tribes of the central Sahara were 
savages and a threat to security. They did not like the Ottoman management and harmed 
the caravan trade and even feared the settled population. Plus, They did not pay their 
taxes. The overall picture drawn by Cami Bey about Tuaregs was negative. He 
described them as bloodthirsty, greedy, cowardly and big-mouthed. Cami Bey did not 
make a plan to civilize these tribes, but he saw them as subjects of the colonial rule.254  
According to him, the inhabitants the city of Ghat was living a “polis” life of first 
civilization age.255 When he arrived there, there was a qadı and a qaimakam from a 
local population who represent the Ottoman Sultan. They had still continued the slavery 
mode of production and matriarchal systems. This system functioned well until the 
Tanzimat’s monolithic regulations. But this system was primitive and old any more.256 
For Cami Bey, people who dealt with the gaining of wheat by rubbing two stones are 
inferior to Arabs who used the hand mills. They were living in the Neolithic era.257 In 
other place, Cami Bey defined these poorest tribes as the lower strata of the society in 
terms of being civilized and claimed that he were processing wheat like Stone Age 
people.258 He claimed that Tuaregs were living a miserable life but even worse Tibu 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
252 Cami Baykurt, Trablusgarp’tan Sahra-yı Kebire Doğru, (İstanbul:Ark Yayınları, 2011). 253	  Cami Baykurt, Son Osmanlı Afrikası'nda Hayat: Çöl İnsanları, Sürgünler ve Jön Türkler, (İstanbul: İş 
BankasıYayınları, 2009),pp. xi-xii. 
254 Christoph Herzog and Raoul Motika, "Orientalism "alla turca": Late 19th / Early 20th Century Ottoman Voyages 
into the Muslim 'Outback'",pp. 192-193. 255	  Cami Baykurt, Son Osmanlı Afrikası'nda Hayat: Çöl İnsanları, Sürgünler ve Jön Türkler, p. 194. 
“Gat cemaati ilk medeniyet çağının küçük siteler hayatını yaşıyordu.”	  
256 Ibid., p. 196. 
“Gat’a geldiğim zaman Osmanlı Padişahını burada temsil eden yerli halktan bir kaymakam ve bir de kadı vardı. Fakat 
hakimiyet iptidai halk cumhurunu temsil eden kapı senatosu elinde idi. Osmanlı devleti Müslüman olmayan dini 
cemaatler hakkında olduğu gibi göçebe akvamın geniş imparatorluğunun bucaklarında iptidai siteler hayatı yaşayan 
cemaatlerin de eski kölelere dayanan içtimai ve hukuki nizamını değiştirmeye kalkmamıştır.  Tanzimatçılığın tek 
çeşitli düzenini her yerde tatbik sevdasına düşünceye kadar memleketi rahatça idare edebilmiş olması bu serbest 
tutum sayesinde olmuştur.” 
257 Ibid., p.204 
“Gat cemaati köle iktisat düzeni matriarka usulü ile eski çağlardan bir numune idi. İki taşı birbirine sürterek buğday 
öğüten Gatlı ve Tuareg ise medeniyetçe küçük el değirmeni kullanmak mertebesine yükselmiş olan Kuzeyin çöl 
Arabına göre neolitik devrin insanı.”	  
258 Ibid., p.220. 
“Kuzey Afrika Sahrası’nın göçebeleri arasında Azgar Tuareg’i şüphesiz en yoksul olanlardandır. Şati’nin Arablarına 
nazaran medeniyetçe çok aşağı derecededirler. Arap’ın hiç olmazsa çadırında küçük bir taş değirmeni vardır. Halbuki 
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tribes lived in the south of Fezzan were more inferior than Tuaregs that they were not 
different form bunch of monkeys walk around the extinct volcano of Tibesti.259 On the 
other hand, Although Sadık el Müeyyed said that Senusians welcomed him 
enthusiastically and they were intimately loyal to the Sultan, Cami Bey did not 
optimistic as much as Müeyyed. He thought that Senusians displayed xenophobic 
attitudes towards themselves like they showed Berberian tribes. It was time to leave the 
last territory of the Ottoman Africa. He felt as despised parasite in this distant place 
conquest by his ancestors and accused the Sultan Abdülhamid due to this miserable 
state.260 
As we known from the Mahdi’s own letters to Muslim leaders, his movement had 
religious characteristics and “his revolution was against the Turks who changed religion 
and replaced it by kufr”. Muhammad Ahmed and then his caliph wrote similar letters to 
Khedive and invited him true religion. Once their call failed, they declared holy war 
(jihad) against the Turks. The revolt was only way to live true religion due to Turkish 
mismanagement and corruption.261 Mahdi revolt from the Ottoman points of view was a 
rebellion (harekat-ı isyaniyye) against Christian governor of the country and Egyptian 
maladministration.262 Right after the Mahdi revolt (29 June 1881), the nationalist Urabi 
uprising had outbroken in Egypt on September 1882.  Indeed, the first document 
regarding the Mahdi revolt reached Istanbul on December 1882.  Hence, it was a year 
after when Ottoman government received the news of rebellion. As mentioned before, 
probably at the first stages of the movement, it was not taken seriously by the local 
governors. Egyptian rulers were preoccupied with the Urabi revolt, so Mahdi’s uprising 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Tuareg hatta Gat’ın şehirli halkı bile iki taş parçasını birbirine sürterek buğday öğütmekte idiler. Taş devrinin 
insanları gibi.”  259	  Ibid., p.211. 
“Tuarg’in serseriyane ve sefil hayatı işte böyledir. Fakat Afrika’nın Büyük Sahrasında onlardan daha aşağısı yok 
değil. Fizan güneyinde, Tibesti’nin sönmüş eski volkanları üzerinde yaşayan Tibuların o civarlarda dolaşan maymun 
sürülerinden farkları çok azdır. Hiç olmazsa Targı’nın kirli bir yorganı vardır.” 260	  Ibid., p.40. 
“O Sünusiler ki Berber kavimlere has yabancı düşmanlığını bize karşı da göstermekte idiler. Her hal ve tavırlarıyla 
Son Osmanlı Afrikası’nı da bırakıp gitmek zamanı gelmiş olduğunu bize anlatmak ister gibi davranmaktaydılar. 
İmparatorluğa o zamanki inkılapçı Türk nesli için bu hal ne elem verici bir şeydi. Biz bu imparatorluğu kurmuş olan 
şanlı ecdadın namert torunları, baba mirasının bu uzak köşelerinde hor görülen sığıntılar olduğumuzu gördükçe bu 
düşkünlüğümüzün yegane mesulü Sultan Hamid’e kinimiz artıyordu.”  261	  Gabrial Warburg, The Turco-Egyptian Sudan: Recent Historiographical Controversy, p. 196.  262	  Ali Akyıldız ve Zekeriya Kurşun, Osmanlı Arap Coğrafyası ve Avrupa Emperyalizmi, p.410. 
“Cenubi Arabistan’da olduğu gibi Merkezi Afrika’da dahi müzmin bir surette hüküm-ferma olan Mehdi harekatından 
biri bin üç yüz sene-i Hicriyye’sine dğru Sudan-ı Mısıri’de zuhur etmeğe başlıyor. İsmail Paşa’nın Sudan cihetlerinde 
mülhakat-ı Mısıriyye’nin hududunu tevsi ile Darfur’da, Kerdefan’da ve Hatt-ı İstiva gölleri mıntıkasında tesis 
eylediği idarenin memurlarının zulm ve irtikabı, rüesa-yı kabailin basilica menba-ı varidatı olan esir ticaretinin ilgası 
ve böyle bir idarenin başında Hristiyan ve ecnebi memurlar bulunması yüzünden ahali-i mahalliyyenin nefret ve 
şikayetini mucip olması ve muhafaza-i inzibata kafi kuva-yı askeriyyenin fıkdanı gibi esbab-ı mütenevvia-i 
içtimaiyye ve idariyye hidiv-i müşarünileyhin evahir-i vilayetinde zemini bir hareket-i isyaniyye için hazırlamış 
bulunuyor.”	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was neglected. Due to this time proximity among these revolution attempts though 
Mahdi’s rebellion started earlier than Urabi’s, the Ottomans were more concerned by 
the Urabi revolt. Even in a personal memorandum, Abdülhamid woud draw a 
comparison between the Sudanese Mahdi and Urabi referring to the Mahdi as ‘brigand 
worthy of the title- a second Urabi (Urabi-i Sani) Urabi became in the Sultan’s mind, 
something of an epithet for rebellion. Abdülhamid regarded Urabi and his supporters as 
“vermin”.263	  So the Sudanese Mahdi was also perceived as vermin because he was 
threat to Sultan’s political and religious authority. However, if the news about the 
Mahdi rebellion reached on time to the Sultan, probably Urabi would be called as 
Mahdi-i Sani (a second Mahdi) and the approach of the Sultan to the Urabi uprising or 
Egyptian question would be changed.  
At the beginning Muhammad Ahmed was named as mütemehdi (false Mahdi) in 
the archival documents. After the certain victories of Mahdi, an edict of Sublime Porte 
ordered on 28 November 1883 that he would be labeled as the shaqi instead of 
mutemehdi. The shaqi denotes a bandit or rebel in general. In the eyes of Ottoman 
authorities, he was rebellious against the rule of the Sultan and threat to the territorial 
integrity of the Empire. 
Abdülhamid II was more concerned about the spreading of the Mahdi’s ideas to 
the Hejaz province. Furthermore, one of the important generals, Osman Nuri Pasha had 
been appointed to the governorship of Hejaz in 1882. Osman Nuri Pasha as a veteran 
statesman and general had prepared a report about the reforms in the Hejaz area on 17 
July 1885. This report is also crucial source to understand the Ottoman’s stance towards 
its periphery close to Sudan. In general sense, this report was a reflection of the policies 
based on order and progress in the provincial administration. At the beginning of the 
report, the union of the Muslims has been emphasized and Pasha advised to increasing 
relationship between Ottoman Sultan and Hejaz. The second theme of the report was the 
reforms on the administration, economy, judge, education, and transportation for 
progress and continuation of the state. He used bedeviyet and medeniyet words in order 
to define nomadism and sedentary. According to him, nomad people had to be settled 
otherwise they would wage their primitive customs and deprive of the blessing of the 
civilization. Furthermore, the transportation was under the control of the nomadic tribes 
who tended to robbery and banditry in Hejaz and particularly in the Hajj season threated 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  263	  Selim Deringil, The Ottoman Response to the Egyptian Crisis of 1881-1882, pp.20-21.  
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the security of the roads.264 Furthermore, he believed that there are six conditions for the 
continuation of the state in the path civilization: division of the politics, constructing of 
the state buildings, establishing nizamiye tribunals, extending of science and education 
and advancing the means of arts and industry, arranging of the incomes of the certain 
region, and constructing roads and bridges.265 
Indeed, Osman Nuri Pasha has seen the nomadic people as an obstacle in front 
of the progress and development of the state. Because, state cannot penetrate into the 
people and impose sanctions to regulate the social life in the state of the nomadism. At 
this juncture, people has been alienated and hated from the state. They would protect 
their savage customs and traditions by depriving of the happiness of the civilization in 
the state of nomadism and poverty. Because of their necessity, they would attack the 
settled areas and they would apply to state in order to satisfy their requirements. Hence, 
they became an insufferable burden for the state. Nomadic people cannot participate the 
civilized world due to the fact that they were destitute of civilized laws and 
education.266   
Briefly, Osman Nuri Pasha approached the nomadic people from the 
modernizing perspective. State structure, laws, education, buildings, science and art 
were all the signs of civilization for him. Nomadic people who were lack of these 
blessings were the backward and savage who resist the rules and regulation of the 
civilized world. For this reason, they should be forced to settle down. Moreover, in 
1886, the reasons of Osman Nuri Pasha’s removal from his duty stemmed from his strict 
administration which neglects the local customs and traditions of the Hejaz people. As 
seen, Ottoman state was not in favor of the enforcing policies toward the local people. 
When they noticed that Osman Nuri Pasha’s project alienated the people and disinclined 
to the state, he was discharged from the governorship of Hejaz province. However, the 
permission of the state to implement the modern laws and regulations on the nomad 
people to some extent prove that the state favored Osman Nuri Pasha’s policies but at 
the end his dismiss was the other indicator that there was a limit of the state to gain the 
alliance of these people whether they were backward or not.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
264 S. Akşin Somel, “Osman Nuri Paşa’nın 17 Temmuz 1885 tarihli Hicaz Raporu”, Tarih Araştırmaları Dergisi, v.29 
(Ankara University,1996).p, 1-4. 265	  S. Akşin Somel, Osman Nuri Paşa’nın 17 Temmuz 1885 tarihli Hicaz Raporu, p. 9.	  
266 Ibid., p. 9. 
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To conclude the Ottoman orientalism/colonialism debate, it could argue for the 
Sudanese Mahdi case that Ottomans perceived Sudan territory as an integral part of 
Egypt and namely of their own. So it could be said that Ottoman Empire saw these 
distant territories as colony. Mahdi revolt was a rebellion attempt against the Sultan’s 
caliphate because Muhammad Ahmed was named himself as the successor of the God’s 
prophet like the Ottoman Sultan. For this reason it could be claimed that the Mahdi 
challenged the religious authority of the Sultan. Furthermore, he refused to pay taxes 
and thereby revolted against the status quo. He was a usual shaqi (bandit) in the eyes of 
the State. His movement was the insurrection. (harekat-ı isyaniye). 
 However, Egypt’s colonial aspirations on Sudan were obvious since 
Muhammad Ali Pasha’s reign. From the very beginning, Egyptian rulers conquered the 
country for the sake of its immense human and material sources. Later on the 
modernization projects put in practice in the Sudan. Slave trade was abolished and taxes 
collected more centrally. Veteran European governors were charged to manage the 
country. When Egyptian rulers followed the patterns of western civilization, to large 
extent they resembled to Europeans. As seen Mihri’s traveler account Prince Yusuf 
Kemal who visited the Europe several times was dressing like a European ruler, hunting 
the animals and taking photographs with them. He saw the local people as savage, 
backward and uncivilized who needed their help to find the right way. Egyptian ruler’s 
approach towards these local people was undistinguished from the any European 
governor. They had embraced the European values to be modern or civilized. The 
modernizer gaze of Egyptians was clear for the Sudanese people.  
On the other hand, I thought that this perspective cannot generalize for all 
Ottoman governors or Sultan’s himself. For the case of Sudanese Mahdi, archival 
documents did not give us any impression that Ottoman central elites saw the Sudanese 
people or Mahdi himself as savage or backward. It is possible that the diplomatic and 
official language of the documents hinders to get such an idea or examined documents 
are inadequate to claim such argument. Yet, Sadık el Müeyyed’s travelogue gives us an 
idea to understand their mentality. He was from Syria and probably familiar with the 
tribal culture. For this reason, we came across many sentences glorify the bedouins, 
tribes and local people in his account. The main aim of his travel was to strength the 
feelings of solidarity and brotherhood among the Muslim societies via sending gifts to 
local rulers and sheikhs. It could be said that he was the symbol of Abdülhamid’s 
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politics of Pan-Islamism in Africa. He was also supporter of this policy as understood 
from his account. However, it is certain that he had some prejudices about the people of 
desert. Regarding the Mahdi revolt, he briefly mentioned his confrontation with some 
Mahdi dervishes during his journey but he did not use any negative words when he 
talked about this event.267 For this reason, it is hard to say that Ottoman Empire, if we 
keep the Egypt outside, colonized the Sudanese territory and performed western type of 
colonial policies. However, the superior gaze toward the region or the movement was 
very straightforward.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
267 Sadık el Müeyyed, Afrika Sahra-yı Kebirinde Seyahat, p.26 
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CONCLUSION 	  
The Mahdi revolt was one of the important case studies to shed light on the Ottoman 
policy towards the Saharan Africa and on the views of the Sultan against the radical 
Islamist movements in the late nineteenth century. The first contact of the Ottoman 
Empire with African continent has occurred in sixteenth century. The conquest of Egypt 
started the Ottoman dominance in the North Africa and in the following four hundred 
years the Ottoman sphere of suzerainty continued to spread into the inside of the 
continent. In 1555, Habeş province was established with the order of Sultan Süleyman 
and as the symbol of the state authority, the sikkes were coined and the hutbes were read 
on behalf of the Ottoman Sultan. Besides, important port cities in the Red Sea shore like 
Massawa, Sewakin and Zeila had also been conquered by the Ottoman navy during this 
time.  
Muhammad Ali who was the Ottoman viceroy of Egypt in 1820 undertook the 
conquest of the northern Sudan for the sake of gold and slaves. Thereby the first 
Turkiyya period has been started in Sudan. There is no evidence that the viceroy had 
obtained permission from the Sublime Port for conquering the Sudan. The firman of 13 
February 1841, which conferred this position on the viceroy, also recognized him as the 
governor of the provinces of Nubia, Darfur, Kordofan, Sinnar and all their dependencies 
outside the boundaries of Egypt, but without the right of succession. The prerogatives of 
the Egyptian province have been gradually enlarged with the other firmans and as a 
result of the amendments, Egypt has legally adhered to Ottoman Empire, politically it 
gained semi-autonomous status.  
In 1882, British forces invaded Egypt with the pretext of Urabi Pasha revolt. 
Meanwhile Muhammad Ahmed had already proclaimed himself as the expected Mahdi 
in the Sudan. The Mahdi has widened his sphere of influence in a short time and when 
the Egyptian authorities who were preoccupied with the Urabi uprising, noticed the 
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seriousness of the incident, Muhammad Ahmed had already won his first victories. It 
was neither a seeking for nationalist state nor for a struggle of independence. It was 
prominently a religious movement. The Mahdi was a revivalist leader who wished to 
return to the conditions to the prophet Muhammad had lived in first Islamic state. For 
these reason, he declared the holy war against the “Turks” who were particularly 
corrupted Egyptian rulers and Christian British administrators. His mahdiship has 
gained acceptance and spread to other communities via his devoted followers and 
disciples. Although the movement had lost its strength after the death of the Mahdi in 
1885, British and Egyptian expeditionary forces have been already heavily defeated by 
the Ansar a number of times and Britain had lost two important generals, Hicks and 
Gordon Pasha, during the war against the Mahdist dervishes.  
On the other hand, the argument, Mahdi had taken stance against the Ottoman 
authority in the Sudan is also debatable. Because, when the Mahdi revolt occurred in 
1881, Egypt was not invaded by Britain and the uprising was against the Egyptian 
administration that ruled the country for sixty years. Furthermore, the Mahdi had 
declared holy war against the infidels who were the British officers governing the 
country. Throughout the uprising, Ansar forces had merely confronted with Egyptian 
and British army. From this point of view, there is no clear opposition against the 
Ottoman state. However, when the Mahdi proclaimed himself as the caliph of the world 
and declared holy war, he had indeed challenged the authority of the Ottoman Sultan 
who was the widely accepted caliph of the Muslim population. On the other hand, the 
real enemy of the Mahdi was the “Turks” as it is understood from the letters of Mahdi 
and his successor Abdullah el-Teaşi. The actual meaning of the “Turks” is controversial 
in the Sudanese history. The term was generally used to refer to all foreign authorities 
who administrates the country. Hence, Anglo-Egyptian period in the Sudan 
historiography was also named as the “second Turkiyya” period. So, it could be 
deduced that the Mahdi movement firstly opposed to the actual rulers of the country, 
Egyptian administration and then British government whose officers were charged with 
the administration of the country by the permission of the Khedive. He was a religious 
leader and British colonialism and his subcontractors were in the target of Muhammad 
Ahmad. In the eyes of Ottoman authorities, he was perceived as a shaqi who was 
rebellious and a bandit against the rule of the Sultan and as threat to the territorial 
integrity of the Empire.  
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According to Yasamee, there were three peculiar features of Abdülhamid’s response 
to the Mahdi revolt: fear of revolution, non-intervention, and legalism. Due to the fact 
that strategic position of Egypt located across the Holy Cities was increasing the 
contingency of the spreading of revolt to the Holy places. Consequently, Ottoman 
government’s first concern was to prevent the insurrection from spreading into 
neighboring regions. Secondly, Sultan Abdülhamid behaved timidly to the Khedive’s 
proposal to support the Egyptian army with Ottoman soldiers. Because sending troops 
means joint operation with the British forces against the Islamic population. 
Furthermore, he believed that the Mahdi revolt was a British-inspired plot and Sudanese 
question could not be separately solved from the Egyptian question. There was also 
possibility of Ottoman soldiers’ joining the followers of the Urabi Pasha in the Sudan. 
Hence, the Sultan limited himself to watch the marches of events without taking an 
active role in the region. Lastly, legalism as the most confortable option has been used 
effectively by the Ottoman Sultan. British decision to separate the Sudan from Egypt 
was a breach of the Sultan’s firmans which guaranteed the integrity of the Khedive’s 
territories.  
Ahmed Muhtar Pasha served in Egypt for twenty-three years and has been 
appointed as high commissioner to monitor the current situation and to write reports 
about the reforms in the Egyptian administration and army as well as the ongoing 
negotiations with Mahdist supporters. Despite his counterpart Drummond Wolff has 
been recalled two years later, he remained in Egypt as the representative of the Sultan. 
His status was no longer legitimate since his counterpart left the Egypt. However, his 
existence bothered Khedive and British Consular, Baring by narrowing their sphere of 
influence. On contrary, he created reliance among Egyptian people. Although his power 
of sanction was very limited even symbolic, he solely aimed to protect the rights of 
Ottoman state over Egypt. At this point, there is an important thing that deserves to be 
taken into consideration. This symbolic power also denotes the inability of Ottoman 
Empire to colonize the continent at least in the Sudan. There is no actual Ottoman army 
or Ottoman governor to manage the country like the conditions of India, the great 
colony of the Britain in the nineteenth century. Ottoman penetration to the region has 
been restricted with the cultural ties and has not gone beyond the religious motives. 
Furthermore, the idea of Pan-Islamism (Ittihad-ı Islam) has been produced as a 
remedy against the rapid colonization movement of the Muslim territories. Since the 
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empire had lost the hegemonic power in the continent, Pan-Islamism as a cultural unit 
has been utilized to increase solidarity, brotherhood and unity feelings among the 
Muslims. Berlin-Bagdad railway project was the most remarkable steps towards this 
goal. Besides, the letters, presents and embassies have been dispatched to the important 
centers of the Muslim world in order to strength the unity against the colonialist powers.  
Regarding the Ottoman orientalism/colonialism debate, it is hard to say that if 
we keep Egypt outside Ottoman Empire colonized the Sudanese territory and performed 
western type of colonial policies. Moreover, the superior gaze toward the region or the 
movement was very straightforward. Because; in the nineteenth century Egypt de facto 
declared its independence from the Ottoman Empire. So; thinking of Egyptians and 
Ottomans policies separately could make the incidents more understandable. On the 
other hand, I thought that Egyptian orientalist/colonialist perspective cannot generalize 
for all Ottoman governors or Sultan’s himself. For the case of Sudanese Mahdi, archival 
documents did not give us any impression that Ottoman central elites saw the Sudanese 
people or Mahdi himself as savage or backward. It is possible that the diplomatic and 
official language of the documents hinders to get such an idea or examined documents 
are inadequate to claim such argument. 
Consequently, there is a recent increase of studies concerning the Ottoman-African 
relations in the historiography.  Most of them tend to exaggerate the Ottoman strength 
in the continent. However, this study came to the conclusion that in the last quarter of 
the nineteenth century Ottoman Empire has lost its military and economic strength to 
deal with the great powers for particularly remote regions. The best solution was to 
benefit from the conflicts among Europeans and to highlight its sovereignty rights on 
the certain territories without intervening there. Sudan was one of the lands which was 
distant and gained through Egyptian invasion.  From these studies point of view, Sultan 
Abdülhamid was not seeing this part of the country as an integral or essential part of the 
Empire. When colonialist powers has been seen in Africa, a map showing the accurate 
borders of the Egypt had been immediately demanded from Ahmed Muhtar Pasha that it 
shows even the Sultan was unaware of the exact borders of his Empire. Besides, 
Ottoman soldiers have been never sacrificed for the Sudan territory and at that time 
when Egypt was under the occupation of British army, fighting for Sudan was trivial. 
On the other hand, the Mahdi revolt was to some extant echoed within the empire. At 
the beginning it was neglected by the authorities due to the fact that there were always 
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Mahdis throughout the history of Islam and even concurrent Mahdis had arisen in 
different corners of the Empire. For the case of the Sudanese Mahdi, the Ottoman 
Sultan thought that it was a British sham to postpone the date of evacuation from the 
Egypt. His only concern was spreading of the movement across the neighboring places, 
thus Hejaz garrisons had been immediately reinforced and religious men and risales had 
been sent to the region in order to break Mahdi’s influence. Indeed, those acts were 
done for the sake of keeping the holy cities and remove the Sudan pretext of Britain to 
fix the evacuation date of Egypt. In discourse, Abdülhamid has staked out a claim on 
the Sudanese territory and highlights the Ottoman rights of sovereignty in the region; he 
did not take de facto role in the course of events.  
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APPENDIX 
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“Sudanda zuhur eden şakiye dair  encümen-i hususide cereyan eden müzakerat-ı 
mutazammın tanzim ve takdim kılınmış olan mazbata-i manzur-ı ali buyruldu. Mazbata-
i mezkurenin hatimesinde bunun bir kere daha müzakeresiyle netice-i muzakeratın 
tekrar arz –ı luzumu dermeyan olunmasına ve fi 5 teşrin-i sani 99 tarihiyle müverreh 
olup dünkü gün bu tarafa vasıl olan ve bir sureti leffen savb-ı sami-i sadaretpenahilerine 
irsal kılınan telgrafnamede merkum şakiye dair hicaz valiliğinden verilen malumat ve 
hususuyla ingilterenin bir büyük harp gemisinin Aden’den Sevakine geldiğini ve bir 
miktar asker ile topları hamilen diğer bir ingiliz sefinesi dahi gelmek üzere 
bulunduğunu mervi olduğunu mutazammın  bulunan fıkra ile mütemehdi ihtilalinden 
dolayı Sevakin misüllü mahaller ahvalince vuku bulacak tekallübata bab-ı alice ne 
nazarla bakılacağına ve ne gibi teşebbüste bulunulacağına dair malumat verilir ise 
hicazca dahi ona tevfik-i meslek olunması mucib-i istifade muhsenat olacağını 
mutazammın olan işar bi’l vucuh caleb-i nazar-ı dikkat ve itina görünmesine mebni 
bunlar dahi komisyonca ilave-i müzakerat olunmak lazımeden olmasıyla binaenaleyh 
işbu telgrafname mündericatında tezekkürüyle verilecek kararın ve bu babda lazım’ül 
ittihaz olan tedabir-i mükemmelenin serian arz ve izbarı ve şaki-i merkum hakkında 
mütemehdi tabirinin istiğmali kat’an muvafık-ı hikmet ve maslahat olmayacağı zikr 
olunan mazbatada mühürleri bulunan zevat-ı fahham nezdlerinde dahi tasdik olunacağı 
cihetle adeta izhar-ı şekavetle böyle birçok fesadların hudüsüne bais olan bir habisin 
müstehak olduğu şaki namıyla yad edilmesi iktiza edeceğinden bundan böyle gerek her 
türlü muharriratta ve gerek Türkçe ve Arapça ve Fransızca gazetelerin cümlesinde 
merkumun şaki namıyla yad olunması zımmındada icab edenlere tenbihat-ı ekide-i 
katiyye icrası mukteza-i emr-i ferman hazret-i padişahiden olmağla ol babda emr-ı 
ferman hazret-i veliyu’l emrundur.”    
 
BOA, İ. MTZ.(05), 23/1115, no: 2, 27 Muharrem 1301 (28 November 1883). 
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BOA, Y.PRK.UM. 6/27, 11 Muharrem 1301 (12 November 1883). 
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“Kurna-i cenab-ı şehriyariden saadetlu Besim Efendi hazretlerine 
Saadetlu efendim hazretleri 19 teşrin-i evvel 99 tarihliyle cevaben çektiğim 
telgrafname-i çakeride arz ve beyan ettiğim risalelerin Türkçe bir nüsha-i 
muharreresiyle nusuh-ı matbua-i arabiyesinden bir kıtasını manzur-ı ali buyrulmak 
üzere leffen arz ve takdim eylerim bu risale matbaa-i vilayette harfiyyen tab ettirilmiş 
ve yine de hafi surette olarak neşr edilmek üzere bulunmuştur risale-i merkumenin tertib 
ve tercümesiyle tabı dört gün içinde husule getirilmiş olmakla öyle mükemmeliyeti 
iddia olunamaz ise de kavm-i arabın iki seneden beri tecrübe olunan mizaç-ı efkarına 
nazaran  Bu kadarca bir şeyden tesirat-ı külliye-i nafia husulü şüphesiz göründüğünden 
bundan gayet mahrem vesaitle  Mısır ve Şam ve Yemen ve Irak ve Sudan taraflarına 
nusuh-ı kafiye irsal ve neşri teşebbüsünde bulunuyorum risalenin mündericatı 
mütemehdinin neşriyat vakasının mahv-ı tesiratı yolunda icab-ı hal ve maslahata tevfik 
edilmek istenilmiş ve istitla olunan  ahvale tevfik edildiği zannında bulunulmuş olduğu 
cihetle bunu kablel istizan tertib ve tab’a vaki olan cüret-i bendeganemden dolayı affımı 
istit’a ve isaf-ı istida-yı kemteranem emrinde delalet-i aliye kerimanelerini temenna 
eylerim her halde emr ferman hazreti men lehulemrundur 11 muharrem sene 1301  ve 
20 teşrini evvel 99. Vali ve Kumandan-ı Hicaz” 	  
BOA, Y.PRK.UM. 6/27, 11 Muharrem 1301 (12 November 1883).  
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BOA, Y.. PRK.ASK, 50/47, 8 Muharrem 1306 (14 September 1888). 
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“Hartum’da bulunan mütemehdi Abdullah’ın “sultan-us Sudan” unvanıyla bi-t’telkib 
ilan-ı keyfiyet olunması sevahil-i hicaziyenin nezaketini taz’if eyleyeceğinden sevahil-i 
mezkurenin muhafazası içün irsali Hicaz vilayetinden arz ve inhâ olunan üç-dört küçük 
vapurun serian tehiyyesiyle gönderilmek üzere atebe-i ulyaya arz-ı keyfiyet olunması 
vilayet-i müşarünileyhadan bu kere dahi telgrafla vaki olan isti’cal üzerine te’kiden emr 
ü ferman buyurulduğu şeref-vürud eden tezkire-i aliyye-i asafanelerinde işar 
buyurulmuştur. Basra içün tertib ve techiz olunmuş olan iki kıt’a vapur Basra 
sevahilince derkar olan ehemmiyet ve elzemiyet ve ol babda canib-i bab-ı âliden vuku’ 
bulan işarâta mebni ledel-arz şeref sunuh buyurulan emr ü ferman-ı keramet-i unvan 
hazret-i şehinşahi mantuk-ı âlisi vechile oraya gönderilmek üzere bulunmuş ve hal-i 
hazırda elde techiz edilmiş başka vapur kalmamıştır. Mamafih zaten Cidde’de beş kıt’a 
süfün-i hümayun bulunduğu gibi orası içün müretteb olub ba-irade-i seniyye-i hazret-i 
hilafet-penahi muhtacin-i hüccacı almak üzere gönderilen Paris vapuru da ba’del-avde 
yine oraya gönderileceğinden şu halde Cidde’deki vapurun miktarı altı kıtaya baliğ 
olacağına bi’l-arz mütemehdinin harekatından sevahil-i Hicaziye içün endişe edilecek 
bir cihet-i melhuz olsa bile sefâin-i mezkure icab eden nukat-ı mühimmeye taksim ve 
tayin olunduğu halde emr-i muhafazaya kifayet edebileceğine nazaran sevahil-i 
mezkure için yeniden vapur tertip ve irsaline pek de lüzum görülmemekte ise de 
mamafih oraya sefine irsali sureti emr-ü ferman buyrulduğu takdirde ahşap Ertuğrul 
Firkateyn-i hümayun mücehhez ve müheyya bulunduğundan onun Girid’e ve Girid’de 
bulunan Fırat ganbot-ı hümayununa dahi Cidde’ye irsali münasib olacağının ve bu 
babda emr-ü irade-i kerâmet-i âliye-i hazret-i şehinşahi her ne suretle şerefrîz-sünuh ve 
sudur buyurulur ise mantuk-ı âlisi infaz kılınacağının arz ve ifadesine ibtidar kılındı. Ol 
babda emr-ü ferman Hazret-i menlehül-emrindir. Fi 8 Muharrem sene 1306 (1888). 
Nazır-ı bahriye.” 
BOA, Y.. PRK.ASK, 50/47, 8 Muharrem 1306 (14 September 1888). 
 
 
 
 
	  	  
	   105	  
 
 
 
 
BOA, İ.MTZ(05) 23/1096,  24 Cemaziyelevvel 1300 ( 2 April 1883). 
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“Sudan’a sevk olunmak üzere hıdiv-i Mısırın bazı memuriyeti hafiyye vesatet ve 
marifetleri ile Anadolu tarafına asakir-i muvazzafa tahrir ve celb etmek teşebbüs altında 
bulunduğu vasıl-ı semi-i ali olduğu gibi yine Sudana gönderilecek süvarilerin (?) tahsis 
olunmak üzere Suriye cihetinden dahi hayvan iştirasına teşebbüs olunmuş olmasına 
mebni bu suretle başıbozuk askeri tahrire katan müsaade olunmaması ve hafiyyen 
yazılacak olur ise gönderilmemesi ve bu babda müsamaha olunduğu halde şediden 
mesul olacakları bilinip ona göre hareket olunması hakkında iktiza eden vilayata ve 
geçen gün maruz-ı huzur-ı ali kılınan tezkere-i samiye-i fehimaneleri üzerine teftiş-i 
askeri komisyonunda bu hususa dair bir karar verilinceye kadar Suriyeden vesair 
vilayatda bu suretle olunması esb iştirasına müsaade olunmaması vesayasını havi Suriye 
vilayetine ve iktiza edenlere ba telgraf tebligat-ı ekide-i müessere ifası hususunun 
dahiliye nezaret-i celilesine havalesi ve bu babda tahkikat-ı mahsusa icra 
buyurulacağının daha yazılacak telgraflara ilaveten tefhim ve ibnası muktezay-ı emr-i 
ferman hazret-i padişahiden bulunmuş olmağla ol babda emr-i ferman hazret-i 
veliyulemrundur. Fi 24 Cemaziyelevvel 1300 ve fi 21 Mart 1299” 
BOA, İ.MTZ(05) 23/1096,  24 Cemaziyelevvel 1300 ( 2 April 1883). 
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BOA, A. MTZ. (05) 14B/ 85   28 Kanun-i sani 1314 (10 December 1898). 
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“Mısır fevkalade komiserliğinde varid olan şifreli telgrafname suretidir. 
Lord Cromeri’in geçen gün Hartum’da meşayih-i urbâna şayana dikkat bir nutk 
verdi içinde en mühim noktalar zirde arz: olunur şu iki bayrağın yan yana bulunması 
badema kraliçe ile hidiv tarafından müştereken hükm ve idare olunacağınıza 
alemetdir. Serdar ikisinden de iktidar-ı kamileyi haiz olduğundan hakimeniz işte 
yanınızdadır. Andan başkasına müracaat olunmayacak ve her işiniz onın tarafından 
tesviye olunacaktır. Kraliçe her hükümdardan ziyade Müslüman teb‘aya malikdir. 
Sizler de onlar gibi bahtiyar kalursunuz. Artık eski zulmetlerden kurtuldunuz. Din 
ve …dan kat‘an bahs etmemiştir. Nutk aynen bi’t-telgraf Avrupa’ya gitti. Ol 
babda... Fi 28 kanun-i Evvel 1314 
Ahmed Muhtar” 
 
BOA, A. MTZ. (05) 14B/ 85   28 Kanun-i sani 1314 (10 December 1898). 
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BOA. Y.MTV. 36/88    23 Rebiyulahir 1306 ( 27 December 1888) 
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“Devletlü efendim hazretleri 
Mütemehdi namına sim mecidiyeyi takliden yapılmış ve Hicazda ele geçirilerek bu kere 
nezarete götürülmüş olan bir parça gümüş aynen ve leffen arz ve takdim kılındı. Ol 
babda emr-u ferman hazret-i veliyu’l emrundur. Fi 26 rebiyü’l ahir sene 1306 ve fi 15 
kanun-ı evvel sene 1304.Telgraf ve Posta Nazırı” 
BOA. Y.MTV. 36/88    23 Rebiyulahir 1306 ( 27 December 1888) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	  	  
	   111	  
 
 
BOA, İ.MTZ(05) 29/1584,  10 Ramazan 1311 (17 March 1894)  
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“Kongo hükümetinin Sudana doğru ilerlemek istediği noktaları mısıra taalluku olup 
olmadığının işarı Muhtar paşa hazretlerine yazılması üzerine evvel emirde sudanın bir 
kıta haritası bab-ı alice hidiviyet-i Mısıriyeden talep edilerek suretinin kendisine irsali 
münasib olacağı ifadesini şamil cevaben gelen tahriratın takdimine ve böyle bir 
haritanın gönderilmesi hidiviyet-i müşarünileyhaya tebliğ edildiğine dair enmile piray-ı 
tazim olan fi 8 ramazan 311 tarihli tezkere-i hususiye-i sedaratpenahileri melfufuyla 
lede’l takdim meşmul-u negah-i ali olmuş ve sudan kıtası sahibsiz ve hal-i araziden 
madud olmayıp firdevsi aşiyan sultan Abdülaziz han hazretlerinin devr-i saltanatlarında 
büyük pederi ismail paşa hazretlerinin hidiviyeti hengamında zikr olunan Sudan 
kıtasında Darfur ve hartum vesair mevaki ba idare-i seniye sevk edilen asakir-i 
Mısıriye-yi şahane marifetiyle feth ve zabt ile taht-ı tasarruf-u idareye idhal edilerek 
oralarda mehakim tesis olunmuş ve ahalisine vergi tarh edilerek kendilerinden asker 
alınmış velhasıl oraları mısıra ilhak ve ilave olunarak keyfiyet-i ilhak hidiviyet-i 
mısıriye ısdar ve ihsan olunan feramin-i alide tasrih ve beyan edilmiş olduğu malum 
bulunduğu halde kıta-i mezkureye  arasıra bazı taraflardan ve Kongo cihetinden tecavüz 
edilmek istenilmekde olduğundan büyükpeder ve pederi zamanlarında bu suretle 
tasarruf ve idare altına alınmış olan mahal-i mezkureye vuku bulan tecavüzata meydan 
verilmeyerek mısır idaresine alınan ve fermanlarda musarrah olan mahal ve arazinin 
velhasıl hudud-ı mısıriyenin muhafazasına itina ve dikkat edilmesi luzumunun ve lede’l 
hace buraca dahi düvel-i ecnebiye nezdinde teşebbüsat-ı mukteziyede bulunulacağının 
hidiv mısır paşa hazretlerine ba tahrirat tebliğ ve işar ve buralarının beyan ve tebliğiyle 
komiserlik  vezaifi bu nokta-i nazardan ifa etmesi hususunun dahi Muhtar paşa 
hazretlerine izbar olunması mukteza-i irade-i seniye-i hazret-i hilafetpenahiden 
bulunmuş olmağla ol babda emr-u ferman hazreti veliyul emrundur. Fi 10 ramazan sene 
1311 ve fi 5 mart sene 1310  Serkatibi hazret-i şehriyari Süreyyadır.”	  	  	  
BOA, İ.MTZ(05) 29/1584,  10 Ramazan 1311 (17 March 1894)  
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